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Preface
This book has been a long time in the making. The seeds were sown in
2009 when I started researching an M.A. dissertation on melancholia and
depressed mood in Wilhelm Griesinger’s work, and quickly realised that
there was a much bigger story to be told about what happened to the
melancholia concept in nineteenth-century psychiatry. This story became
the focus of a Ph.D. thesis on which this book is based.
Melancholia is a topic that has attracted vast attention from writers
across disciplines and genres, spanning a range of perspectives. At the
same time, much existing work on melancholia is underpinned by a
common theme: the belief that melancholy is a timeless human emotion,
a phenomenon that has remained largely constant as our societies have
changed, a shared experience that connects us to our ancestors of past
historical periods. Seen in this way, melancholy is a core feature of
humanity, as is its pathological mutation, melancholia. To understand
melancholia, then, is to understand something about what it means to
be human: to suffer without apparent cause.
As this is the context in which this book is written, and as it will
inevitably be read against the backdrop of a large catalogue of works
on melancholia and melancholy, it is only right that I confess that my
interest in this topic and my original motivation for exploring it are less
ambitious and more mundane than those of many of the writers who
have sought to make sense of this ubiquitous yet elusive feature of the
human condition. My initial interest in mood disorders arose in relation
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to the politics of the pharmaceutical industry and the medicalisation of
psychological distress that provides a lucrative market for drug companies.
I once offered this explanation in a scholarship interview, and it didn’t go
down very well. It was not, it seemed, how or why one is supposed to
do history. It was, however, the truth, though that original motivation
has since been superseded by a more fundamental desire to understand
how knowledge in the psy disciplines is produced, in particular relating to
psychiatric classification.
But I was never particularly interested in exploring melancholy as
a feeling. In the field of the history of psychiatry, the question that
often looms—usually unspoken—over our heads when we talk about
our research is that of personal experience. Do you write about melan-
cholia because of your own struggles with pathological low mood? The
short answer to that is no. My interest is more broadly in the produc-
tion of psychiatric knowledge about people, how our emotions, thoughts,
and actions become symptoms of psychiatric diagnoses. Depression has
become ubiquitous, more so than any other psychiatric condition—the
WHO considers it to be a leading cause of disability worldwide and the
prescription and consumption of antidepressant medication continue to
rise every year. I wanted to understand how we got to this point. But
when I delved into the world of historical scholarship on depression and
melancholia I soon discovered that a significant piece of the puzzle was
missing.
The more I read, the more evident it became that something funda-
mental occurred in the nineteenth century. Most writers on the topic,
whether they subscribe to a narrative of continuity or one of change,
recognise that today’s Major Depressive Disorder doesn’t correspond to
past conceptions of melancholia. But nineteenth-century melancholia was
not only significantly different from clinical depression as understood
today, it was equally different from the various forms of traditional melan-
choly madness that came before. As German Berrios has noted, a shift
occurred that was about more than just a change in language.1 The recon-
ceptualisation of melancholia in the nineteenth century facilitated the later
emergence of clinical depression in the twentieth, but it also paved the
1German E. Berrios, “Melancholia and Depression during the Nineteenth Century: A
Conceptual History,” British Journal of Psychiatry 153 (1988): 298–304.
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way for the creation of other affect-based diagnostic categories, such as
bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder, and anxiety disorders.
The story of how melancholia was reconfigured along biomedical lines
is not, then, only the story of a specific diagnosis, or state of mind, it is
also the story of how the modern concept ‘mood disorder’ was created.
That story didn’t begin on asylum wards, but with the rise of a new
discipline: experimental physiology. The epistemological framework that
was created in the early nineteenth century to explain the internal opera-
tion of emotions and ideas continues to form the basis for how we think
about psychological events today, and consequently informs the direction
of current research into the mind and brain. If we want to understand
how we arrived at this point in history where ‘depression’ is an illness that
can be treated with psychotropic medication and therapeutic strategies
aimed at teaching us to ‘regulate’ our emotions, we must first understand
how the idea of disordered mood as a medical condition became possible
in the first place. And we must also understand the relationship between
statistics and diagnostic practices, another distinctly modern development
that is crucial to mapping the creation not just of mood disorders but of
most modern psychiatric diagnoses.
This book, then, is an attempt to redress a significant gap in the history
of depression and melancholia, and of mood disorders more generally.
It arises from a desire to understand how knowledge that is absolutely
fundamental to the human experience in the twenty-first century was
created and made real. So, I didn’t come to this topic because of an
interest in melancholy as a feeling or a personal experience with depres-
sion. But of course, an interest in psychiatric knowledge is an interest
in knowledge about human distress and suffering, and in this way it
concerns us all. Most if not all of us will experience psychological distress
at some point in our lives (whether or not that distress is pathologised
and diagnosed). And what I found once I immersed myself in the archival
records of Victorian asylums was that while I don’t necessarily relate to
twenty-first-century descriptions of clinical depression, some of the ways
in which nineteenth-century asylum patients diagnosed with melancholia
expressed their distress resonated with me deeply. Many Victorian melan-
cholics appeared to display ‘symptoms’ that are largely consistent with
the key criteria of depression today, but equally common were profound
delusions, and in more severe cases hallucinations were not unusual.
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This led me to start asking questions about our current separation of affec-
tive (mood) and cognitive (schizo) disorders, which began in the nine-
teenth century and was cemented in the twentieth. That story is yet to be
told, and doesn’t form part of this book. But it looms in the background
and illustrates one of the most important differences between nineteenth-
century melancholia and clinical depression, in that delusions and hallu-
cinations are only a secondary and much less talked about feature of the
latter.
Finally, it should be emphasised that there are many ways in which one
can write the history of nineteenth-century melancholia. This book is an
attempt to write it as the history of medical and psychiatric conceptions of
what melancholia was—and became—in this period. In other words, this
book is not a search for answers about what melancholia feels (or felt)
like or why people are apparently afflicted by it. Nor is it an attempt to
right historical wrongs in psychiatry by demonstrating the timelessness of
melancholia as a medical condition. And it is not a critique of the ubiquity
of the clinical depression concept. These are all important issues, which
to various extents form the context for the present story, but they have
been, and are still being, comprehensively discussed elsewhere. This book
is the story of how the first modern mood disorder was created.
Why is this important? There are undoubtedly many reasons, but the
most fundamental is this: ‘knowledge about human beings changes what
people are’.2 An historical perspective on such knowledge is crucial. It
allows us to understand where it comes from, how it emerged, how it
operates, and most importantly how it becomes central to our lives. It
shows us that such knowledge is not permanent or universal. Mood disor-
ders constitute a particular, historically specific way of making sense of
and experiencing emotional distress. What shedding light on this histor-
ical specificity does is show us that the existence of this framework is not
inevitable. It’s very much real today—people are diagnosed with mood
disorders and experience themselves as suffering from these conditions—
but it hasn’t always been. This way of understanding emotional distress
is neither right nor wrong; it can be both helpful and harmful. What is
important is that we are equipped with the tools to think critically about
its place in our lives and the work that it does, and to equally allow for
2Roger Smith, Being Human: Historical Knowledge and the Creation of Human Nature
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 8.
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different frameworks and ways of experience. This, in my view, is one of
the most important tasks of history: to remind us of the impermanence of
human nature, and that we have the power to fundamentally change the
way we understand our inner selves and the world around us.
Durham, UK Åsa Jansson
Acknowledgements
I’m indebted to many people and institutions for their help and support
in the research and writing of this book. Thanks first of all to Molly
Beck at Palgrave Macmillan for her enthusiastic interest in and support
for the book, as well as to Maeve Sinnott for continuous support and
guidance during the writing process. Thanks also to the editors of the
Mental Health in Historical Perspective series, Catharine Coleborne and
Matthew Smith, and to the anonymous peer reviewers for their helpful
comments on the proposal and manuscript.
This book would not have been possible without a generous scholar-
ship from the Wellcome Trust (grant number 092988/Z/10/Z), which
allowed me to research and write the thesis on which the book is based.
I’m also grateful to my colleagues and friends at the University of London
whose feedback at various stages of this project in its early years was instru-
mental in shaping the story that eventually became the present book, in
particular my Ph.D. supervisors Thomas Dixon and Rhodri Hayward, as
well as Sarah Chaney, Chris Millard, Jennifer Wallis, Tom Quick, Stephen
Jacyna, and Sonu Shamdasani. I’m also especially grateful to Felicity
Callard for continuous support and advice over the years.
Thanks also to my colleagues at the Institute for Medical Humani-
ties and Hearing the Voice at Durham University, in particular Angela
Woods, Sarah Atkinson, Victoria Patton, Ben Alderson-Day, Chris Cook,
Charles Fernyhough, Kaja Mitrenga, and Mary Robson. Working in a
collaborative and interdisciplinary context over the last few years has had
xiii
xiv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
a profound impact on my approach to history, and has led me to ask
sometimes difficult and uncomfortable questions about the role of histor-
ical research and historical perspective in the medical humanities, and
more fundamentally in our common endeavour to understand and redress
human suffering.
I’m also grateful to the following people for feedback, advice, and/or
fruitful conversations that have provided insight and guidance over the
years since I first began researching this topic: Ingrid Lindstedt, Roger
Smith, Rob Iliffe, Roger Cooter, Rebecca O’Neal, Victoria O’Callaghan,
Yewande Okuleye, and Eric Engstrom, as well as everyone who has
offered questions and comments on seminar and conference talks based
on different aspects of this research.
Finally, my deepest gratitude is due to the people whose unconditional
love and support have kept me (relatively) sane through the various stages
of this journey: Annika, Annelie, Britta, Melek, Becky, Shannon, Anna,
Danny, Sophie, Hanna, and Olly. Thank you.
Contents
1 Introduction: Disordered Mood as Historical Problem 1
2 The Scientific Foundation of Disordered Mood 35
3 The Classification of Melancholia
in Mid-Nineteenth-Century British Medicine 63
4 Melancholia and the New Biological Psychiatry 89
5 Statistics, Classification, and the Standardisation
of Melancholia 123
6 Diagnosing Melancholia in the Victorian Asylum 173





Introduction: DisorderedMood as Historical
Problem
If mania and melancholia took on the face that we still recognise today, it is
not because we have learnt to ‘open our eyes’ to their real nature during the
course of the centuries; and it is not because we have purified our perceptive
processes until they became transparent. It is because in the experience of
madness, these concepts were integrated around specific qualitative themes
that have lent them their own unity and given them a significant coherence,
finally rendering them perceptible.1
Michel Foucault, History of Madness (1961)
In the summer of 1874, Moses B., a young doctor, was brought into
Edinburgh Royal Asylum at Morningside. According to his family, he
had become so intent on taking his own life that they saw no other
option but to have him certified as insane and admitted to the hospital.
One of the doctors who examined him in his home had written in the
medical certificate that Moses suffered from severe ‘delusions’, which
had him convinced that ‘his soul is lost, that he ought to die’ and that
‘he is committing great sins’. When Moses arrived at Morningside, the
attending physician noted in the patient journal that the young man’s
‘depression’ was ‘considerable’, and made a note of his ‘suicidal tenden-
cies’, which, based on family testimony, consisted in ‘taking belladonna,
refusing food, &c’. Moses B. was subsequently diagnosed with melan-
cholia, with emphasis given to his pronounced ‘suicidal tendencies’, which
required that he be placed under close observation.
© The Author(s) 2021
Å Jansson, From Melancholia to Depression,




For the experienced medical staff at Morningside, diagnosing Moses
was a straightforward matter. Melancholia was, at the time, a common
affliction among patients who arrived in the asylum. Its symptoms were
considered to be clearly recognisable and, according to the institution’s
chief physician, Thomas Clouston, the disease ran ‘a somewhat definite
course, like a fever’.2 But what would a twenty-first-century psychiatrist
or general practitioner make of a patient like Moses Black? Would they
conclude that he suffered from Major Depressive Disorder, prescribe him
a course of antidepressants, and put him on the waiting list for Cogni-
tive Behavioural Therapy? Or would his thoughts and actions—believing
himself to have sinned against God and attempting to poison himself—
appear unfamiliar to today’s clinicians? These questions speak to a more
profound, ontological concern: is clinical depression a timeless condition?
In other words, have people always been depressed?
I will return to this question momentarily. Whether or not depression
has always been a feature of the human condition, if current statistics
are to be believed we are, as a society, becoming more depressed with
each passing year. According to the World Health Organisation, clinical
depression is now the world’s leading cause of disability. When a new
generation of antidepressant drugs, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors
(SSRIs), flooded the market in the late twentieth century, one scholar
suggested that we had entered an ‘antidepressant era’.3 In the 1990s,
SSRIs became what benzodiazepines were to the sixties—the universal
cure for unwanted negative emotions. A common question in response to
these developments, which has been posed by scholars across the natural
and human sciences, is whether rates of depression have increased, or
whether we have become less tolerant of emotional distress, or simply
more likely to denote it as a medical problem with a chemical solution.
It has been suggested that the apparent rise in depression is primarily
due to a growing tendency to over-diagnose ‘normal sadness’.4 Others
argue that there has been a real increase in the symptoms of genuine
Major Depressive Disorder since the early twentieth century, leading one
observer to conclude that depression is, like obesity and type-II diabetes,
a ‘disease of modernity’ caused by humanity’s collective derailment from
our true evolutionary path, suggesting that ‘humans have dragged a body
with a long hominid history into an overfed, malnourished, sedentary,
sunlight-deficient, sleep-deprived, competitive, inequitable, and socially-
isolating environment with dire consequences’.5
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However, a different school of thought exists that has found support
both in clinical circles and among some humanities scholars: that, histori-
cally, two types of depression have coexisted.6 One is a mild to moderate
form of mood disorder, what is usually meant by the term ‘clinical depres-
sion’ today: low mood and sadness, often accompanied by sleeplessness,
appetite disruption, and anxiety. The other is an endogenous form that
is more than a mental disorder, it is an illness where the entire system
is, in effect, ‘pressed down’, resulting in retarded speech and slow bodily
movement. This illness often manifests with delusions (psychosis) and can
in its most severe forms leave sufferers in a catatonic stupor. This condi-
tion is usually referred to as psychotic or melancholic depression. Existing
research on this type of depression holds the promise of something that
has eluded psychiatry since its infancy: a mood disorder with a trace-
able and measurable biological basis. Endocrine psychiatry indicates that
individuals who fit the external symptomatology for melancholic depres-
sion show similar results when subjected to a Dexamethasone Suppression
Test (DST) measuring the level of cortisol in the blood. Such research
is, however, marginalised in the current neuro-focused climate where
neurotransmitters are conceptualised as the cause, effect, and cure for
depression, and where the major diagnostic manuals retain a descriptive
focus. Another key feature of melancholic depression is its perceived resis-
tance to standard antidepressant treatments such as SSRIs and behavioural
therapies; instead, it is argued that patients tend to respond to a combi-
nation of electroconvulsive therapy and atypical (tricyclic) antidepressants.
In recent years, a number of scholars and clinicians have sought to insti-
tute this type of depression into diagnostic literature as an illness in its
own right: melancholia.7
This drive to formally institute melancholia into psychiatric diagnostic
literature is presented as an attempted ‘resurrection’ of a condition that
has existed throughout human history and been documented by physi-
cians as far back as Hippocrates. This melancholia, its proponents argue,
‘lends itself to definition as an independent entity in the classification’ and
‘is consistent with centuries of observation’.8 It is constituted as universal
and timeless, the ‘real’ depression, whereas our time’s standard clinical
depression is seen to have more in common with the nervous disorders
of the early modern period or neurasthenia in the nineteenth century.
Authors beyond the psy disciplines who have adopted this view constitute
a broad church, including historians, philosophers, and social scientists,
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and their work is prominent within existing scholarship on the history of
melancholia.9
Max Fink and Michael Taylor, two psychiatrists who are at the fore-
front of the campaign to resurrect melancholia, argue that this disease
is ‘consistently’ described in ‘psychopathological literature’ as ‘a severe
illness of acute onset with unremitting moods of apprehension and
gloom, psychomotor disturbance, and vegetative signs. Psychosis, inter-
mittent mania, and suicide intent are prominent features’.10 What is
most noteworthy about this is not the definition itself, but that the ‘psy-
chopathological literature’ referred to is from the mid-nineteenth century.
Indeed, while those attempting to ‘resurrect’ melancholia assert that this
illness has existed since the beginning of time, the disease they are seeking
to revive appears to be an updated version of a diagnostic category specific
to nineteenth-century psychological medicine.
What, then, is this nineteenth-century melancholia that some writers
are attempting to bring back to life? Is it a timeless illness finally discov-
ered and described by nineteenth-century doctors? It would certainly be
possible to write the history of melancholic depression as the history of
a medical condition that has existed since the dawn of humanity, and
which was finally given an accurate scientific description in the nineteenth
century. But this narrative ignores a number of important factors. First of
all, the very idea of a ‘mood disorder’ was not possible before a modern,
scientific model of emotion was created. Secondly, melancholic depression
was not suddenly discovered with the help of modern medical science.
Rather, the meaning of melancholia as a medical condition changed—
in other words, melancholia was reconceptualised as a modern mood
disorder in the nineteenth century. This process required significant intel-
lectual work, and was made possible by the appropriation of experimental
physiology to talk about unseen and unmeasurable mental phenomena.
The model of emotion that emerged in the early-to-mid-nineteenth
century was not discovered, it was made—originally as an analogy of
sensory-motor action, which eventually became a scientific concept in
its own right. There was nothing inevitable about this development; as
one scholar has suggested, ‘implications had to be constructed rather than
merely extrapolated’.11 Finally, as will be demonstrated in the chapters
that follow, the melancholia that was described by nineteenth-century
physicians and diagnosed in asylum patients had a distinct symptoma-
tology, which does not seamlessly correspond to either the milder or the
‘melancholic’ depressions that are diagnosed today.
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There exists, then, a different history of melancholia and depression,
one that is yet to be told. It is this history that is the focus of this book. It
maps the first decades of melancholia as a biomedical disease, but rather
than showing how this timeless illness was finally discovered and correctly
described by modern psychiatry, this book tells the story of how the idea
of a ‘mood disorder’ was created in the nineteenth century and subse-
quently made into a possible and plausible medical concept. This was
a development that to some extent occurred simultaneously in several
European countries; however, important national differences existed. For
instance, French physicians were more concerned with melancholia as one
stage of ‘circular insanity’ (the other being mania) than their German or
British counterparts; indeed, British physicians held that cases of circular
insanity were rare among their patients. Such geographical differences
speak to the malleability of mental disorders not just across time, but also
across cultural or linguistic contexts. This book is primarily concerned
with melancholia in the British context, for three reasons. First of all,
melancholia was consistently diagnosed in British asylums throughout
the second half of the nineteenth century, and the wealth of asylum
records and statistical reports, as well as prolific diagnostic literature on
melancholia, offer an optimal space for interrogating this medical cate-
gory. In many asylums across the country, melancholia was the second
most common diagnosis after mania. From the mid-nineteenth century
onward, the rate increased gradually, and at the same time, the diag-
nosis was gradually standardised. This coherence across asylums as far
apart as Edinburgh and Sussex was in part the result of a standardised
regime imposed by the Lunacy Commission from the 1840s onward,
as well as growing professional interaction between asylum physicians
through meetings and publications. Secondly, Germany is often presented
in historical narratives as the cradle of modern psychiatric knowledge
and the most important influence on contemporary diagnostics. This is
in part due to the significance of Emil Kraepelin’s work and the promi-
nent place awarded to his nosology in both historical and contemporary
texts on psychiatric diagnostics. However, while Kraepelin’s division of
mental disorders into dementia praecox and manic-depressive insanity at
the turn of the twentieth century had a fundamental impact on the subse-
quent classification of insanity, his diagnostic system was the product and
articulation of decades of accumulated knowledge, much of which origi-
nated within British psychological medicine. In particular, one of the most
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crucial developments of modern psychiatry and the focus of this book—
the creation of ‘mood disorder’ as a medical category—can in large
part be attributed to the intellectual context of British asylum medicine.
Finally, while a truly inter- or transcultural history of melancholia in this
period would no doubt be a fascinating one, such an approach would limit
the possibility for an in-depth study of its transformation. At the same
time, however, the making of melancholia as a modern mood disorder
in Victorian medicine did not occur in a national vacuum. The uptake of
German and, to an extent, French medical knowledge into British psycho-
logical medicine was instrumental, and consequently forms part of the
present story.
This book begins with early nineteenth-century experimental physi-
ology and ends in the Victorian asylum at the turn of the twentieth
century. Victorian physicians conceptualised melancholia as a form of
affective insanity in which the intellect was left wholly or partially intact.
During European psychiatry’s foundational century biological disease
models came to dominate, underpinned by increasingly refined medico-
scientific technology, specifically microscopy. Physicians were able to ‘see’
into the brains of deceased patients in ways never before possible, and
eagerly searched for cerebral lesions to support biomedical theories of
mental disease. Contrary to one historian’s suggestion that ‘neuropsy-
chiatry never really flourished in Britain’,12 Victorian medical psycholo-
gists embraced neurological explanatory frameworks for mental disease.
However, despite the spread and growing sophistication of psychiatric
autopsies in Europe, some forms of madness consistently failed to turn
up visible changes to brain tissue.13 This was particularly the case with
milder forms of insanity where the emotions were seen as the chief site
of pathology. In a biomedical context, such illness came to be explained
primarily through functional physiological (rather than structural anatom-
ical) language.
In 1883, Scottish asylum physician Thomas Clouston defined melan-
cholia as ‘mental pain, emotional depression, and sense of ill-being,
usually more intense than in melancholy, with loss of self-control, or
insane delusions, or uncontrollable impulses towards suicide, with no
proper capacity left to follow ordinary avocations, with some of the
ordinary interests of life destroyed, and generally with marked bodily
symptoms’.14 At this time, melancholia was not only one of the most
common forms of mental disease diagnosed in British asylums, it was also
one of the most standardised and homogenous diagnoses, both in terms
1 INTRODUCTION: DISORDERED MOOD AS HISTORICAL PROBLEM 7
of a coherent symptom picture and an internal biological explanatory
model. Yet only a few decades earlier, the nosological status of melan-
cholia in British (and European) medicine was unclear and unstable, with
some of the most prominent medical writers trying to do away with this
category altogether. Its symptomatology was similarly far more diverse
and inconsistent in the first half of the nineteenth century, often overlap-
ping with other conditions such as monomania and moral insanity. Thus,
while the term melancholia had been used to denote a form of illness
or madness in medical literature since antiquity, the biomedical model of
melancholia that emerged in the mid-nineteenth century was historically
new and conceptually different from any earlier meanings of the term.
Two developments in particular were foundational to this new model
of melancholia. The first was the uptake of physiological language and
concepts into psychological medicine. In the early decades of the nine-
teenth century, physicians began to appropriate language from experi-
mental physiology to speak about the perceived internal operations of
ideas and emotions. Such models became central to the development
of modern psychiatric concepts, particularly that of disordered mood.
The emergence of what became known as physiological psychology and
its significance for mid-to-late nineteenth-century conceptions of mind
have been considered in detail elsewhere.15 The role of physiological
models of mental pathology in the creation of modern mood disorders
is, however, largely absent from the history of psychiatry. The reconfig-
uration of melancholia as a biomedical disease and a form of affective
insanity was dependent upon the creation of ‘disordered emotion’ as a
medical category. It follows that in order to adequately map the evolution
of nineteenth-century melancholia one must trace how the idea of disor-
dered and pathological emotionality was constituted and appropriated by
medical psychologists to speak about mental disease.
The second key development was the institutionalisation of medical
statistics together with a standardisation of recording practices in asylums
across Britain. Following the creation of the Lunacy Commission in
1845, diagnostic practices were increasingly carried out within an admin-
istrative framework heavily reliant upon asylum statistics. While histo-
rians of psychiatry have made considerable use of asylum statistics in
constructing various narratives, both local and on a wider geograph-
ical scale, the relationship between such numerical data and the creation
of an increasing number of diagnostic categories in nineteenth-century
psychological medicine has been curiously neglected. As I demonstrate
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in Chapters 5 and 6 of this book, statistical and recording practices
were crucial in shaping melancholia as a modern diagnostic category.
In sum, nineteenth-century melancholia was constituted through the
interplay between the language of physiological psychology, statistical
practices, and clinical diagnostics, which together facilitated the creation
of a modern biomedical disease concept.
Central to the developments described above was the use of metaphor-
ical language to explain mental operations.16 As a form of affective
insanity, melancholia was a disease perceived to rarely leave internal
marks on patients’ brain tissue. Through the application of metaphors
borrowed from experimental physiology, such as ‘irritation’, ‘reflex’, and
‘tone’, disordered emotion could be explained as a defective physiological
process. Moreover, the biomedical language of physiology contributed to
a conceptual and linguistic shift in the description of external ‘symptoms’
of melancholia. Symptoms such as ‘depression’ and ‘mental pain’ (or ‘psy-
chalgia’) rose to prominence in the second half of the nineteenth century.
These terms have a history that pre-dates modern scientific medicine.
Within the framework of a physiologically constituted model of mental
pathology, older terms were imbued with new meanings. The language
used by medical writers to explain mental phenomena is central to the
present story, and the semantic ambivalence of medico-psychological
terminology will gradually unfold in the subsequent chapters.
A Note on Language
While much of the medical and scientific terminology of the nineteenth
century sounds familiar to the twenty-first reader, familiarity does not
equate to sameness. This book attempts to strike a balance between
contextual and historical sensitivity on the one hand, and rendering Victo-
rian concepts intelligible in twenty-first-century language on the other.
With that in mind, two words in particular that feature throughout this
book warrant clarification.
1. Biomedical. Geneticists Craig Venter and Daniel Cohen have
referred to the twenty-first century as ‘the century of biology’.17 This
pronouncement is perhaps a little premature, but what is more certain is
that, over the last century and a half, biology has become central to how
we understand ourselves and the world around us. In its modern meaning,
that is, the way it gradually came to be used from the nineteenth century
onward, biology is, broadly speaking, ‘the science of life’.18 The scientists
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and doctors whose work is discussed in this book were concerned with
the study of living organisms, a category that included human beings. It
follows that many of the medical events and phenomena described in this
book are referred to as biological. The organism–environment dualism
emerged in this period and emotion was believed to be produced in the
brain through the interaction—and disequilibrium—between the two. To
describe melancholia in the mid-to-late nineteenth century as biological
would, however, suggest only part of the picture. The condition was
facilitated by the fusion of the new experimental sciences with medical
knowledge, and is consequently referred to here as biomedical .
Biomedicine and its adjective did not come into use in the English
language until the 1920s,19 in other words, some two decades after
the conclusion of the present story. Why, then, use it to describe
nineteenth-century melancholia in a narrative that explicitly emphasises
the importance of historical context and specificity? Following Clarke
et al., I use ‘biomedical’ to denote ‘the increasingly biological scientific
aspects of the practices of clinical medicine’.20 While the term biomedical
belongs to the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the process it refers
to began in the nineteenth. In the mid-to-late nineteenth century, melan-
cholia was reconstituted along biological (primarily physiological) lines,
and it was conceptualised as a disorder of emotion, bringing the latter
within the purview of medical science in new ways. As will be seen in the
story that unfolds, Victorian physicians became increasingly concerned
with non-delusional affective insanity as well as with emotional distur-
bances not considered strictly pathological. This constituted a profound
shift (or shifts) in perceptions of human life, of medicine, and of the
health/illness dichotomy. When I began to research this book, I needed
an adjective for this new melancholia that emerged, one that would
encompass these developments and denote the distinctly modern quality
of this disease concept. Moreover, while this book is concerned with
historical specificity and change, it is just as much about continuity. Specif-
ically, the continuity of a macro-ontology of emotion as a biological
operation (physiological and automated) subject to medical interroga-
tion. This definition of emotion was created through the appropriation of
data from experimental physiology, an area of research that utilised new
technologies and techniques to study the animal body. Situated within
this framework, melancholia was construed in modern, scientific terms
radically different from pre-nineteenth-century descriptions of melancholy
madness. It became, in short, a new disease. Referring to this melancholia
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as ‘biomedical’ is intended to highlight this significant conceptual shift, in
language familiar to the twenty-first-century reader.
2. Depression. Scholars writing histories of melancholia or melancholy
have often done so under the assumption that underlying cultural and
temporal differences in language and understanding is a more or less
timeless condition, a mood disorder that corresponds largely to what is
today known as clinical depression. At the same time, as suggested above,
critics of the twenty-first-century model of depression that appears to
grow increasingly inclusive and opaque, have turned to past descriptions
of melancholia in an attempt to show that there exists a core condition—
a severe form of depression usually accompanied by psychosis—that has
remained relatively stable across time, but which is becoming eclipsed by
the current fashion of extending the term depression to an increasingly
wide range of emotional states. These different but overlapping percep-
tions of melancholia and depression make it difficult to write a history of
the former without also taking the latter into consideration. However,
while it is important to acknowledge that a close link exists between
nineteenth-century melancholia and the depressions of the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries, the nature of this relationship should not be taken
for granted. There is no inevitable and uncontested historical trajectory
that leads from one to the other—such a linear development has been
read and written into the histories of melancholia and depression by the
people writing such histories.
‘Depression’ has been used unproblematically to speak about mental
suffering in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.21 This is not simply
a question of historians projecting modern terminology onto a past where
it did not exist. The use of the term depression to denote a low mental
state, such as profound sadness, has featured in the English language at
least since the mid-seventeenth century. In this way, it was a metaphor-
ical description of a mind or soul ‘pressed down’; close in meaning to its
literal, geometrical sense.22 In Victorian psychological medicine, ‘depres-
sion’ was reconstituted within the repertoire of words with strong physi-
ological connotations, such as ‘irritation’, ‘cerebral reflex’, and ‘tone’. In
this context, it was equally used to denote low mood, but in a more literal
(physical) sense than today, since the physiological framework allowed
for a perception of mental functioning as lowered or slowed down. This
phenomenon was often linked to decreased blood flow to the brain, and
consequently impaired cerebral nutrition. Due to the multifaceted history
of the term, it is difficult to pin down the medical roots of depression
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as a psychiatric symptom; however, its nineteenth-century meaning may
have been at least partially appropriated from cardiovascular medicine.23
Depression used in this way became a key symptom of melancholia along-
side ‘mental pain’ and ‘suicidal tendencies’. It was also used as an umbrella
category for various states of affective insanity characterised by low mood,
often referred to as the ‘states of mental depression’, contrasted with the
‘states of mental weakness’ and the ‘states of mental exaltation’. However,
it is important to note that Victorian physicians did not speak of depres-
sion as a mental disease or disorder. Prior to the twentieth century,
depression was a symptom or a unifying descriptive term, but it was
not understood as a specific medical condition. Nineteenth-century usage
of the word was more semantically different from ours than is generally
acknowledged today. The tendency to equate nineteenth-century melan-
cholia with today’s depression can at least in part be attributed to a lack
of contextual and semantic sensitivity displayed by scholars when using
the term depression in pre-twentieth-century narratives.24
Melancholy and Melancholia
Before the Nineteenth Century
While depression is, then, a strictly modern illness category, melancholia
has a long history as a medical condition (or, rather, conditions), going
back as far as the origins of the word, which derives from the Greek μšλας
(melas) and χoλή (kholé), meaning ‘black bile’.25 The various forms of
ancient, medieval, and early modern melancholias should not be grouped
into one uniform, pre-modern category; nevertheless, Angus Gowland
notes that ‘[i]n terms of medical theory, the history of melancholy from
antiquity to early modernity is predominantly one of continuity rather
than change’.26 Taken together, these classical forms of melancholy or
melancholia stand in stark contrast to the melancholia of the mid-to-late
nineteenth century. Earlier versions, taken as a group, had strong links
to the gastric region (as a result of the humoural hypothesis on which
the disease concept was based), and were generally characterised by vivid
delusions and a profound and debilitating sadness.27 While contempo-
rary historians have referred to classical forms of melancholia as a ‘mental
disorder’,28 it was not universally understood as a form of madness;
medical and theological explanations often conflicted over its nature.
Melancholy could be a temperament, a persona, a religious sentiment, or a
sorrowful state of mind (or soul). Melancholia as a disease was, like other
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forms of illness, a humoural imbalance, believed to result from an excess
of black bile. When the bile overflowed and rose to the head, clouding
the mind and soul, this would produce sadness, fear, and delusions. In
this regard it was often, but not always, perceived as ‘a species of madness
(delirium) involving the impairment of a principal internal mental faculty,
and usually accompanied by groundless fear and sorrow’.29
Despite numerous palpable similarities across centuries, the many pre-
modern melancholias equally took on various distinct features specific to
the cultural and temporal context of each form. Among early medieval
monks, for instance, a prominent feature of melancholy and melancholia
was acedia, ‘a condition that particularly affected hermit monks in the
desert’.30 Acedia was a negative, indifferent state of mind, in which
one had little interest in or concern for one’s surroundings. Described
in fourth-century literature as a hatred of the present moment and a
profound desire to be somewhere else, it was caused by the demon of
acedia, also known as the ‘middle of the day demon’ from its tendency
to appear during the hottest hours of the day among the monks who
lived in desert colonies outside Alexandria.31 During the Baroque period,
conversely, melancholy chiefly affected men of great artistry and intel-
lectual abilities, and could result in terrifying delusions, such as the ‘glass
man’ (believing oneself to be made of glass and thus fearful of being shat-
tered into thousands of pieces). Other such early modern experiences of
melancholy included the self-perception of being part man and part wolf,
wild and uncontrollable (the ‘wolf man’—a delusion given meaning and
reality through popular stories about werewolves), as well as the sensation
of being made entirely out of butter (thus prone to melt in the sun), or
from straw (thus unable to stand up).32 In eighteenth-century England,
melancholy became ‘the English malady’, an affliction primarily affecting
persons of the upper classes whose ‘nerves’ were weak, and which was
often linked to the cold, damp climate of the British Isles, as well as to the
sedentary lifestyle of the landed gentry.33 This nervous affliction, overlap-
ping with the ‘vapours’ and ‘spleen’, should be distinguished from the late
nineteenth-century affliction ‘nervous exhaustion’ (or ‘neurasthenia’), a
condition brought on by a combination of the ills of modern urban life
and too much ‘brain work’.34
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The Changing Face of Melancholia
As these historical vignettes indicate, melancholia is not, and never has
been, one thing. The meaning of the word has changed over time, some-
times significantly, and other words have equally been used to describe
emotional states that we might today associate with melancholia. For
over two thousand years, doctors, philosophers, scientists, theologians,
historians, artists, and writers have tried to make sense of low mood, in
particular the shifting and often opaque boundary between health and
illness. Anyone attempting to write a history of melancholia, whether
as a form of madness, an emotion, a temperament, an artistic trope,
or as depression previously called by a different name will, intention-
ally or not, add their story to a vast catalogue of scholarship spanning
all of these perspectives, sometimes brought together in a single narra-
tive.35 As the existing body of work on the history of melancholia attests,
scholars continue to be drawn to the topic, attempting to understand
where contemporary experiences of low mood fit in the wider context
of human history. Our ability to experience profound and at times debili-
tating emotional depression appears to be a feature that unites the human
species across temporal and cultural boundaries. At the same time, the
range of experiences associated with melancholy, melancholia, and depres-
sion suggest that these psychological states come in an endless number of
different shades and nuances.
To capture in a single narrative the multitude of imagery that is
conjured up by the melancholia term is no easy feat, and it is harder
yet to create order among this chaos of emotionality. One writer who has
managed this with considerable skill and success is intellectual historian
Karin Johannisson, whose history of melancholy is an apt illustration of
its multifaceted nature. She maps some of the different ways in which low
mood has been conceptualised and experienced in different societies in
the West, showing how emotional expressions associated with melancholy
have changed over time. In doing so she asks whether ‘each epoch gener-
ates its own emotional repertoire’.36 While Johannisson suggests that hers
is a history of the emotions rather than of medicine, she nonetheless draws
heavily on medical sources in order to contextualise the ‘experience’ of
melancholy, testifying to the difficulty in making any definitive distinction
between medical condition and emotion. Her history of melancholy is,
then, also a history of melancholia and of depression, which attempts
to organise and differentiate types of melancholic qualities associated
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with different historical periods. Johannisson does this by separating low
mood into three, temporally anchored, shades of melancholy: black (early
modern), grey (modern), and white (late modern). All three are presented
in fragments, medical and popular notions intermingled and boundaries
obscured. This mosaic presentation of what is at one moment a feeling
and at the next a medical condition is poignant and aptly illustrative
of how meanings attached to the terms melancholy, melancholia, and
depression have not only changed over time, but how different and even
conflicting notions of these concepts have often coexisted.
Broadly speaking, existing histories of melancholia can be divided into
two camps: one emphasising continuity, the other historical specificity
and change.37 Johannisson’s study exemplifies the latter, while Stanley
Jackson’s comprehensive work on melancholia and depression through
the ages takes a continuity perspective. Melancholia and Depression: From
Hippocratic Times to Modern Times, first published in 1986, remains the
most ambitious attempt to date to piece together a coherent history
of low mood spanning more than two millennia. Jackson frames his
narrative as the history of depressive illness, suggesting that this condi-
tion, traditionally known as melancholia, has shown ‘both a remarkable
consistency and a remarkable coherence in the basic cluster of symp-
toms’ across time.38 More recently, Clark Lawlor has attempted a similarly
expansive history that traces melancholia from ancient Greece to the
twenty-first century. Lawlor laments the end of a centuries-old conti-
nuity with the ‘paradigm-changing arrival’ of the third edition of the
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM -III) in 1980, which produced a new depression
based solely on descriptive psychopathology and which expanded into
the realm of normal sadness.39 Edward Shorter is similarly critical of the
DSM approach to mood disorders. He argues for the existence of two
distinct forms of depression, one that is endogenous (melancholia), and a
socially and culturally produced category, what is today the main form of
depressive illness diagnosed in primary care.40
Contrasting these narratives with a focus weighted towards historical
change, Judith Misbach and Henderikus Stam have traced a concep-
tual shift in the nineteenth century whereby melancholia was ‘gradually
reconceptualized as depression’ through a process of ‘medicalization’.41
While their study is limited and places particular focus on the rela-
tionship between melancholia and neurasthenia, it forms an important
contribution to the history of depressed mood. Their narrative follows
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on from German Berrios, who emphasises the role of French alienist
Esquirol’s idiosyncratic term lymemanie (‘sadness mania’) in the recon-
figuration from intellectual to emotional insanity, arguing that, while the
term was only ever used by French and Spanish physicians, it nonetheless
helped bring about a change in meaning of the term melancholia, before
the latter became gradually replaced by depression. For Berrios, there is
little conceptual difference between late nineteenth-century melancholia
and early twentieth-century depression. It is primarily a terminological
change in large part driven by a preference for the latter term as it
‘evoked a “physiological” explanation’.42 As these narratives imply, there
was no straightforward transition from melancholia to depression—the
former was not simply replaced by the latter. However, within existing
histories tracing the reconfiguration of the melancholia concept in the
nineteenth century, two events that were fundamental for this devel-
opment have been almost completely overlooked. As I demonstrate in
the chapters that follow, the shift in psychiatric knowledge relating to
depressed mood was underpinned and driven by on the one hand the
appropriation of language and concepts from experimental physiology to
talk about emotion as a physiological event, and on the other by the
role of asylum statistics in the development of diagnostic categories and
criteria.
Existing histories of melancholia and depression such as those briefly
outlined above testify to the historical instability of these medical
concepts, which is foregrounded in Matthew Bell’s cultural history of
melancholia prior to the nineteenth century. Bell brings attention to the
question of whether psychiatric disorders are natural kinds, which in turn
speaks to problem of retrospective diagnosis. These issues are at the
heart of debates about the relationship between pre-twentieth-century
melancholia and today’s depressive disorders.43 Since the nineteenth
century, psychiatry’s proponents and practitioners have not been averse
to reading pre-modern accounts of various afflictions through the spec-
tacles of modern medicine. For instance, Victorian physicians diagnosed
Shakespeare’s Hamlet with melancholia,44 twentieth-century psychiatrists
have given World War I soldiers PTSD,45 and medieval saints have been
described as schizophrenic.46 Historians, too, have jumped on this band-
wagon, to a lesser degree.47 The basic premise of this perspective is that
categories of classification have changed, but the illnesses to which they
refer have remained largely the same across time.
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The interlinked questions of retrospective diagnosis and natural kinds
in psychiatry illustrate the perpetual tensions that characterise the
historical study of illness, particularly of the psychiatric kind, between
the universalist and the context-specific, and between the real and
the constructed. Following Dominic Murphy, Bell rejects the ‘false
dichotomy’ between ‘mental disorders as natural kinds and mental disor-
ders as socially constructed’, arguing that psychiatric conditions ‘with an
organic component can very well have social causes too’.48 One might
argue that there is also a more profound epistemological concern at the
core of this debate, as the conceptual distinction between ‘organic’ and
‘social’ is historically specific to the modern period. Bracketing this ques-
tion, however, I agree with Bell that there is no meaningful knowledge to
be gained by asking whether or not melancholia is a real or constructed
condition. All psychiatric conditions are constructed in the sense that the
labels and the clusters of symptoms they refer to are not inevitable or
discovered, they are the product of significant intellectual work (which in
this book is taken to include a host of clinical and administrative prac-
tices and concerns, as well as the theoretical development of diagnostic
categories). At the same time, psychiatric conditions are also very much
real, insofar as people are diagnosed with them and experience them-
selves as suffering from such illnesses (this, I would argue, is what makes
a psychiatric condition real, irrespective of any perceived organic cause).
It follows that in the period with which this book is concerned, melan-
cholia was very much a real condition. But while melancholia has existed
as a medical term for over two millennia, the biomedical illness which that
term came to denote in the nineteenth century was historically new. The
aim of this book is to show how this condition was produced, that is, how
melancholia was made into a modern biomedical mood disorder in the
nineteenth century—how it was created, shaped, modified, and reified.
In other words, it maps the events whereby this particular conception of
melancholia was made real.49
Melancholia and the History of Psychiatry
Why study diagnostic practices? What is the value of such history?
Michel Foucault remarked that diagnostic categories are not important
in psychiatric medicine. The question is ‘not whether it is this or that
form of madness, but whether it is or it is not madness’. Everything
else is little more than window dressing, an attempt by psychological
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medicine to resemble more closely its organic counterpart, indeed to be
organic medicine, rather than to be like it.50 Psychiatric diagnoses are
undoubtedly unstable, fluid, and contingent. But this is precisely why it
is so important to subject them to scrutiny and critique. Diagnosis was
paramount in nineteenth-century psychological medicine. Medical litera-
ture in the second half of the century devoted an extraordinary amount of
attention to the difficult act of classifying various forms of mental disease.
Each type of illness had to be distinguished from other forms as well as
from non-pathological mental states. To be insane was not simply to be
delusional.
Existing studies of madness and the asylum in the nineteenth century
have contributed much to our understanding of institutionalisation and
bureaucracy, and of the everyday practices of psychological medicine.
Such histories have made intelligible the Victorian asylum, that odd,
foreign place where a struggling profession attempted to treat a range
of maladies that were poorly understood and for which there appeared
to be few, if any, targeted cures. Much has been made of the struggle
of a nascent psychiatric profession to assert itself, to prove its useful-
ness to society in general and the medical sciences in particular.51 There
exists today a vast and rich catalogue of scholarship addressing the social
and political history of psychiatry. Whether concerned with the ways in
which power structures were reproduced and reinforced through psychi-
atric knowledge and institutions,52 or whether attempting to restore
the patient as the protagonist of psychiatric history,53 social histories of
madness and of the asylum have challenged traditional, clinically oriented
and largely positivist narratives.54
The detailed and comprehensive records that British asylum staff were
required to keep on their patients and institutions have provided histo-
rians with a wealth of rich source material on individual asylums as well
as on the national lunacy bureaucracy. In-depth asylum studies have high-
lighted local practices and concerns in the context of a wider system in
which asylums were increasingly subject to central directives and guide-
lines. Studies such as Joseph Melling and Bill Forsythe’s compelling
narrative of the Devon county asylums describe and interrogate the devel-
opment of clinical knowledge and practices as well as the physical space
of the asylum and life within its walls.55 Until recently, however, the ways
in which these spaces and practices were productive of specific kinds of
knowledge about mental disease have received limited attention,56 and
the role played by asylum statistics in the creation and consolidation
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of psychiatric categories remains underresearched.57 Nevertheless, while
diagnostics and classification have rarely been the central focus of existing
asylum studies,58 they have featured as part of broader narratives. For
instance, Melling and Forsythe note the high prevalence of melancholia
in the Devon county asylums, as well as concerns among staff over the
treatment of suicidal patients, who were placed on a ‘special ward where
attendants could be vigilant at night’.59
The picture in the South-West of England was mirrored elsewhere
in the country. The number of people admitted to asylums in Britain
and diagnosed with melancholia rose sharply in the second half of the
nineteenth century, and the management of suicidal patients posed a
growing challenge for asylum staff and lunacy commissioners alike. Several
physicians noted that the number of melancholic patients increased at a
higher rate than admissions overall, prompting discussions over whether
more people were suffering from low mood than in the past, or whether
such individuals were more likely than previously to be admitted into
the asylum. Melancholic patients were rarely seen as posing a danger to
others, but they were often believed to be a danger to themselves. The
late nineteenth century saw a growing tendency to label melancholics as
suicidal on medical certificates, but as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6,
the meaning of ‘suicidal’ was ambiguous. Nevertheless, asylum physicians
were increasingly concerned with the correct description and diagnosis of
melancholia, and tried to the best of their abilities to identify, label, and
categorise the multitude of expressions and behaviours met within their
patients and which were seen as indicative of melancholic illness.
The history of melancholia in this period is, then, not just the history
of psychiatric knowledge, but also of asylum practices, and of the range
of human activity that was read by physicians as signs of melancholia.
From the often hastily scribbled notes in asylum casebooks, the twenty-
first-century reader catches a glimpse of the human suffering that was
translated into diagnostic terms such as ‘depressed mood’, ‘suicidal
tendencies’, and ‘religious delusions’. Snippet quotations tell of people
haunted by oppressive feelings of guilt and shame, people who feared that
their sins were so grave that they had forfeited the right to live, people
who believed themselves persecuted by the devil, or who were convinced
that the world was about to come to an end. In short, there is little ques-
tion that the human beings to whom the melancholia label was affixed
often experienced great pain and despair.
1 INTRODUCTION: DISORDERED MOOD AS HISTORICAL PROBLEM 19
It follows that ‘experience’ looms large over the history of melan-
cholia, as it does over historical scholarship more broadly. A source
of frustration for some historians and of fascination for others, experi-
ence is that slippery, perpetually unstable concept that can neither be
pinned down nor ignored. The relationship between knowledge and
experience is a particularly difficult, indeed often treacherous, space to
navigate. When new knowledge and forms of classification are estab-
lished, new facts are created. One way of understanding this process
holds that psychiatric knowledge offers new ways of experiencing psycho-
logical phenomena, and that experience is subsequently fed back into
the new categories, reinforcing these—producing what Ian Hacking has
called a ‘looping effect’.60 While the culturally and historically contingent
nature of experience has been convincingly demonstrated,61 it remains a
central, if contested, feature of the history of psychiatry, and the history
of melancholia is no exception. The experiences of people diagnosed with
melancholia lay beneath and informed the intellectual work that produced
diagnostic language and, more broadly, psychiatric knowledge, but they
are not the focus of this story. Not because they are not important, but
because the object of scrutiny here is psychiatric knowledge: the aim is to
understand how psychiatry creates its facts and truths. To the extent that
patients feature in the present narrative, they do so primarily as descrip-
tions and labels in textbooks, journal articles, asylum reports, and case
notes.
This book takes classification to be a key event in the history of melan-
cholia and depression, and of psychiatry more broadly. It has been a topic
and source of much contention since the early years of the profession, and
psychiatric categories have a significant, indeed sometimes life-changing,
impact on the lives of individuals whose experiences are classified as
mental disorders. To understand psychiatric knowledge, its role in care
and treatment, and in shaping perceptions of selfhood, one must under-
stand classification—how it is produced and applied, and the work it
does in different contexts. Classification in psychiatry is primarily descrip-
tive, and this has been the case since modern nosologies emerged in the
nineteenth century. While physiology provided a useful framework for
explaining disordered emotion, such models were of little practical use
on asylum wards. They did not offer diagnostic tools to be deployed in
determining the disease of a newly admitted patient. Instead, melancholia
had to be identified and diagnosed according to a number of observable
symptoms, primarily of the emotional kind. These could be deduced from
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communication with the patient, from enquiring into their actions prior
to arriving in the asylum, and from observing the patient’s demeanour,
mode of speech, body language, motor function, and actions.
There was a dearth of home-grown British medical literature on
insanity in the first half of the nineteenth century; no standard British
nosology existed. Some physicians rejected melancholia as a diagnostic
category, whereas others deployed it alongside other forms of chiefly
emotional disorders, specifically monomania and moral insanity. However,
in the second half of the nineteenth century melancholia was made
increasingly coherent in British medical literature, in part though contin-
uing uptake of German research. The disease picture that emerged was
surprisingly consistent for a period when psychiatry was still an infant
profession with few established norms and standards save for the legali-
ties of incarceration and treatment. A physician who had read any of the
major late nineteenth-century British textbooks on mental disease would
know that the typical signs of melancholia were depressed mood, mental
pain, despondency, despair, fear, delusions (often of a religious nature),
refusal of food, inertia, restlessness, sleeplessness, and in some cases hallu-
cinations, in particular hearing voices. Another key feature, which would
become nearly as defining as the primary symptom of depressed mood,
was the presence of suicidal tendencies. Melancholia was in many ways
a broad medical concept, but it is misleading to dismiss the category, as
one historian has done, as ‘too vague and all-encompassing’.62 It was a
broad concept, but towards the end of the century, the disease picture
was seen as relatively coherent, stable, and homogenous. The illness was
often divided into a number of subcategories, but key symptoms were
largely seen to apply across the board. Descriptions of melancholia were
anything but vague—they were detailed and precise, both in published
literature and in asylum records.
Nineteenth-century classification of affective insanity holds a marginal
place in existing scholarship on melancholia and depression, despite the
continued influence of nosologies and methods of classification devel-
oped in this period. German Berrios notes that the taxonomy of insanity
underwent a profound shift in the modern period, which included the
introduction of ‘time’ as a diagnostic feature. Importantly, he also notes
that the emergence of descriptive psychopathology arose out of ‘the
failure of the anatomo-clinical model of mental disease which left alienists
with mere symptom descriptions’.63 He does not, however, address the
other crucial development that emerged in response to the limits of
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anatomical models of mental disease: the appropriation of language and
concepts from experimental physiology. As I show in subsequent chap-
ters, these had a significant impact on how symptoms were interpreted,
described, explained, and labelled. In this book, classification is under-
stood as an historical event and a productive act. Melancholia was made
(or re-made) in the nineteenth century as a modern, biomedical disease
category. People who were diagnosed with melancholia were not incor-
rectly labelled; the act of diagnosing created melancholic patients, who in
published material displayed a specific and largely consistent symptoma-
tology. As will be seen in Chapter 6, however, the unity of this apparently
coherent and delineated medical condition was achieved through the
merging and flattening of a highly uneven and varied field of human
experience through the use of standardised terminology and recording
practices.
Before proceeding to tell this story, and bearing in mind the different
concerns relating to melancholia and the history of psychiatry briefly
outlined above, I want to emphasise what this book is not. It is not
the history of an emotion. Neither is it a history of how people expe-
rienced melancholia in the nineteenth century. More broadly, it is not
a social history of psychiatry or of the asylum as an institution. It is
a history of a disease concept, specifically how this concept was recon-
figured in nineteenth-century (primarily British) psychological medicine
(later psychiatry). In this way, it is best understood as an intellectual
history of psychiatric knowledge.64 Statements are here taken to be histor-
ical acts with a productive force,65 and clinical and administrative practices
are taken to form part of the intellectual work that produced melan-
cholia as a modern mood disorder. In mapping this process, the book
draws on a range of sources, including psychiatric and medical textbooks,
journal articles, legal records, lunacy commission directives, and asylum
records, in particular statistical data and casebooks. In regard to the latter,
Chapter 6 utilises records from several different asylums, each of which
has its own particular history. Some of these institutions have been the
focus of rich historical studies, which form part of an important and fasci-
nating chapter in the history of madness and of medicine and society
more widely. Here, however, asylum records are drawn upon for a specific
purpose—to map how the melancholia diagnosis and its defining criteria
were shaped and reified on the journey back and forth between case
notes and published literature. Archival sources such as casebooks and
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diagnostic data sets are read as texts, part of a range of textual sources
that together constitute what nineteenth-century psychiatrists said about
melancholia and disordered mood at this time, and what knowledge was
produced through these statements. To sum up, this book is the story of
how melancholia was constituted as a specific type of illness in the nine-
teenth century: a modern mood disorder with a biomedical basis and a
descriptive symptomatology.
Structure of the Book
The book begins in the early decades of the nineteenth century, when
physiology was being established as the foundation of internal medicine.
Chapter 2 maps the early appropriation of language and concepts
from experimental physiology to explain mental phenomena. Through
the works of early-to-mid-nineteenth-century physiologists and medical
doctors schooled in the new science, the reader is introduced to the
physiological origins of medico-psychological terms such as ‘irritation’,
‘reflexion’, and ‘tone’ that would be used to explain cerebral activity.
These early writers provided the framework for the next generation of
scientists who applied the findings of empirical research on sensory-motor
action to the realm of ideas and emotion, and in doing so, established
a new kind of mental science, physiological psychology. The chapter
considers how Thomas Laycock and W.B. Carpenter, who had studied
together in London, both created a model for mental reactivity, or
psychological reflex action, that would form the framework for explaining
disordered mood.
Chapter 3 picks up the historical trajectory of melancholia and affective
insanity at a moment of significant change in perceptions of madness.
Turn of the century asylum physicians and others treating the insane
had increasingly favoured the new ‘moral treatment’, presented as a
humanitarian and modern approach contrasted with older practices of
restraint. This new approach not only transformed the treatment of the
insane, but also ideas about what constituted insanity. The idea that one
could be mad without being delusional was increasingly popularised in
the first decades of the nineteenth century and provided an important
philosophical foundation for the concept of disordered mood as a mental
disease. The chapter traces the uptake of these ideas in mid-century
British medical literature through the works of early influential physicians
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J.C. Prichard and John Conolly. Finally, the chapter notes how mid-
century British asylum physicians began to draw on physiology to explain
disordered mood, and how melancholia was gradually reconfigured
within this context.
Chapter 4 maps the establishment of a new, scientific model of mental
disease in British psychological medicine, through the uptake of physi-
ology as well as German psychiatry into mid-Victorian medical literature.
In Germany, psychiatry was an established academic discipline by the
1860s, and a new generation of doctors promoted a strictly biological
approach to mental disease. The chapter traces the conceptual history
of disordered mood from Wilhelm Griesinger’s early work on psycho-
logical reflex action, through his later psychiatric publications, through
to Richard Krafft-Ebing’s 1874 monograph on melancholia, in which
it is presented as a distinct psychiatric category with a clear neurobio-
logical foundation. The chapter then goes on to consider how Henry
Maudsley successfully merged physiology and mental pathology in one
of the century’s most influential textbooks on mental disease, in which
established a firm division between ‘affective’ and ‘ideational’ insanity.
The development of this new approach to disordered mood is followed
into the 1870s and 80s, where it was rapidly embraced by British asylum
physicians across the country. Finally, melancholia is contrasted with
neurasthenia, another nineteenth-century condition that was particularly
popular in North America.
In Chapter 5 the story departs from internal medicine and turns
instead to the administrative framework that was being constructed in
Britain from the 1840s onward, where the creation of a national Lunacy
Commission to oversee asylums produced a new bureaucracy of madness
that sought to standardise diagnostic systems across the country. Asylum
physicians were increasingly under pressure from lunacy commissioners
to record a wide range of information about their patients, including
symptoms and diagnoses, and compile such data into statistical tables
and reports. Such numerical data was central to the standardisation of
melancholia as a relatively stable and coherent diagnostic category with
suicidality as a defining feature. The chapter goes on to show how the
melancholia diagnosis coalesced around four distinct symptoms which
became defining of the disease category in the last quarter of the century:
mental pain, depression, suicidal tendencies, and religious delusions. We
will see that these four keywords have remarkably different histories and
that their emergence as defining symptoms of melancholia was the result
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of significant intellectual work coupled with new administrative practices
as well as attempts to develop psychiatry as a medical profession and
academic discipline.
Chapter 6 traces the processes of classification and diagnostics to the
asylum ward. The casebooks of Edinburgh Royal Asylum form the focal
point of the chapter, and are contrasted with records from other asylums.
The chapter follows melancholia as it was reified through the circular and
mutually constitutive relationship between asylum records and published
material. Yet this relationship was also one characterised by tension and
ambiguity. As narrative accounts of patients’ mental states gave way to
singular keywords, the description of symptoms appeared to become
more precise and homogenous. The act of merging a range of expres-
sions into descriptive key words facilitated more efficient recording of
symptoms and presentation of cases in professional publications. At the
same time, however, this practice changed what was recorded, producing
new information about people. This chapter sheds light on the significant
intellectual labour required to turn the chaos of human emotionality into
neat medical categories.
Finally, the Conclusion briefly sketches out some of the shifts that
began to occur at the turn of the century, in particular Emil Krae-
pelin’s nosological division of insanity into dementia praecox and manic-
depressive insanity, and Adolf Meyer’s introduction of ‘depression’ as
an illness category rather than a symptom of melancholia. These acts
had significant consequences for the continued usage of the melancholia
diagnosis, which rapidly declined in the twentieth century. The Conclu-
sion places nineteenth-century melancholia in the context of twentieth-
and twenty-first-century debates around mood disorders, descriptive
psychopathology, and the ubiquity of clinical depression, asking how a
critical historical approach to disordered mood can help us better under-
stand—and critique—contemporary medical views on emotional distress.
Finally, the Conclusion suggests some of the possible implications of
attempts to revive biomedical melancholia as a diagnostic category in
present psychiatry, and of attaching psychiatric labels to the emotional
life of human beings.
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CHAPTER 2
The Scientific Foundation of Disordered
Mood
The scalpel and microscope will alike fail; the meditations of metaphysicians
will come to nought; the disease will remain in its status quo, a phantom and
a fear. To the pure doctrine of physiology, we must look for the first glimpse
of truth, and by the close application of its principles shall we soonest find
the path; while without its help in the study of cerebral disease we shall never
attain our end.1
J. Hawkes (1855)
In a paper read before the British Association for the Advancement of
Science in 1844, physiologist Thomas Laycock described to his audience
the case of a young boy who suffered from hydrophobia (a fear of water).
He quoted a Mr. Thornhill who had originally published the case in the
Medical Gazette:
On suggesting that he should swallow a little water, [the boy] seemed
to be frightened, and began to cry out. He turned suddenly in bed, and
was simultaneously seized with a momentary clonic spasm of the trunk,
greatly resembling emprosthotonos [a spasm in which the head and feet
meet and the back is arched]; however, by kindly encouraging him, he
soon manifested a willingness to accede my wish, but the sound of the
water as it was poured into a teacup, again brought on a similar convulsive
action.2
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The boy’s reaction showed, Laycock argued, that ‘the idea of water excites
convulsion’, proving his thesis that the kind of reflexive model normally
reserved for sensory-motor activity also applied to the brain and the mind.
In other words, just like involuntary movement could be triggered by
sensory stimuli, an abstract idea could act as a trigger for involuntary
emotion as well as motor action. While this was at the time a radical
idea, it would become one of the most influential and durable psycho-
logical principles of the modern period. But how did Laycock arrive at
his argument? And what were the implications of such a model of mental
operations? This chapter traces the origins of psychological reflex action,
the scientific principle that formed the basis for the idea of disordered
mood as a medical concept. It begins in the early years of the nineteenth
century, when experimental physiology was taking Europe by storm.
British scientists such as Marshall Hall and Charles Bell were attempting
to describe the functions of the spinal nerves while navigating the gradual
and equivocal shift from older ideas about ‘sympathy’ to a modern frame-
work for physical reactivity. Physiology, the new science of the body with
its growing catalogue of empirical evidence, was a goldmine for physicians
trying to make sense of and treat the maladies of the mind, and it was
rapidly absorbed into medical textbooks for students and practitioners.
The first part of the chapter is concerned with the physiological
language of internal medicine from where Laycock drew the analogies
used to explain psychological reflexion and, subsequently, disordered
emotion. The function of analogous language is central to the emergence
of a biomedical language of emotion, and plays a key role in the story of
nineteenth-century melancholia more widely. A number of the words used
to describe features of melancholia, internal and external, were deployed
both as literal descriptions of cerebral (and thus psychological) events, and
as analogous to physical processes elsewhere in the body. Moreover, older
theories often converged with the new, such as in the work of British phys-
iologist W.B. Carpenter, who embraced a biological reflex model for some
mental operations, while insisting on retaining a higher faculty indepen-
dent from somatic automatism. In sum, biomedical theories of emotion
were, at this time, new, fragmented, unsteady, conflicting, and constantly
evolving. Nevertheless, within the emerging framework of what became
known as physiological psychology, emotion was gradually constituted as
a physiological process and a biomedical object of study. As will be seen
in later chapters, melancholia was subsequently reconfigured along these
new biomedical lines.
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Reflex Action, Automatism,
and Emotion in Medical Science
The significant epistemological shifts that occurred in the first decades of
the nineteenth century in terms of both scientific and lay perceptions of
the natural world and the animal body have been thoroughly explored
elsewhere.3 What should be noted here is that the physiology of disor-
dered emotion was to a large extent premised upon a belief that the
mind could be explained as a manifestation of cerebral activity. Within
the wider context of the rise of scientific medicine and secular psychology
such beliefs made sense to a vast number of physicians. At the same time,
however, materialist conceptions of the relationship between body, brain,
mind, and soul were contentious and contested both within and outside
scientific communities. For some medical scientists, such as Laycock,
subscribing to a physiological model of cerebral activity meant the rejec-
tion of a higher, abstract intellect, but for others, most notably Laycock’s
acquaintance and intellectual rival Carpenter, a separation between soma
and psyche was to some extent maintained. There was, as Roger Smith has
suggested, ‘nothing inevitable about these intellectual developments’.4
The mind–body problem and the place of humans in the world were ques-
tions that pushed at both old and new boundaries of epistemology during
the nineteenth century, and there was no clear or simple shift from the
Christian to the secular or from the philosophical to the scientific. Rather,
‘language often left unresolved a choice between new or old, between a
concern with human culture or human science, between a religious or a
secular world view.5
Nevertheless, physiological experiments performed on frogs and other
animals in order to infer knowledge about the human nervous system
were premised upon a belief that human beings were inherently part of
the animal world and subject to the laws of nature. While humans held a
hierarchically superior position in this world, experimental physiology as
a path to knowledge about the human body made sense because human
beings were perceived as having sufficient shared characteristics with other
animals. This did not, however, mean that scientists rejected providence
or a higher soul. When physicians began to speak about ideas and emotion
as automated physiological processes this was for many a controversial
move. Both within and beyond scientific communities physiologically
anchored theories of mind met with objections from Christian writers.
Thomas Dixon notes that reactions among Christian thinkers were far
38 Å. JANSSON
from unified; nonetheless, a shared point of antagonism between many
of them was that the new physiological psychology left little or no room
for a higher, abstract soul.6 The idea of emotion as a reflexive, automated
function was possible within a system of thought that took emotion to be
a bodily and often also a cerebral process.7 This latter point constituted an
important division between physicians who believed in different models
of psychological reflexion. The kind of model of involuntary reaction of
emotion and ideas in conjunction that formed the basis for biomedical
theories of melancholia generally held emotion to be a cerebral activity
rather than a reaction occurring in a lower part of the nervous system. The
significance of this distinction is illustrated below in the contrast between
the psycho-physiological theories offered by Thomas Laycock and William
Benjamin Carpenter.
Viewed as a psychological reaction, ‘emotion’ would in one sense
become a broader category than the traditional ‘passions’, ‘sentiments’,
and ‘appetites’. As a secular, psychological category, ‘emotion’ would
gradually replace such older terms anchored in a theistic language
and view of the body–mind relationship. At the same time, however,
emotion as understood within physiological psychology and psycholog-
ical medicine was a narrow category, in that it was perceived as a process,
or event, contained within the human nervous system.8 This way of
explaining the mental life of humans did not mesh comfortably with the
possibility of an intellect belonging to a higher soul and capable of disci-
plining the lower animal appetites. However, as Smith has noted, the new
scientific discourse about mind and body remained steeped in moral argu-
ment.9 Indeed, as the century wore on a person’s immorality became
an increasingly biological feature, permanently imprinted on degenerate
brains and bodies.10
The Reflex Concept
The theory of reflexive action was a chief preoccupation of European
physiologists early in the century and formed the basis of and ratio-
nale for numerous experiments on living animal bodies. Ruth Leys has
referred to the reflex concept as espoused by nineteenth-century experi-
mental scientists as ‘one of the most influential explanatory principles in
the history of the medical, biological, and psychological sciences’, noting
that ‘it has played a major role in the rise of psychology as an experi-
mental science’.11 Smith and L.S. Jacyna have both drawn attention to
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the role of the reflex in the development of nineteenth-century British
psychopathology.12 Building on existing historical work in this vein, the
emphasis here is on how the reflex model facilitated the creation of
disordered mood as a medical concept, a concept that was foundational
to melancholia as a modern biomedical mental disease. This transfer of
knowledge from neurology and nervous physiology to psychology and
psychiatry was neither inevitable nor straightforward, and, as is demon-
strated below and in Chapter 4, a significant amount of intellectual labour
was required to bring it about.
A driving force behind physiological research in the nineteenth century
was the objective of ‘knowing the body’, and with it the brain. Roger
Cooter has observed that the knowledge produced through such research
had little practical use for ordinary people, the way earlier medical self-
help manuals and recipe books had had. Yet this nascent science held
the power to reveal ‘what was hitherto a mystery for most people, the
internal operations of their bodies.’13 For scientists who believed that
the production of ideas and emotions was the result of cerebral activity,
knowing the body also meant knowing the mind. As suggested above,
experiments on living animal bodies occurred within a belief system about
the natural world without which it would not make sense to conduct
such experiments in the first place. In this context, the nervous system
was conceptualised and visualised along certain lines, it was discussed in
terms of ‘reactions’, ‘reflexes’, ‘sensation’, ‘irritation’, stimulus’, ‘tone’,
and ‘motion’.
While ‘reflex’ came to mean something quite specific in medico-
scientific literature in the mid-to-late nineteenth century, the idea of
reflexive action as something occurring inside the human body was not
the invention of experimental physiologists. Any attempt to trace the
origins of the reflex concept beyond the modern period must, however,
be carried out with the same kind of historical and contextual sensitivity
as is called for when comparing ancient, medieval, and early modern
writings on melancholia with nineteenth-century literature. Historians
(and nineteenth-century scientists) have offered different views on the
history of the modern sensory-motor reflex. The invention of the concept
has been attributed to Descartes,14 whereas others have highlighted
British physician Marshall Hall as one of the key figures in its creation.15
Ruth Leys agrees that Hall’s theory of the ‘reflex arc’ was central to
modern ideas about involuntary reflexive action, but she cautions histo-
rians against perceiving the reflex as having ‘developed in a linear or
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incremental fashion towards the present’.16 Hall’s theory of reflexive
action was, she suggests, equally a rearticulation of older ideas about
‘sympathy’; moreover, it was purely ‘mechanistic’, almost in a Cartesian
sense. For Hall, ‘[t]he central nervous system was subject to the laws of
the reflex as high as the medulla but no higher: above the cord was the
entirely different cerebral system, the seat of the immortal soul’.17 Hall’s
conception importantly allowed for volition as a faculty independent from
and higher than reactions anchored in the body. In this way, it followed
along the lines of older, broadly Christian beliefs, which held that the
higher faculties were able to exert control over the lower ones (such as
‘animal passions’).18
Much of the language that came to be used to speak about emotion
was metaphorical in its origins. While we may, as historians have done,
speak about the reflex having been ‘extended’ to the realm of ideas and
emotion, such a narrative suggests a progressive, indeed an almost teleo-
logical, development. Nineteenth-century scientists did not simply follow
a path of step-by-step discovery. The acts and events that create scientific
objects are never simple and uncontested, and the creation of psycholog-
ical reflexion, and of disordered emotion, was a particularly imaginative
endeavour. A new generation of scientists was keen to use novel empirical
research to try to make sense of that which had perplexed and mysti-
fied European philosophers since antiquity—what is it that makes humans
think, feel, act, and react? An area of inquiry that used to belong chiefly
to philosophy was increasingly being staked out by medical scientists
through the appropriation of medical language from the realm of the
physical to that of the psychological. Concepts that have solid and natu-
ralised meanings in psychology and psychiatry today began their journey
as metaphors borrowed from internal medicine.
Irritation and Morbid Sensibility: From
Internal to Psychological Medicine
As British writers themselves noted, most of the cutting-edge research in
the area of experimental physiology was being carried out on the conti-
nent. However, home-grown publications were not entirely absent, and a
handful of early Victorian authorities on the subject were emerging in
the 1830s and 40s. Charles Bell and Marshall Hall were both impor-
tant champions of neurophysiological theories on the continent as well
as in Britain, and their work has been considered in detail by historians.
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However, other less prominent writers also had a significant impact on the
development of physiological psychology in Britain, and an even greater
influence on the emerging concept of disordered mood. Of particular
significance in this regard was Archibald Billing’s popular First Princi-
ples of Medicine, published in several editions between the 1830s and
the 1860s and widely consulted and cited by British physicians with an
interest in the brain and the mind. Billing, physician, lecturer and clinical
instructor at the London Hospital in Whitechapel,19 eagerly emphasised
his own role in the establishment of physiological ideas about cerebral
activity, alongside some of his more famous peers.20
Billing’s textbook underwent several revisions, but his approach to
nervous action was strictly somatic from the outset. He suggested that
all nervous function was best understood as analogous to electricity,
and held that this may be more than an analogy, since the application
of an electric current to the nerves would prompt muscle contraction
(something which scientists had noted since the seventeenth century).
Billing situated his treatise within the framework of experimental physi-
ology, drawing indirectly upon experiments performed on living animals,
particularly frogs, where surgically exposed nerves were subjected to elec-
tric currents intended to produce reflexive movement. In a presentation
of different ways in which various bodily reactions simulated electricity,
Billing also suggested as an example ‘[v]olition being conducted along
the nerves with a speed equal only to electricity’.21 In this way, the will
was conceptualised as a physiological process; no distinction was made
between involuntary reaction as somatic and voluntary action as mental.
Two things are important to note about Billing’s work. First of all,
his physiological model was a fusion of old and new language and
concepts. Billing’s illustration of nerve force bore evident resemblance
to eighteenth-century natural philosophy, and ideas about ‘irritation’ as
a trigger of nervous function looks superficially similar to von Haller’s
concept of ‘irritability’ put forward in the 1750s and which explained
involuntary muscular reaction in response to stimuli. For Haller, however,
‘the power of contraction resided in the muscle itself’ and was the result
of a ‘nerve force’ or vis nervosa.22 This illustrates the argument made
above, that while much early modern terminology was slow to disappear,
similarity in language should not be mistaken for conceptual sameness.
Secondly, we should not take his statement above to mean that Billing
perceived volition as a reflexive act. He circumvented the problem of an
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independent will in a biological framework by suggesting that sensation,
action, and reaction in the human body were carried along two different
sets of nerves—voluntary and involuntary.23 Despite this attempt to
keep the will intact, we can note the possible consequences of Billing’s
argument. He made it clear to his readers that ‘[a]ll organic action is
contraction, produced by nervous influence’.24 This would appear to
suggest that Billing held all mental activity to be a manifestation of
such contraction; however, his somatic model of nervous activity did not
extend to intellectual life. In other words, while volition was transmitted
along nerve paths, it was not an automated somatic reaction. Not only
did Billing perceive a separation between bodily activity and the mental
faculties; the detailed study of ‘the properties and processes’ of the human
body was ultimately a revelation of ‘the omniscience of the Deity’. The
body was, in the end, merely a ‘structure’ that ‘the Soul’ was ‘destined to
inhabit for but a short space of time’.25
In First Principles of Medicine we find a number of medical concepts
that would become foundational to physiological theories of mental
disease. Two of these are particularly important for our present enquiry:
‘irritation’ and ‘morbid sensibility’. Billing used the latter to describe ‘that
state of the nerves or central organs which renders them more suscep-
tible to impressions than natural’.26 Billing explained the occurrence of
such sensibility in different organs through the application of ‘the reflex
theory’. The inherent sensibility of nerves would render these susceptible
to ‘irritation’, which in turn could produce morbid sensibility:
If, therefore, certain diseased states, unaccompanied by pain, termed ‘irri-
tation’ (which term can properly be applied only to whatever is the
cause of the morbid sensibility), exist in a part of which the spinal cord
takes cognizance, and which are indicated by subsequent production of
abnormal muscular contractions, &c. in distant parts of the body, it follows
that the spinal cord has become sensible of that diseased state, that is, has
participated in the morbid sensibility, although the brain has not been
informed of it.27
The idea of ‘irritation’ of the nerves causing an organ to become morbidly
sensitive would become central to the kind of physiological explanation
for disordered emotion offered by later writers. As will be seen below, it is
important to note that Billing perceived this process as happening without
cerebral involvement. By this he not only meant that the mind was not
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aware of it, but also that it was a reactive process that did not reach
the brain hemispheres. In this way, Billing was consistent with standard
medical opinion at the time in that he did not deviate from the distinc-
tion made by Hall and others between voluntary and involuntary action
where the latter was somatic and the former cerebral or even outside of
the body completely. In other words, involuntary action could only occur
without cerebral involvement, as a reaction triggered below the brain,
no further up than the medulla. It was a separation that was physical
in its description, but of which the consequences were also psycholog-
ical. However, as shall be seen in a moment, when scientists extrapolated
such concepts to speak about ideas and emotion, a framework was created
whereby involuntary reaction could occur in the brain but still without
conscious awareness.
Billing went on to describe precisely how disease would arise from
the state of irritation, suggesting that ‘[i]f the nerves of sensation be
rendered morbidly sensitive, pain is produced by common occurrences
which ought not to affect them, such as pressure either from external
things, or even of the surrounding parts’.28 This metaphor would above
all become key to explaining biomedical melancholia; indeed one may
go so far as to say that it formed the rationale for melancholia as a
disorder. The idea of how a morbid reaction to normal impressions could
occur would become part of standard descriptions of melancholia as a
disease in which ordinary impressions that would trigger no emotional
reaction in a healthy mind would produce ‘mental pain’ and ‘depres-
sion’.29 Similar models were offered by other contemporaneous British
writers who, like Billing, referred much of the current knowledge on the
anatomy and physiology of the nerves to Bell and Magendie. A work
that received particular interest among mid-century medical psycholo-
gists was Samuel Solly’s The Human Brain, first published in 1836 with
an updated second edition a decade later. Solly’s book was to a large
extent an account and discussion of recent French research. The first
edition was also chiefly concerned with the anatomy and physiology of
animal brains—i.e. data directly derived from empirical research—with
some extrapolations regarding the human brain.30 Overall, two recurrent
themes in particular should be noted in regard to British medico-scientific
literature on the physiology of the nervous system prior to the 1840s: the
idea that persistent ‘irritation’ of the nerves caused them to become more
sensitive and prone to morbidity, and, a model of involuntary reflexive




While Billing and Solly’s frameworks were later taken up in and adapted
to psychological medicine by the next generation of British physicians, in
the early decades of British mental science the impact of work produced
by continental writers was at least as substantial, if not more so. Prus-
sian physiologist Johannes Müller’s Elements of Physiology31 navigated
territory that Billing and many other contemporary physiologists had not
ventured into. Müller was curious about the psychological implications of
physiological research and attempted to draw parallels between the human
psyche and sensory-motor experiments performed on animals. His work
contains the beginnings of the kind of analogous transfer of concepts that
would form the core of later theories about affective insanity. Müller’s
Elements provided mid-century physicians with tools allowing them to
hypothesise about psychological (and thus emotional) reflexive action.
Müller, who trained rising stars such as Hermann von Helmholtz and
Emil du Bois-Reymond, was appointed to the first German chair of phys-
iology in 1833,32 the same year as the first volume of his Elements of
Physiology was published. This work drew upon experiments performed by
Müller himself as well as data derived from other people’s research, and a
substantial chunk of the book was devoted to the workings of the nervous
system, including the brain and the mind. For many early nineteenth-
century German scientists, their convictions about the place of human
beings as part of the animal kingdom and natural world were rooted in
Naturphilosophie, generally regarded as belonging to Romanticism and,
from a scientific point of view, somewhat pre-modern. However, as Jutta
Schickore has suggested, these beliefs had much in common with later,
post-Darwinian explanatory frameworks. In particular, the unity of ‘Man’
and nature is important in this regard, and philosophical ideas within this
early tradition had an impact on scientific endeavours later on.33 One
of the most influential explanations of human ability to acquire knowl-
edge about nature arising from Naturphilosophie came from Friedrich
Schelling, who argued that ‘we are able to have knowledge about the
natural world because nature and the human subject are essentially the
same’.34 Müller came out of this tradition, but largely rejected Schelling’s
views. His own beliefs were complex, however, not least because he was a
prolific researcher who carried out work within a vast number of different
areas of physiology. Nevertheless, Schickore suggests that he was in the
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first instance concerned with ‘the overall problem of how living things
could be experienced’.35 This perspective was important for how a new
generation of scientists in the German-speaking areas approached their
work. While for many laboratory scientists empirical research continued
to be carried out within a loose framework of older philosophical and
spiritual beliefs about the world, ‘a new accent on academic, original
research came together with an explicit preference for experience over
speculation’.36
For Müller, emotion was a manifestation of nervous action; a physio-
logical process of the interconnected brain-body system. Perhaps seeking
to distance himself from the populist science of phrenology, he remarked
that ‘[t]here are no data for either proving or refuting the hypothesis that
the passions have their seat of action in a particular part of the brain’. He
went on to emphasise the ability of emotion to trigger peripheral bodily
reactions:
The exciting passions give rise to spasms, and frequently even to convul-
sive motions affecting the muscles supplied by the respiratory and facial
nerves. Not only are the features distorted, but the actions of the respi-
ratory muscles are so changed as to produce the movements of crying,
sighing, and sobbing. Any passion of whatever nature, if of sufficient inten-
sity, may give rise to crying and sobbing. Weeping may be produced by
joy, pain, anger, or rage.37
What Müller described, then, was how emotion could excite involun-
tary movement elsewhere in the body. Andrew Hodgkiss has suggested
that Müller also envisaged reflexive action as a potentially psychological
activity.38 The German physiologist did indeed allow for the mind to be
excited by external stimuli. This was how he perceived ideas to arise,
stating that ‘an idea or conception is that which is excited in the mind
by impressions on the senses, or by those actions of our own body which
are communicated to the sensorium’.39 According to this model, ideas
could react upon stimuli originating from outside the body, or from other
parts of it. This model was taken up and developed by Thomas Laycock
in Britain and Wilhelm Griesinger in Germany, who would suggest that
ideas and emotions were not only triggered by external stimuli, but also
by activity elsewhere in the body. As will be seen in Chapter 4, Griesinger
abstracted from this model an analogous process whereby ideas and
emotions would react upon one another, producing novel mental states.
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If the brain was subjected to repeated external and/or internal ‘irritation’,
the process of intra-cerebral reflex action would result in persistent mental
pain—the manifestation of pathological mood.
The Physiology of Disordered Emotion
in Mid-Century British Medicine
Kurt Danziger has referred to British physician Thomas Laycock as ‘one
of the most original minds’ among his contemporaries.40 Laycock left his
home county of North Yorkshire to begin his medical studies at Univer-
sity College London in 1833, where he became acquainted with William
Benjamin Carpenter when they both attended Robert Grant’s optional
classes in comparative anatomy.41 Tom Quick suggests that Grant’s
lectures helped shape the future research interests of both students, and
quotes Laycock as later remarking that ‘Carpenter “set on the same
researches with himself when both were studying comparative anatomy
and physiology”.’42 Having graduated as a Member of the Royal College
of Surgeons in 1835, Laycock obtained a position at the York County
Hospital the following year. During his time on the female wards at York
he published a series of papers on hysteria, out of which emerged his first
monograph. A Treatise on the Nervous Diseases of Women43 appeared in
1840, shortly after Laycock received a doctorate in medicine from the
University of Göttingen. He was later appointed to the chair in medicine
at Edinburgh University, where he would also go on to lecture on metal
diseases, remaining there until his death in 1876.44
In the 1870s, Laycock and Carpenter would become engaged in a
dispute over who had first articulated the idea of psychological involun-
tary reflexion, or ‘unconscious cerebration’ as some mid-century British
writers called it. The invention of the term ‘unconscious cerebration’
has been attributed to Carpenter,45 and he appears to have used it
first in the 1842 edition of his Principles of Human Physiology . Laycock
claimed to have suggested the idea of unconscious cerebral reflexion
before Carpenter, first in On the Nervous Diseases of Women in 1840, and
in a separate article a few years later.46 The sometimes antagonistic rela-
tionship between the two physicians has been engagingly portrayed else-
where47; its bearing upon the present story centres on what unconscious
cerebration or involuntary psychological reflexion was meant to convey,
how this concept related to Carpenter’s term ‘ideo-motor’ reaction,
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and what the significance of these models was for mid-Victorian theories
of disordered mood.
William Benjamin Carpenter
Carpenter developed an impressively substantial framework for physio-
logical psychology in the multiple editions of his widely read Principles of
Human Physiology , first published in 1842. His theory of mind embraced
certain metaphysical principles that set it apart from those offered by
Laycock and Griesinger. Carpenter developed a hierarchical table of the
nervous system, which also included a division of mental functions. At the
lowest level he situated ‘the true spinal cord’, followed by the medulla
oblongata. The next level up was ‘the ganglia of the nerves of special
sensation’, and finally ‘the cerebral hemispheres’, the latter being the
seat of the will.48 He perceived reflexive action to occur not only in
the medulla, but also in ‘the ganglia of the nerves of special sensation’.
Importantly, involuntary reaction occurring in this higher sphere could be
distinguished from the former as it would be ‘attended with conscious-
ness, and also, it would appear, with certain peculiar feelings’.49 This,
then, was the seat of emotion (together with the five senses), which for
Carpenter had distinctly somatic and animalistic qualities not dissimilar
from more traditional conceptions of animal passions and appetites. Voli-
tion and emotion belonged to separate spheres in Carpenter’s model, and
only the latter was prone to the kind of automatism that facilitated phys-
iological theories of insanity. As will be seen below, this was a significant
factor setting his framework apart from that developed by Laycock.
According to Carpenter, reactions occurring in the second highest part
of the nervous system were ‘commonly termed instinctive in the lower
animals, and consensual and emotional in ourselves; these all correspond,
in being performed without any idea of a purpose, and without any direc-
tion of the will, – being frequently in opposition to it’. The result was that
in Carpenter’s model emotion was a reflexive activity that could occur in
conflict with the will. In other words, emotion was something the control
of which was at once difficult and desirable, but most importantly possible.
For volition belonged to a separate, higher sphere, that of the cerebral
ganglia, and as such was ‘capable of acting in greater or lesser degree,
on all the muscles forming part of the system of Animal life’.50 That is,
while Carpenter allowed for psychological reflex action, he perceived it as
applicable to ‘emotions’ and ‘instincts’, and in later editions of his book
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to some extent also to ‘ideas’, but when it came to the will he would not
concede to its reduction to a physiological process. In a turn of phrase that
brings Hall’s dualism to mind, Carpenter suggested that while psychology
shared on the whole the same principles as physiology, it was wrong to
conceive of ‘the Thinking Man’ as a ‘puppet that moves according as its
strings are pulled’. Rather,
he also possesses a self -determining power, which can rise above all the
promptings of external suggestion, and can, to a certain extent, mould
external circumstances to its own requirements, instead of being completely
subjugated by them. We can scarcely desire a better proof that our posses-
sion of this power is a reality and not a self-delusion, than that which is
afforded by the comparison of the normal condition of the mind, with that
in which the directing power of the Will is in abeyance.51
It follows from this that a healthy mind would be able to exercise voli-
tion to control the other faculties, but in conditions of abnormality, i.e.
mental disease, the ability of the individual to direct their will could
be compromised. That is, Carpenter insisted on keeping the will sepa-
rate from and superior to emotion, but he nevertheless allowed for the
possibility of the former becoming compromised by the latter. Carpenter
abandoned his tabular division of the nervous system in later editions of
his textbook; however, he maintained the separation of the will from the
emotions, concluding that, ‘[t]hat the Emotional and Volitional move-
ments differ as to their primal sources, is obvious’.52 He thus stayed
committed to a clear separation of the will from emotion throughout
his career.53 In this way, Carpenter’s theory of mind set itself apart from
the more strictly biomedical approach of Laycock, as well as that of a new
generation of asylum physicians, such as Henry Maudsley, who would
apply physiological language to theories of mental disease.54
In the 1855 edition of Principles, Carpenter attempted to explain the
relationship between mind and body through ‘a correlation of forces’.
There could be no analogy drawn between ‘mind’ and ‘matter’; such a
theory was ultimately flawed. However, with the nervous system oper-
ating through nervous force, the will could be conceived of as a mental
force. In this way, ‘nerve-force’ could be excited by ‘mental agency’ and
vice versa. This ‘correlation of forces’ could, he argued, explain the rela-
tionship between ‘emotional excitement and bodily change’, as well as
the emergence of ideas in the mind and the subsequent ‘action of those
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ideas upon the centres of movement’.55 Carpenter assigned this latter
operation to the brain itself, giving it the term ‘ideo-motor’ action. This
kind of action was, importantly, both conscious and involving the will in
its execution. In this way, Carpenter’s model was qualitatively different
from the theory of cerebral reflexion developed by his former university
associate Thomas Laycock.
Thomas Laycock
In seeking to explain the ‘convulsions’, ‘fits’, and ‘paroxysms’ of his
female patients at York, Laycock drew upon recent research into the phys-
iology of animal bodies with which he had become acquainted during his
studies.56 In On the Nervous Diseases of Women (1840), he suggested that
most cases of hysteria had an emotional basis, and that the female repro-
ductive system played a central role in producing hysterical fits. Internal,
organic actions could, Laycock suggested, trigger a reaction in the brain.
Women were particularly prone to such excitability, since their repro-
ductive organs were disposed to causing internal tension and imbalance,
upsetting an already weaker and more susceptible constitution. In other
words, women were more likely to experience involuntary emotional reac-
tions triggered by external or internal stimuli. Thus, the women’s wards
at York offered Laycock an optimal stage upon which to observe reflexive
emotionality in action. Jacyna observes that ‘[h]e saw an analogy between
[epilepsy] and the “emotional” convulsions of hysteria. It was to explain
this analogy that Laycock argued for an extension of the reflex model of
nervous action from the spine to the encephalon’.57
In On the Nervous Diseases of Women, Laycock offered the following
description of reflex action:
We find that changes excited in the system by the action of external forces
are communicated to the brain by the sensitive nerves; that will act upon
the muscles so as to excite motion trough the motor nerves, and that
a third class of nerves, the organic,58 are subservient to the perfection,
preservation, and repair of the vital mechanism, and are influenced by
certain mental agencies of which we are conscious, – as the emotions,
– but which are independent of the will.59
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Through the class of ‘organic’ nerves, then, Laycock was able to suggest
that cyclical and reproductive changes playing out within the female body
could excite the brain and trigger reactions in the form of a range of
hysterical-emotional convulsions. However, as we can see, the emotions
were correspondingly able to influence bodily functions, independent of
volitional control. It was relatively easy for Laycock to proceed from this
discussion to drawing a tentative analogy between motor and ‘sensorial’60
reflexion:
The analogy between the voluntary and involuntary systems of motor and
sensitive nerves is partly demonstrated by the previous facts; it remains to
inquire whether there be anything in the changes produced in the sensorial
system by external and internal stimuli analogous to those excited in the
motor. Of these changes it is certain we can only judge by the phenomena
produced in each case, sensation being analogous to movements, abolition of
consciousness to motor paralysis.61
This kind of analogy would become central to physiological theories
of mental disease. The biomedical language on emotion was riddled
with metaphors and analogous explanatory models; as will be seen in
subsequent chapters, this language would underpin symptoms of melan-
cholia, such as the ubiquitous ‘mental pain’ (or psychalgia—a term
sometimes used to emphasise its analogous relationship to neuralgia62).
While Laycock displayed some caution in comparing motor and mental
reactions, he had little doubt that the brain as an organ was involved
in reflexive action, as the ‘nervous connexions’ running to and from the
periphery in his view clearly extended to the cerebral hemispheres. More-
over, he was not blind to the potentially revolutionary implications of
such a theory. ‘How vast’, he exclaimed, ‘is the field of inquiry opened
out by an application of the laws of reflex function to these structures!’63
And vast it was indeed. The idea of emotion and even ideas as potentially
reflexive, automated, and subject to disorder, has proved one of the most
durable legacies of nineteenth-century psychological medicine.
Laycock continued to develop his ‘field of inquiry’ in his 1844 paper
‘On the Reflex Function of the Brain’, cited at the start of this chapter.
The aim of the paper, he stated, was to ‘prove’ his earlier claims about
cerebral reflexion. Using the example of ‘hydrophobia’ (fear of water),
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Laycock outlined three ways in which such phobia could be induced—
‘three classes of irritations [of the brain] inducing the reflex acts of
gasping and spasm of the respiratory muscles’. The first two involved
either the sight of water or bodily contact with it. The third referred
to ‘an idea excited by the sound of water dropping, or by the mention
of water’.64 Once the fear of water—an emotional reaction—had been
induced, the patient ‘immediately attempts to remove it. This movement
is strictly involuntary, and not the result of sensation’.65 What the reader
was presented with, then, was a process whereby a morbid emotional
reaction producing involuntary muscular movement could be triggered
by an idea alone, rather than by sensory stimuli to the body. Laycock
did not name this process, but it is similar to what Carpenter termed
‘ideo-motor’ activity, to distinguish it from sensory-motor action. What
Laycock did was to describe the means by which this kind of ideation-
ally induced morbid reaction could occur, again by using the analogy of
involuntary or automatic sensory-motor action:
[S]ince an infinity of muscular acts are already inscribed within the struc-
ture of the anterior gray matter of the spinal ganglia, and require only the
appropriate sensory impression to rouse them into action, so ideas may be
inscribed and require only sensory impressions to rouse them.66
Danziger notes that Laycock was able to use these principles to explain
‘hitherto puzzling phenomena such as somnambulism, hysteria, impul-
sive insanity, and bizarre religious behaviour.’67 Laycock described, for
instance, a case of a young girl who began to develop rhythmical spas-
modic muscular movements, which over several days developed into ‘a
graceful dance’ conducted to the melody of the song ‘Protestant Boys’,
which the patient claimed to be constantly ‘dwelling upon her mind’.
When the music became more ‘pressing’, this ‘impelled her to commence
the involuntary actions’. Laycock explained this phenomenon as caused
by ‘centric changes, which had induced this alteration of sensory func-
tion, and which had reproduced in fact the idea of the air with such force
that it impinged upon the motor track, and there excited consentaneous
reflex acts, in spite of the utmost volitional effort of the individual’.68
As will be seen in Chapter 4, the notion of ideas being inscribed onto
the brain, to be aroused anew at any moment by application of appro-
priate stimuli, was developed in more detail by Griesinger, who offered
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the idiom ‘mental storages’ for the space where ideas were collected in
the brain.
While Laycock and Carpenter were no doubt two of the most
influential writers of their generation, similar theories were offered by
other British medical scientists in the 1840s and 50s. For instance,
William Senhouse, physician and anatomy teacher at St. Bartholomew’s
in London, offered a model of nervous function adopting a stricter level
of materialism than Carpenter while still being less radical than Laycock.
Senhouse followed Carpenter in separating the ‘sensory ganglia’ from the
‘cerebral hemispheres’, with the former being subject to involuntary reac-
tion. The brain itself Senhouse described as the seat of attention, volition,
perception, memory, imagination, and judgement, faculties which were all
independent of the lower animal functions.69 However, the operation of
these cerebral faculties could still potentially be compromised, resulting
in morbidity:
In health, the mind combines the impressions received by the two hemi-
spheres, and produces from them single ideas, like as in healthy vision the
impressions on the two retinæ give rise to a single perception. In certain
forms of disease, however, in which, perhaps, one or both hemispheres
are disordered, the same object may produce two separate sensations, and
suggest simultaneously different ideas; or, at the same time, two trains of
thought may be carried on, by the one mind acting, or being acted upon
differently in the two hemispheres.70
As will be seen in Chapter 4, this ability of the brain to produce unwanted
ideas was a key element in German psychiatrist Wilhelm Griesinger’s
model of psychological reflex action. Unlike Senhouse, who paid scant
attention to emotion, for Griesinger the emergence of morbid ideas
was closely related to morbid emotionality and the development of
melancholia.
Morbid Sensibility and Morbid Introspection
In the second half of the nineteenth century, models of involuntary
psychological reaction and the metaphorical language used to create
such models would facilitate a reconceptualisation of melancholia into a
modern biomedical disease of disordered emotion. More broadly, psycho-
logical reflexion and physiological psychology offered Victorian asylum
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physicians a range of useful tools with which to explain the maladies
of their patients. In On the Nature and Proximate Cause of Insanity
(1853) James Davey drew upon Billing’s model of mental physiology to
suggest that in people suffering from mental disease, the ‘nervous power’
was easily ‘converted into “irritation” or “morbid sensibility”, and this
fact is well illustrated by the origin and progress of almost any case of
mental derangement’.71 This argument was further developed in a series
of ‘Lectures on Insanity’ published in the Association Medical Journal in
1855, where Billing’s concepts ‘morbid sensibility’ and ‘irritation’ were
presented as central to the emergence of mental disease, and theories
within a metaphorical image of muscle contraction:
Long continued mental exertion, protracted anxiety, or excessive action
of any one or more of the cerebral faculties, lead, ere long, to a morbid
sensibility of a portion or portions of the cineritious neurine72; this, the
source of power, intellectual and emotional, if overtasked, loses, like any
ordinary muscle, the capacity to respond duly to the too frequent and
long continued calls made on it; and it assumes, therefore, a condition
of irritation (excitement without power) which, if allowed to proceed
unchecked, or if not relieved, realises all the external indications of mental
derangement.73
The idea of morbid sensitivity of the brain and the mind equally found
an abstract application as a means of explaining an old philosophical idea
about the causal relationship between solitary introspection and a melan-
choly state of mind (potentially leading to melancholy madness). Michael
Clark has suggested that Victorian medical psychologists held up ‘morbid
introspection’ as an important factor in the aetiology of mental disease.74
In Clark’s narrative of Victorian psychological medicine, morbid intro-
spection was the factor often seen to distinguish an ‘unsound Mind’ from
‘mental soundness’. Defined as ‘the habitual turning of the mind inwards
upon itself to the virtual exclusion of external impressions, accompa-
nied by the temporary or partial suspension of will or judgment’,75
physicians agreed that morbid introspection fed an unhealthy imagina-
tion, leading certain ideas to become dominant and thus destructive to
mental health. In this way, emotionality and obsessive ideas would take
over at the expense of volition and rational thinking.76 Clark’s narra-
tive is premised upon a view of insanity where ‘the condition of “sound
Mind”, in which reason and will governed the succession of thought
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and feeling, was familiarly contrasted with that of “unsound Mind”, in
which reason and will were at least temporarily in abeyance, and emotion,
nourished by imagination, held unchecked sway’.77 However, within
the physiological framework for mental activity embraced by mid-to-
late nineteenth-century physicians, such a division could not be so easily
made. Emotion and volition were not necessarily seen as separate. This
was particularly evident in melancholia, and will be considered further
in subsequent chapters. A number of physicians would describe melan-
cholics, especially in the early or non-delusional stages of the disease,
as being fully capable of reasoning about their morbid emotionality yet
unable to think themselves out of their despair. Indeed, this tension was,
so the argument went, what drove many melancholics to commit suicide,
as this appeared the only ‘logical’ solution to their suffering.78 The adop-
tion of physiological language by physicians writing on mental disease
led, if anything, to an increasingly complex view of the human mind, one
in which the boundary between normal and pathological was perpetually
fluid and contested.
By the 1850s, physiological theories of affective insanity were gaining
ground among British alienists. Such explanatory models would become
increasingly useful later in the century as a biological, evolutionary view
of human nature, and of health and illness, gained wide acceptance within
the medico-scientific world, and increasingly also outside it. The internal
disease model offered by physiological psychology meant that melancholia
could be plausibly explained as a biomedical condition in the apparent
absence of structural changes to brain tissue. In other words, within a
biological system of knowledge, the lack of visible evidence in the form
of lesions did not have to preclude the presence of mental disease. As
one British physician put it, ‘insanity really is a disease of the brain’, and
an adherence to a physiological view of the mind must lead physicians to
recognise that
the absence of post mortem evidence, even when it is satisfactorily proved
to exist, is no argument against the correctness of this opinion, because
such a result may merely arise from the real changes being too minute to be
detected by the processes in ordinary use for anatomical investigation.’79
Thus, the stage was set for a new generation of medical psychologists who
were increasingly concerned with diagnosis and classification of mental
disease and who sought to anchor their nascent discipline firmly in the
conceptual realm of medical science.
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Conclusion
This chapter has shown how concepts borrowed from experimental phys-
iology and internal medicine were used to speak about the psychology of
emotions in biological language. Terms like ‘irritation’ used to describe
the state and function of organs were applied to the mind within a
framework where mental activity was conceptualised as the unseen but
presumed activity of the brain. Laycock explained mental operations
through the concept of cerebral reflexion and perceived the emotions,
together with ideas and the will, as produced in the brain—such reflexive
action was, in other words, both psychological and cerebral. Carpenter,
however, maintained that the emotions were separate from a higher intel-
lect, which retained some measure of control of the former. This tension
between emotion and volition would continue to inform discussions
about disordered emotion, and melancholia, and were at the heart of
ideas about mental pathology embraced by late-Victorian asylum physi-
cians, many of whom drew on Laycock and Carpenter, as well as on
the work of influential psychiatrist Wilhelm Griesinger, whose theories of
psychological reflex action and the aetiology of melancholia are discussed
in Chapter 4.
Physiological psychology came to inform medico-scientific conceptions
of the mind and its disorders in the Victorian period, allowing for melan-
cholia to gradually become reconstituted as ‘disordered emotion’ and as
such a modern biomedical mental disease. The consequences of this event
were significant for how insanity was perceived in nineteenth-century
medicine, not least as it increasingly blurred and shifted the boundary
between healthy and pathological emotions. As will be seen in Chapter 5,
towards the end of the century physicians were increasingly concerned
with ‘simple’ or non-delusional melancholia. This did not merely mani-
fest in an expansion of the sphere of emotional disorders, but also, and
perhaps in a sense conversely, it facilitated the argument that emotional
states which physicians themselves considered to be non-pathological
could nonetheless legitimately fall within the purview of psychological
medicine. Moreover, the development of a physiological model for mental
disease did not only have consequences for conceptions of insanity in
the nineteenth century. The model of disordered mood that emerged
mid-century has proved durable in modern psychiatry, psychology, and
neuroscience. It continues to guide present research into the emotions
and their disorders, but more than this, it importantly governs what we
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perceive emotion to be, both as a central aspect of the human condition,
and as a private and intimate experience.
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The symptoms of melancholia are so well pronounced when present, and hence
so readily recognized, that they do not require to be very minutely described.
J.C. Bucknill and Daniel Hack Tuke (1858)
In 1863 William Sankey, medical superintendent at Hanwell Asylum in
Sussex, offered a survey of current perspectives on melancholia in Euro-
pean medicine.1 One of the first things he noted when comparing works
by British, German, and French physicians was the lack of agreement over
the nosological status of this disease category:
The foremost question with respect to melancholia is its position in
nosology. Some of the authors enumerated2 ignore its existence as a
distinct form of insanity, others retain it as one of the chief divisions of
their classification of mental maladies. Now, taking a broad, or what may
be called a distant view of the whole, nothing appears more marked or
distinct than melancholia from other kinds of insanity.3
Sankey’s ‘distant view’ was to become typical of his British cohort in the
last decades of the nineteenth century. However, as Sankey’s survey indi-
cated, during the first half of the nineteenth century British and European
medical literature on melancholia was characterised by divergence rather
than coherence. Some physicians, most notably J.C. Prichard, rejected
the validity and usefulness of the diagnosis altogether, seeking to replace
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it with other diagnostic terms or subsume it under broader categories.
At the same time, a reconceptualisation of melancholia began in the early
1840s, a process which would eventually produce a far more standard-
ised and coherent version of this category than had previously existed.
This process had its origins in experimental physiology, and emerged out
of an ongoing conceptual and terminological shift in the philosophy and
science of emotion.
This chapter maps the shifting nosological status of melancholia in
mid-century British medical literature, beginning in the 1830s and ending
with Sankey’s review of contemporary literature on the topic. At the turn
of the century, medical writers had begun to argue that the ‘passions’
played a central role in milder forms of insanity.4 This idea, emerging
before psychiatry itself, proved popular, flexible, and durable. It was foun-
dational to the modern medical concept of disordered mood, and has
persisted in some form or another until the present. The twenty-first-
century reader must, however, note that to suggest, as Enlightenment
physician Phillipe Pinel did, that strong passions can be a cause or
symptom of madness, is something quite different from suggesting that
emotion is a physiological process prone to disorder and disease.5 More-
over, it is equally important to note that both these explanations are quite
far apart from the twenty-first-century neurochemical model for disorders
of mood.
The biomedical melancholia that emerged at mid-century had two
important conceptual features, one external and one internal. Externally,
it was perceived as a form of mental disease in which emotion was the
main, or only, faculty affected, and as such it could present without delu-
sion of thought. An editorial in the Journal of Psychological Medicine in
1850 posing the question ‘Are delusions always present in melancholia?’
is illustrative of this approach. The answer offered by the author6 was
decisive: ‘We doubt it. Cases of intense melancholia have come under
our notice and care, in which we could not trace the faintest semblance
of delusion of any kind’.7 Internally, melancholia was conceptualised in
physiological (functional) rather than anatomical (structural) language as
a form of insanity that rarely left visible marks on the brain. In a speech
delivered at Hanwell Asylum the same year as the article quoted above,
John Hitchman forcefully argued that ‘[i]n every case of insanity, there is
irritation, or disease of the grey matter in the encephalon’.8 He suggested
that, while visible lesions may not always be discovered, indeed may not
occur at all, mental disease nonetheless always entailed a disorder of brain
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function. He cited in support of this argument the case of a forty-six-
year-old woman diagnosed with melancholia. Her subsequent death was
deemed the result of liver failure unrelated to her mental disturbance; the
post-mortem examination revealed no abnormalities of brain tissue. This
failure to find lesions on her brain was, however, used as a defence of
the cerebral theory rather than to rebuke it. The case was presented as
evidence of melancholia as a disease of the physiology of emotion rather
than an illness causing visible and lasting structural damage to the brain.9
As discussed in the Introduction, in European medical literature the
term melancholia had traditionally been deployed to describe various
manifestations of delusional madness characterised by sadness, grief, and
despair. Prior to the modern period there was consistently both tension
and harmony between medical and lay views of melancholia as madness
and melancholy as feeling or temperament. Moreover, in medieval and
early modern literature on melancholia and melancholy distinctions were
not always made between medical and non-medical descriptions, the most
obvious and famous example being the mammoth three-volume ode to
melancholy written by sixteenth-century clergyman Robert Burton. While
lay and medical perceptions of melancholia and melancholy continued
to interact to some extent in the nineteenth century,10 the two realms
grew increasingly separate. This is particularly evident on the pages of
asylum casebooks, where patients’ expressed religious guilt and fear of
divine punishment were generally interpreted and noted down by medical
officers as ‘religious delusions’. In Victorian Britain, the disease cate-
gory melancholia came within the purview of psychological medicine
(later psychiatry). As such it became a classifiable, diagnosable mental
disease with a specific set of symptoms, and often with an expected
course of progression. As a disease concept reinvented by physicians
wedded to a biological, and specifically physiological, view of health and
illness, melancholia was fashioned with a plausible biomedical model that
explained in scientific terms how the disease arose. The previous chapter
showed how this model was created through an appropriation of language
and concepts from experimental physiology, an event that constituted
emotion as an automated physiological process. However, the status of
melancholia as a distinct mental disease was uncertain in the first half
of the century. In part due to the influence of French alienism, partic-
ularly the nosological approach of Parisian physician J.E.D. Esquirol,
attempts were made to do away with the centuries-old traditional category
melancholia. Newer concepts such as ‘monomania’ and ‘moral insanity’
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threatened to eclipse or even erase melancholia as a diagnostic category
in British psychological medicine. However, by the end of the century,
melancholia was not only one of the most common forms of mental
disease diagnosed in British asylums, it was also one of the most written
about in medical literature. Moreover, descriptions of this disease, both
in medical texts and asylum casebooks, were remarkably standardised for
an age when psychiatry was still in its infancy and no formal standard
nosology existed in Britain or elsewhere. This and subsequent chapters
constitute an attempt to map how and why this happened.
To tell this story chronologically poses some difficulties, as the recon-
ceptualisation of melancholia was not a linear development. In 1845,
influential German psychiatrist Wilhelm Griesinger used his theory of
psychological reflexion, which closely resembled Laycock’s, to explain the
internal aetiology of melancholia in the first edition of his textbook on
psychiatry. However, his work was not translated into English until two
decades later, and then it was a revised and expanded second edition
that finally reached an English readership. At the same time, British
writers on mental disease began to appropriate physiological research
from the late 1840s, drawing on the works of people like Laycock,
Carpenter and Billing. This was, however, a patchy process; biomedical
models for melancholia similar to that offered by Griesinger began to
gain a foothold in British medical literature in the early 1850s, but many
physicians equally continued to favour a more traditional view of mental
disease. Griesinger’s work and its impact on British theories of mental
disease will be considered in detail in Chapter 4. This chapter will begin,
however, with the state of British nosology in the first half of the nine-
teenth century, prior to any significant uptake of physiology into literature
on insanity. This is illustrated chiefly by the work of British physician
J.C. Prichard, whose major textbook of insanity published in 1835 was
largely based on the teachings of Esquirol. The chapter continues into
the 1840s and 50s, when British asylum physicians were increasingly
embracing models of mental disease based on physiological concepts.
Around mid-century, nosological approaches varied, sometimes greatly,
yet melancholia was rapidly taking shape as a distinct and easily identifiable
disease category, prompting Sankey’s conclusion above.
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Melancholia, Monomania and Moral Insanity
When Bristol physician James Cowles Prichard’s monograph A Treatise on
Insanity was first published in 1835 it became part of a relatively sparse
catalogue of home-grown British works on mental disorders. While a
growing number of public and private lunatic asylums existed around the
country in the mid-1830s, standard national guidelines on the manage-
ment of these were still a decade away. There was as yet no professional
association or journal in Britain (unlike on the continent) and univer-
sities offered no formal training in what was to become ‘psychological
medicine’ (and later psychiatry). All of this would, however, soon begin
to change. Indeed, Prichard himself went on to become one of the first
national Lunacy Commissioners in 1845, just a few years before his death.
However, at the time when he produced his main work on insanity the
landscape of British psychological medicine was still uneven and compara-
tively barren. Prichard had travelled to Paris and trained under the famous
alienist Esquirol, and had become so impressed with the Parisian physician
that not only did he attempt to adapt the latter’s nosology for a British
audience, he even dedicated A Treatise on Insanity to his mentor.11
Despite a relative scarcity of literature compared to subsequent
decades, Prichard’s monograph was not the only Anglo-Saxon text on
mental disorders available to British physicians in the 1830s. This was
a time when the Tuke family’s advocacy for moral management of
lunatics was gaining ground across the country, perhaps most passion-
ately supported by Prichard’s contemporary John Conolly, whose work
is considered below. Prichard’s classification of insanity, and his approach
to melancholia in particular, offers a fitting starting point for the discus-
sion that will unfold in this chapter as it represents a particular early
nineteenth-century approach to the classification and diagnosis of mental
disease, one which marked itself quite clearly both from traditional
medical writings on madness, and the physiologically inspired models
that would follow. It was also the by subsequent generations of medical
psychologists most read and cited early century British publication on
insanity.
While historians have primarily attributed Prichard’s place in psychi-
atry’s hall of fame to his supposed invention of the term ‘moral
insanity’,12 he was also much preoccupied with Esquirol’s versatile
category ‘monomania’. Following Esquirol, he attempted to subsume
melancholia under this umbrella category. In doing so, he also classified
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melancholia as a form of ‘partial insanity’, a type of madness in which
the intellect was only compromised in regards to one particular aspect
or idea. This, indeed, was arguably Prichard’s more significant contribu-
tion to the early creation of diagnostic categories in psychiatry. When
the Metropolitan Commissioners in Lunacy (a precursor to the nation-
wide Lunacy Commission) adopted a formal nosology in the 1840s this
included the umbrella category partial insanity under which melancholia
was listed alongside monomania and moral insanity. Prichard, however,
used partial insanity interchangeably with monomania, and distinguished
it from moral insanity. The latter he defined as ‘a morbid perversion of
the natural feelings, affections, inclinations, temper, habits, moral disposi-
tions, and natural impulses, without any remarkable disorder or defect of
the intellect or knowing and reasoning faculties, and particularly without
insane delusion or hallucination’.13 Conversely, monomania (or partial
insanity) did involve some measure of intellectual disorder, pertaining to
‘one subject, and involving one train of ideas’. The central premise of
Prichard’s nosological approach was significant: that one could be mad
without being fully delusional, an idea that had been gaining ground
in medical circles across Western Europe at least since the turn of the
nineteenth century.
In addition to Esquirol, Prichard found his inspiration among other
European writers, whose work he subjected to critical analysis. He paid a
great deal of attention to the early German school of psychiatry, partic-
ularly the work of Johann Christian Heinroth, whose view of insanity
reflected a Romanticist philosophical worldview. Early nineteenth-century
German literature on madness produced in this vein tended to emphasise
the importance of the passions (and the soul) in mental disease (Hein-
roth himself referred to madness as Seelenstörungen—disturbances of the
soul).14 However, it was different from the French school in that the
latter showed greater interest in the potentially physical basis of insanity;
anatomical investigations and particularly psychiatric post-mortems were
commonplace in the Parisian hospitals.15 Prichard attempted to incor-
porate some of the recent findings of such empirical research, taking
stock of the various European writers who had tried to locate madness
in brain tissue. His discussion did not, however, move beyond anatomy
to take in any aspects of the research emerging at the time in the area of
experimental physiology. For the most part, Prichard’s approach largely
followed that of Esquirol, stating that abnormalities found in the brain
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tissue of dead asylum patients suggested that insanity was a morbid condi-
tion affecting the brain. However, he withheld judgement on whether
‘disorders in the affections and feelings’ were purely or chiefly cerebral,
suggesting that ‘however probably it may be thought by some persons
that the passions and propensities are seated in the brain, or that modifi-
cations which the mind undergoes with respect to these phenomena are
connected with instrumental changes in the brain, the fact has never been
proved’.16
Prichard was primarily concerned with the description of symptoms
and the classification of these into correct categories. He suggested of
melancholia that it was an outdated term that failed to accurately convey
the type of illness it was usually deployed to describe, since ‘the illusions
which possess the mind are not constantly, in individuals partially insane,
indicative of grief and melancholy’.17 Thus, he concluded that ‘Melan-
cholia seemed to be an improper designation for cases of this kind; and
the term Monomania, which was happily suggested by M. Esquirol, has
been universally adopted in its place’.18 Prichard was somewhat optimistic
in his assessment of the impact of his mentor’s nosology; monomania
never completely replaced melancholia, but it was taken up by other
British writers and became for a while a relatively widely used category
in psychological medicine. Esquirol had suggested lypemanie (‘sadness
mania’) to denote a melancholic subtype of monomania, but Prichard
did not perceive such a specific label to be necessary.
Moral insanity featured at least peripherally as a diagnosis into the
second half of the century. Yet, as will be seen in Chapter 5, the
nosology favoured by the Lunacy Commission gave primacy to the more
well-established categories melancholia, mania, dementia, and general
paralysis. Asylum physicians were encouraged to use preprinted forms
produced by the Commission to record diagnoses and symptoms, an
act that facilitated a gradual standardisation of diagnostics within the
significant portion of British psychological medicine that was tied to
the asylum. Moreover, the nineteenth-century meaning of ‘moral’ was
ambiguous. While Prichard used the term to mean ‘psychological’ in the
wider sense,19 conceptualising moral insanity as a form of partial affec-
tive mental disease, others used the word specifically to denote insanity
that manifested in immoral feelings, thoughts, and actions. James Davey
suggested that ‘several cases given by Dr. Prichard to illustrate what he
conceived to be moral insanity, were instances of everyday mania in which
the intellectual faculties had escaped the ravages of the disease affecting
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the emotional qualities of the mind’. Rather, Davey argued, the diag-
nosis of moral insanity should be confined to cases where a ‘well marked
predisposition to the indulgence of the lower feelings and animal desires
is manifested’.20 He deferred to Thomas Mayo’s Elements of Pathology of
the Human Mind (1838) to suggest that moral insanity proper involved
an element of ‘brutality’.21 According to Mayo, brutality arose from a
‘defect’ in ‘the emotive department’, but he did not consider this a form
of insanity in the strict sense, rather it was one of three types of ‘deviation
from health in which mental phenomena predominate’—the other two
being insanity and idiocy.22 It is important to note, too, that both Mayo
and Davey associated brutality and moral perversion—and the emotions
more generally—with the lower bodily appetites rather than the higher
mental faculties. This is an apt illustration of how older philosophical and
medical concepts were fused with the new sciences in this period. The
language used to talk about human activity was ambiguous in this sense,
with ‘emotions’ at times being used interchangeably with ‘passions’, at
times to denote bodily ‘appetites’, and other times as an umbrella term
for all mental activity that was considered to have a somatic basis, separate
from the intellect.
This oscillation between old and new language was particularly evident
in aetiological descriptions. Prichard’s account of how a person would
become affected by the melancholic subtype of monomania is a case in
point:
An individual of melancholic temperament, who has long been under the
influence of circumstances calculated to impair his health and call into
play the morbid tendencies of his constitution, sustains some unexpected
misfortune, or is subjected to causes of anxiety; he becomes dejected in
spirits, desponds, broods over his feelings till all the prospects of life appear
to him dark and comfortless.23
The idea of a ‘melancholic temperament’ gradually declined later in the
century, but a belief in the predisposition to certain forms of mental
disease was maintained by late Victorian physicians through narratives of
heredity. In the first half of the century, however, the holistic language
of temperament took precedence over a physiological aetiology empha-
sising cerebral morbid processes in descriptions of melancholia. This was
even more prominent in Mayo’s discussion of mental disease, where the
language used to describe the different forms of insanity was explicitly
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humoural. Mayo deployed the simple tripartite division of mania, melan-
cholia, and dementia, respectively associated with ‘sanguine’, ‘bilious’,
and ‘leucophlegmatic’ temperament. Overall, however, Mayo devoted
scant attention to melancholia, including only one case study of the
disease in his textbook.24
Like Prichard, Davey did not find melancholia particularly useful as
an independent disease category, suggesting that ‘[m]any patients said
to be suffering from melancholia labour, in point of fact, under mania;
but, in these cases, the most prominent symptom is grief’. In other cases,
melancholia was best understood as a form of moral insanity in the broad
psychological meaning adopted by Prichard.25 A point upon which Davey
clearly set himself apart from both Prichard and Mayo, however, was in
regard to the internal explanation of mental disease, where he adopted a
physiological perspective. As noted in Chapter 2, Davey based his theory
of disordered emotion and ideation upon Billing’s work, suggesting that
the latter ‘demonstrates that “the consequence of the brain or spinal cord
becoming in a state of morbid sensibility is, that their healthy actions
are deranged”’. In language similar to that used by Laycock in the
previous chapter, whereby abstractly described psychological states could
produce morbid physiological reactions in the brain, Davey concluded
that ‘“mental excitement”, such as anger, grief, fear, etc., which are anal-
ogous to the direct irritation of the brain or spinal cord by a depressed
fracture or spicula of bone’ would, if carried on over time, result in a
‘state of morbid sensibility of the nervous centres’.26
‘Depression’ as a Symptom of Melancholia
Davey’s reference to a ‘depressed fracture’ as an analogy to describe a
brain in a state of morbid sensibility manifesting in depressed mood illus-
trates the multivalence of ‘depression’ as an emotional state in this period.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, depression was increasingly
constituted as one of four defining criteria of melancholia (the other three
being mental pain, suicidality, and religious delusions, all of which are
considered in Chapter 5). While the Oxford English Dictionary dates
‘depression’ back at least to late fourteenth-century astronomy,27 the
term grew in popularity as a descriptive word in the modern period, and
was used throughout the nineteenth century to denote a range of events
and conditions. How the term entered the vocabulary of psychological
medicine is uncertain; it was at least in part derived from the language of
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internal medicine, where it was used to speak of the action of the heart.28
From the turn of the nineteenth century depression gained significant
popularity as a term used to talk about a slump in economic markets, and
its gloomy connotation in this context cannot be ignored. ‘Depression of
spirits’ was sometimes used to describe a melancholy state of mind prior to
the nineteenth century, but as such was conceptually different from the
‘mental depression’ often referred to in Victorian medico-psychological
literature on melancholia.
As noted in the Introduction, the regular use of ‘mental depression’
to describe the general emotional state of the melancholic in the nine-
teenth century has led twentieth- and twenty-first-century scholars both
in the human and natural sciences to attempt to equate melancholia with
the condition commonly known as clinical depression or Major Depres-
sive Disorder in the present. For nineteenth-century physicians, the term
was applied in a way that suggested a much more literal meaning, that of
something being ‘pressed down’. In melancholia, the ‘tone’ of the mind
was slackened and subdued. The mental depression was one in which
the operations of the brain were dampened, lowered. This pressing down
of the mind was often seen as mirrored in overall bodily function, with
digestion, respiration, and movement significantly slower than normal in
cases of severe melancholia. Towards the end of the century London
physician Charles Mercier suggested that melancholia was characterised
by a ‘depression of spirits’ with a corresponding deceleration of bodily
functions:
We find, therefore, that in melancholia there is evidence of want of vigour
in all the bodily processes. The hair grows but slowly, the nails seldom
want cutting, the mouth is dry, the digestion is sluggish, the bowels are
constipated, the pulse is feeble, the breathing is shallow, the muscles are
flabby, the bodily activity is diminished. Together with these bodily mani-
festations goes a depression of spirits which varies in degree from a trifling
want of buoyancy to the profoundest misery and despair.29
Victorian medical psychologists spoke of a ‘depression of spirits’, or an
‘emotional’ or ‘mental’ depression when describing melancholia, but the
term was predominantly used as a way to describe the overall state of the
melancholic mind, and as a way to contrast melancholia with mania—the
opposite state of ‘mental excitation’. In this way, depression was a helpful
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concept in the process creating boundaries of classification, but it was not
used in place of melancholia, as a term denoting a specific disease.
From Conolly to Sankey: Remaking Melancholia
In 1846, British physician John Conolly gave a series of lectures at
Hanwell asylum, where he held the position of medical superintendent
prior to Sankey. Conolly is perhaps best known to posterity as a vocal
champion of non-restraint (and, later, as Henry Maudsley’s father-in-law).
However, as a well-known and influential asylum physician Conolly was
also an important source of knowledge about the diagnostics of mental
disease for students and younger practitioners. His ‘Clinical Lectures
on the Principal Forms of Insanity’ were subsequently published in The
Lancet over several issues. Of the different types of madness addressed,
Conolly awarded the most attention to melancholia, the discussion of
which constituted three separate articles.
Conolly remained consistent with earlier works in that he did not clas-
sify melancholia as an independent disease category, suggesting instead
that it was a ‘variety of maniacal affection’. Nevertheless, he devoted a
significant amount of space to melancholia, and argued that the nature
of the symptoms exhibited warranted a separation of melancholia from
other types of mania when explaining how to identify and diagnose
it. Conolly’s descriptive language displayed a mixture of old and new
terminology that was characteristic of his generation. On the one hand,
he suggested that melancholics were so predisposed because of their
‘temperament’ and that they could usually be identified according to
certain characteristics of ‘physical appearance’ such as ‘dark hair and
eyes’, ‘long features’, and ‘a sallow complexion’. On the other hand, he
incorporated modern medical language when describing the psycholog-
ical features of the disease, emphasising the key symptom as ‘depression
of mind’. When discussing the aetiology of melancholia Conolly was
chiefly concerned with ‘moral’ causes, these being ‘grief,’ ‘care’, ‘dis-
tress’, ‘religious despondency’, and ‘conscientiousness in excess’.30 As
with the symptomatology of the disease, there was evidence of biomed-
ical language, though it remained unspecific. He suggested that while the
illness could be triggered by such moral causes as mentioned above, more
often melancholia
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creates its own distresses, coming on without adequate moral cause, some
state of the brain being induced by which it is incapable of receiving
pleasing impressions. This state is sometimes obviously connected with
morbid actions or conditions of the liver, of the heart, of the intestinal
canal, or of the uterus; but oftentimes the cause is wholly obscure; and the
unexplained disposition to sadness hereditary.31
The framework for this description originates with physiological
psychology, where both internal and external sensations could cause an
automated emotional response. The idea that morbid action elsewhere
in the body, for instance the uterus, could trigger a negative reaction in
the brain leading to low mood echoes Laycock’s discussion of nervous
disorders in women a few years earlier. Conolly did not cite his influ-
ences, but he was writing at a time when the ideas of people like Laycock
and Carpenter were gaining popularity among British physicians with
an interest in mental disease. While not explicitly referring to reflexive
action, Conolly drew upon this model to explain instances of melancholia
apparently unmotivated by external causes. Going one step further, he
also suggested that a mental depression of the mind triggered internally
need not be linked to morbidity in a specific organ, but could be due to
‘obscure’ causes. Conolly did not elaborate further on what such causes
might entail; however, his mention of heredity signalled a move towards
a concept which would become important to all forms on insanity, as
well as to criminality and vice, in the second half of the century.32 It is
also important to note that his argument that the melancholic brain was
‘incapable of receiving pleasing impressions’ would be modified by later
medical writers. As will be seen in subsequent chapters, the increasingly
standardised description of melancholia that emerged in the second half
of the century generally held that all impressions received by a morbidly
sensitive brain, whether positive or negative, would produce feelings of
displeasure.
Joseph Williams, a privately practising physician who primarily treated
wealthy outpatients, was inspired by Conolly’s work and largely followed
his approach to the aetiology and classification of melancholia, bringing
together traditional language on insanity with modern scientific research.
Williams trained briefly at a number of hospitals around Europe and
proceeded to bring together his observations and research in an 1852
textbook that situated him somewhere between early century alienists
like Prichard and the new generation of medical psychologists who
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approached their profession and its objects of research from a strongly
biomedical viewpoint. His view of mind and emotion was particularly
coloured by traditional language. He perceived a division between on
the one hand ‘emotions’, ‘passions’, ‘propensities’, and ‘bodily appetites’,
and on the other the ‘intellectual faculties’ including the will.33 Contrary
to the suggestions of some writers, he argued, ‘judgment is always
perverted in insanity, although in different degrees.’34 Moreover, like
Conolly Williams perceived a close link between insanity and ‘tempera-
ment’, suggesting that ‘those with intensely black hair and eyes are of a
nervous temperament and are more subject to melancholia’.35
Williams largely adhered to the classification of insanity put forward
by the Metropolitan Lunacy Commission in the 1840s. As noted above,
this system saw melancholia situated as a subcategory under ‘partial
insanity’, alongside monomania and moral insanity. This nosology was
maintained with the creation of the nationwide Lunacy Commission in
1845, and would dominate for a few decades (though monomania and
moral insanity were gradually phased out). It is not surprising, then,
that a number of physicians writing in the 1850s and 60s adopted
this system of classification, regardless of their aetiological approach
to mental disease. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 5, this gradual
standardisation of diagnostic categories occurred despite resistance from
the Medico-Psychological Association to formally adopting a standard
nosology.36
One of the early presidents of the Association was Henry Monro (son
of the famous Bethlem physician Thomas Monro), a consulting physician
on mental disease at St. Luke’s whose experience in diagnosing insanity
led him to publish several works on the topic. He is of particular impor-
tance to the present story as his Remarks on Insanity (1851) was one of
the earliest British works to fully embrace a view of mental disease firmly
anchored in physiological psychology. Monro’s adoption of a biomed-
ical model for melancholia and other forms of insanity was rationalised
through a now familiar type of analogy. If one believed that mental disease
was a disorder of nervous function, one would, he argued, naturally seek
to discover ‘how far the mental excesses and deficiencies of insanity could
be accounted for by the same rules that account for spasm and paralysis of
motion’.37 While the abstract qualities of mind might differ from strictly
somatic functions such as ‘motion’ and ‘nutrition’, Monro held that that
since these distinct functions nonetheless used
76 Å. JANSSON
a common instrument, – namely, nervous matter, and as this mecha-
nism is of the same nature, subject to the same infirmities, and intimately
connected in its various parts both by sympathies and continuity, we must
believe that, so far as the various phenomena presented through nervous
instrumentality are really dependent on this similar mechanism, similar
results are to be anticipated.38
Like Conolly, he also perceived a causal relationship between somatic
and mental operations, whereby a disturbance in an organ elsewhere in
the body could reflexively trigger a painful cerebral reaction.39 A healthy
mind was one where a ‘static condition of the nervous system’ was main-
tained, and where a mental reaction would only occur when ‘it is called
forth into action by its own proper stimuli’. Conversely, a morbid condi-
tion ‘is that wherein abnormal stimuli set in action and produce the same
effects that proper stimuli should’.40
Following from this, Monro put forward a five-point definition of
‘the pathology of insanity’ based on a psycho-physiological model of
mind and brain. He suggested that mental disease constituted ‘an affec-
tion consequent on depressed vitality’, and that ‘when the cerebral
masses are suffering from this condition of depressed vitality, they lose
that static equilibrium of the nervous energies which we call tone’.
This muscle metaphor used by Monro to illustrate the state of healthy
nervous and mental function became popular with the next generation of
medical writers whose work is considered in subsequent chapters, and was
deployed to suggest that the ‘tone’ of the brain was slackened or lost.41
The analogous relationship between the physical and the mental was then
further reinforced by Monro through the suggestion of a reversal of the
causal relationship in which ‘coincidentally with this want of tone, mani-
fested in the seat of the sensorial faculties, there exists very frequently in
the insane a marked want of vitality and nervous tone in those parts of
the system which are connected with physical life’, such as the skin.42 In
sum, then, somatic disturbances would often give rise to morbid mental
reactions leading to or constituting insanity, a condition of lost equilib-
rium and ‘tone’ of the cerebral nervous tissue. When the tone of the mind
and brain was diminished or lost this would subsequently often lead to an
externally manifest loss of tone, such as of the skin or muscles.
When it came to diagnostics, Monro found distinct categories of
mental disease less useful than a division of stages into ‘acute’, ‘chronic’,
and ‘imbecile’, suggesting that any more detailed and precise distinc-
tion was difficult to maintain in a clinical setting.43 Nevertheless, he
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proceeded to divide insanity into a number of categories and subcate-
gories. On the status of melancholia as an individual diagnostic category
Monro largely followed the recommendations of the Lunacy Commis-
sion, including it under the heading ‘partial insanity’, suggesting that it
could manifest without delusion of thought. The description he offered
was heavily anchored in the new biomedical language. Melancholia was,
he suggested, a condition in which there was a ‘general and extreme pros-
tration of all nervous and physical power’; in other words, a ‘depression’
of nervous power and consequently of mood. In this type of disorder,
the patient does not manifest any delusion until his lowness becomes exces-
sive and more than ordinary, and then his extreme depression runs into
terror and anxieties which have no real source; every effort is performed
with morbid dread, even the least movement seems sufficient to raise
anxious fears; sounds are listened to with anxiety, objects of sight cause an
extremely morbid interest: this is a state, in short, of distressing sensibility,
which only occasionally runs into real aberration of mind.44
Melancholia, then, was chiefly a disorder of affectivity, which in the more
advanced stages could also manifest in delusion of thought. Later in the
century physicians would generally distinguish more clearly between the
non-delusional and delusional forms of the disease by referring to the
former as simple melancholia. It would be argued by Henry Maudsley
and others that the suffering tended to be greater in this form of the
disease, as subjects were fully aware that their mental pain was unfounded
and irrational.45
A model very similar to Monro’s was presented a few years later by
George Robinson, asylum physician and lecturer in mental disease at
Newcastle. Robinson explained the mind-body relationship by perceiving
the brain as the medium between the two, meaning that its health
or illness was subject to both mental and physical disturbances.46 In
other words, the brain could be excited by psychological factors—recall
the ‘mention’ of water in Laycock’s example of hydrophobia discussed
in Chapter 2—as well as by known or unknown activity elsewhere in
the body. Robinson was, however, quick to caution his peers against
presumption and speculation, warning that ‘the precise laws regulating in
individual cases the production of the various forms of functional nervous
disorder’ were ‘as yet very imperfectly known.’47 However, there was, he
argued, ‘one law explanatory of a large and important group of nervous
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affections which must not be passed over in silence, namely, the law of
reflex action’. From the basic sensation-motion reflex Robinson perceived
two analogous laws; the first being
that the morbid impression produced by a source of irritation existing in a
distant part of the body, may be transmitted by the incident nervous fibres
to the spinal cord and brain, and thence reflected to various motor nerves,
giving rise to convulsions and other results of disordered nervous action.48
Following from this, the second law was, he suggested, ‘less capable
of direct experimental demonstration’, but no less central to under-
standing the emergence of mental disorders. According to this law,
‘reflected morbid stimuli’ would ‘give rise to painful affections in parts
far distant from the original seat of irritation, as for instance, in some
forms of neuralgia, in sick headache from indigestion, &c’. While having
warned against careless conjecture, Robinson nevertheless ventured a
third possible law derived from the sensory-motor reflex concept. This
was the process ordinarily referred to as ‘the association of ideas’. For
what was this process, he asked, ‘but a species of reflected feeling, which
from the most trivial circumstances can call into existence, and evolve, an
elaborate chain of thoughts and sentiments, apparently the most remote
and unconnected?’49
Just like sensation, then, emotion could travel as an automated reac-
tion and trigger ‘an elaborate chain of thoughts and sentiments’. In a
similar fashion to the models offered by Griesinger and Laycock, this
analogy described by Robinson largely erased any hierarchical separation
between emotion as somatic and ideas and volition as cerebral. Rather,
the functions of the mind were, according to Robinson, the result of
operations of the brain, which in turn equally depended upon activity
elsewhere in the body. A reflexive relationship existed between mind,
body, and brain in conjunction, and between emotion and ideas as prod-
ucts of this relationship. It is easy to see how this framework allowed
for a range of aetiological explanations for insanity, and specifically for a
conceptualisation of disordered emotion as a form of mental disease.
It follows, then, that Robinson believed melancholia to arise from a
number of factors, and that this disease did not necessarily entail delu-
sion of thought and judgement: ‘Some patients display merely lowness of
spirits, with a distaste for the pleasures of life, and a total indifference to
its concerns. These have no disorder of the understanding, or defect in
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the intellectual powers’, while others ‘derive their grief and despondency
from some unreal misfortune which they imagine to have befallen them’.
Robinson, too, deployed a nosology similar to the one sanctioned by the
Lunacy Commission, which saw melancholia fall under the category ‘par-
tial insanity’ together with monomania and moral insanity. However, he
perceived a much more marked distinction between these three forms of
disorder than many other contemporary writers. Taking the literal (and,
following Esquirol, original) definition of monomania, he described it as
a form of insanity where the patient’s intellect was compromised only
in relation to one ‘particular topic’, this frequently being the idea that
‘they hold conversations with supernatural beings.’ Moral insanity, on the
other hand, was often free of delusion, but manifested in ‘a total want of
self-control, with an inordinate propensity to excesses of various kinds.’50
As we have seen, mid-century medical writers were increasingly turning
to physiology for language and concepts with which to explain mental
disease. This shift was particularly apparent in the work of Daniel Noble,
medical officer at a private lunacy facility in Manchester, where he also
lectured in mental diseases at the Chatham Street School of Medicine.
His Elements of Psychological Medicine (1853) acknowledged a signifi-
cant intellectual debt to Carpenter’s work, and appropriated much of
the latter’s framework for mental physiology. Noble based his theory
of mental disease on a psycho-physiological framework of the mind
and brain, in which ideas, emotions, and actions could arise reflex-
ively, without external stimuli.51 However, he departed somewhat from
Carpenter’s model in designating the different mental faculties to their
correct physical location. While Carpenter had assigned emotion to the
‘the ganglia of the nerves of special sensation’,52 Noble suggested that
it inhabited its own specific space separate from ‘the sensibility of the
five senses’, namely in ‘the Optic Thalami and Corpora Striata’.53 It was
evident, Noble argued, from ‘the speciality of emotional sensibility’ that
emotion must originate in ‘proper nervous centres’. The reactive power of
emotion was significant, he argued, and actions would ‘often arrive imme-
diately and exclusively from this inner sensibility’.54 It is not surprising,
then, that Noble was unequivocal in suggesting the possibility of ‘emo-
tional disorder’ in which there was ‘no perversion of ideas’. However,
Noble was equally firm in the view that he would ‘never characterise
such cases as insanity, so long as the reason evinced itself unimpaired.’55
Where, then, did that leave melancholia? Here, Noble set himself apart
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from many of his peers in suggesting that cases of ‘melancholic depres-
sion’ of limited duration and where reason was left fully intact should not
be considered pathological.56 Morbid melancholia, he argued, was a state
characterised by ‘a fixedness and permanence in the moral depression’ in
which ‘the ideas’ would ‘sustain perversion’. However, in summing up
the differences between non-pathological melancholy and melancholia,
Noble’s description of the latter resonated with contemporaneous views:
In melancholia, the circumstances are disproportionate to the result;
and the ulterior development of the emotional state, becomes referable,
very often, to classes of ideas that have no immediate relation with the
primary facts occasioning the mental distress; the moral disposition, in
other respects, is found to have undergone some notable change, not to
be accounted for by ordinary influences; and, moreover, there are often
physical signs of nervous irritability or cerebral disturbance.57
The view that melancholics tended to attribute an incorrect cause to their
suffering would be cited repeatedly by medical writers later in the century.
While twenty-first-century scholars have described melancholia in this
period as ‘sadness without cause’,58 this is a slight misconception of how
Victorian physicians perceived it. They distinguished between external
and internal causes—the former would usually be (wrongly) suggested
by patients, whereas the latter could be correctly assigned by the medical
psychologist.
As the works discussed above indicate, during the 1850s the land-
scape of British psychological medicine was rapidly growing fertile as an
increasing number of physicians decided to turn their experience in the
diagnosis and observation of mental disease into educational publications.
One textbook would, however, tower over other contemporary literature
on the topic. Appearing in several editions throughout the early second
half of the century, Bucknill and Tuke’s Manual of Psychological Medicine
was one of the most widely circulated textbooks on insanity of the mid-
Victorian period, and Tuke’s equally impressive Dictionary59 published
in the 1890s saw contributions from a range of Britain’s most prominent
medical psychologists. With the Manual, Tuke and Bucknill gave British
physicians their most comprehensive textbook on insanity since Prichard’s
Treatise. Indeed, it was the authors’ own explicit aim to replace this book
with a more modern publication on the topic.60 They offered a wide-
ranging survey of medical opinion on insanity from ancient times until
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the present, paying particular attention to recent works by home-grown
physicians such as Conolly and Monro.
However, remarkably little space was devoted by the authors to the
physiology and pathology of mental disease. The reason for this was
alluded to by the cautious attitude displayed towards the promise and
potential of recent empirical research. Despite what they perceived as
great advances in internal medicine more generally, Tuke and Bucknill
held fast to the view that the true functions of the brain and their correla-
tion with mental phenomena were in all likelihood perpetually beyond the
grasp of human knowledge. Following from this, they were highly critical
of physicians who tried to attribute all mental disease to one particular
type of disturbance of nervous function, such as ‘exhaustion’, ‘irritation’,
or ‘inflammation’. However, in a broad sense they agreed that all forms
of insanity, being disorders of the mind, were also disorders of the brain,
and ‘that diseased conditions which affect the mental functions must have
their seat in the grey matter of the cerebral convolutions ’.61 Importantly,
the authors did not perceive a division between higher and lower mental
faculties, suggesting instead that the brain was the seat of emotion as well
as of the intellect.
The model of emotion as a reflexive function of the brain prone to
interact with ideas in a similarly involuntary manner formed the basis for
Tuke and Bucknill’s explanation of the mental suffering typical in melan-
cholia. The despondency of melancholics tended to be at its worst in the
early morning, they argued, and this could most likely be attributed to
the unwonted activity and force which attend all operations of the mind at
this period. Every one must have observed the vividness with which sugges-
tions occur to the mind, and ideas irresistibly succeed each other, when
conscious, although involuntary cerebration is then first put in action.62
Like other authors at the time, they were of the opinion that melancholia
could be present with or without delusion of thought and judgement.63
The authors largely adhered to the nosology endorsed by the Lunacy
Commissioners; however, they suggested following Esquirol and Prichard
that melancholia could in fact be seen as a type of monomania. However,
later editions of Tuke and Bucknill’s Manual would place stronger
emphasis on a biomedical perspective, as well as on melancholia as a
distinct disease entity.
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Continuing this trend, John Millar’sHints on Insanity (1861) reflected
several contemporaneous developments, drawing together a physiological
explanatory framework with a system of classification that gave promi-
nence to melancholia, mania, and general paralysis. Millar’s monograph
also contained extensive helpful notes on how to fill out the medical
certificates of insanity that were required for the admission of patients
under the 1845 Lunacy Law. In regards to melancholia, Millar suggested
that there was ‘frequently no mental aberration detectable’, reaffirming
the view that the disease could manifest without delusion.64 For the most
part, Millar’s brief monograph consisted of disseminating existing views.
However, his discussion of melancholia contained an observation that was
at this time relatively peripheral in medico-psychological literature, but
which would a mere two decades later be widely accepted as a medical
fact, as will be seen in subsequent chapters. ‘Every case of melancholia’,
Millar suggested, ‘should be looked upon as having a suicidal tendency.’65
As the works discussed in this chapter suggest, when William Sankey
published his survey of current medical opinion on melancholia in 1863
something of a coherent approach was beginning to emerge. In published
material there was growing agreement on the validity of a biomedical
approach to mental health and disease, and the view of emotion as
cerebral and subject to disorder was becoming widely accepted. While
disagreement on the nosological status of melancholia prevailed, descrip-
tions of the disease were becoming increasingly distinctive as well as
comprehensive. When Sankey arrived at his own observations on this
disease category, then, the model he offered was firmly anchored in
biomedical language. Beginning by discussing the ‘excitory-sensatory’
and ‘excitory-motory’ action of the central nervous system, he arrived
by analogy at a concept similar to that of Laycock’s cerebral reflexion,
suggesting that ‘illusions’ occurred through a mental process analogous
to that which produced ‘convulsions’.66 The cause of these ‘illusions’ (by
which is taken to mean the mental or ideational correlate of a physical
convulsion—essentially a convulsion of ideas) was ‘an abnormal (state) in
the nutritive changes of the nervous centres’.67 The physiological model
suggested by Sankey to explain the emergence of disordered emotion
was carried over into his description of melancholia as a diagnostic
category. He described melancholia as ‘a group of morbid phenomena
or symptoms……characterised chiefly by depression of spirits’. Sankey
went on to list various manifestations of morbid emotion displayed in
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melancholia, such as mental pain, fear, depression, despondency, selfish-
ness, and suicidal intentions.68 In this way, Sankey and his contemporaries
tried to solve the problem of how to wed a scientific, biomedical model
of mental disease with the external manifestations of the patients they
encountered by describing an increasing number of the ‘symptoms’
observed in a language compatible with the internal disease model.
Conclusion
Sankey’s attempt to reconcile the new biomedical language of disor-
dered emotion with the diagnostic picture of melancholia highlights a
conundrum that would pursue medical psychologists throughout the rest
of the century. At the same time, however, the language of physiology
was making itself increasingly evident in the external symptomatology
of melancholia. As this chapter has documented, psycho-physiology gave
rise to a new language for descriptive psychopathology, where symptoms
such as ‘mental pain’ and ‘depression’ were perceived as key features
of melancholia. While these symptoms began their life in medical liter-
ature, physicians claimed with increasing regularity to observe them in
melancholic asylum patients.
The argument that melancholia could present completely without
delusion of thought or moral judgement was gradually assuming the
status of medical fact at mid-century. Such a belief was in part facili-
tated by a model of the mind in which the emotions were able to interact
and react with ideas. Some writers maintained a hierarchical separation
between emotion and intellect, but allowing for the ability of these facul-
ties to interact and react within a framework that nevertheless constituted
emotion as chiefly psychological. For an increasing number of medical
writers, however, emotion was perceived as cerebral. Moreover, for more
strict materialists like Laycock all mental functions, being functions of the
brain, were subject to involuntary reflexive action. One of the first medical
psychologists and asylum physicians to develop a detailed and compre-
hensive monograph based on these ideas and devoted solely to the mind
and its disorders was Henry Maudsley. His monumental The Physiology
and Pathology of the Mind, first published in 1867, endeavoured to fully
bring together existing physiological knowledge of mental operations and
show how the pathology of insanity was not a separate scientific discipline,
but merely an extension of physiology. Maudsley’s first textbook was a
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work of medicine, but more than this it offered a comprehensive psycho-
logical framework for normal and pathological emotion, a framework
which merged the languages of physiology, psychopathology, and evolu-
tionary theory. Maudsley was strongly influenced by both Laycock and
Carpenter, but also by the biological and increasingly academic research
on mental disease that was coming out of the German states in the 1860s.
In Germany, psychiatry became a concept, a trade, and an academic
discipline earlier than in Britain, a development spearheaded by an ambi-
tious doctor from Göttingen, Wilhem Griesinger. Griesinger developed
a model of psychological reflex action at the same time as Laycock, and
applied it to his aetiological work on mental disease. As will be seen in the
next chapter, he wrote extensively on melancholia, and influenced a new
generation of German psychiatrists whose work was strongly neurological
in character.
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CHAPTER 4
Melancholia and the New Biological
Psychiatry
[W]hen there is perversion of the affective life, there will be morbid feeling
and morbid action; the patient’s whole manner of feeling, the mode of his
affection by events, is unnatural, and the springs of his action are disordered;
and the intellect is unable to check or control the morbid manifestations, just
as, when there is disease of the spinal cord, there may be convulsive movement,
of which there is consciousness, but which the will cannot restrain.1
Henry Maudsley (1867)
By the 1860s, the concept of disordered emotion as a physiological
phenomenon was firmly established in British medicine. The physiological
models of mental operations proposed by Carpenter and Laycock outlined
in Chapter 2 were foundational for this development. As previously noted,
at the same time as Laycock put forward his theory of cerebral reflex
action, German physician Wilhelm Griesinger presented an almost iden-
tical model which he referred to as ‘psychological reflex action’ (psychische
Reflexactionen). While neither Carpenter nor Laycock discussed mental
reflex action in relation to depressive emotions, Griesinger applied his
theoretical framework to melancholia and disordered mood. His text-
book on mental pathology, first published in 1845 with a second, revised
and expanded edition reaching a wide European audience in the 1860s,
offered one of the century’s most influential nosological descriptions of
melancholia firmly anchored in a physiological model of emotion.
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Griesinger inspired a new generation of physicians in Germany and
beyond, including in Britain. In the late 1860s, up and coming asylum
physician Henry Maudsley drew on Griesinger’s work, as well as on
the ideas of some of the most prominent scientific minds of the time,
including Laycock and Carpenter, as well as Herbert Spencer and
Charles Darwin. Maudsley sought to definitively merge physiology and
psychology into a new scientific psychiatry that was equally concerned
with classification and aetiology. His model of disordered mood and his
nosological system had a far greater impact on subsequent psychiatric
knowledge than is generally recognised by historians today. As a new
scientific psychiatry was rapidly endorsed across Britain and the conti-
nent, numerous voices were added to those of Griesinger and Maudsley.
In mapping the development of a biological model for melancholia and
disordered mood, this chapter begins by tracing Griesinger’s work on
psychological reflexion and disordered mood from the 1840s until his
premature death in 1868. The chapter then looks more closely at the
uptake up these ideas into British psychological medicine in the 1860s,
culminating in the publication of the first edition of Maudsley’s The Phys-
iology and Pathology of the Mind in 1867. Finally, the story travels back to
Germany and the model of melancholia presented by Richard von Krafft-
Ebing in 1874. The chapter concludes by considering the relationship
between melancholia and neurasthenia, in the context of North-American
psychiatry in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
Wilhelm Griesinger: From Cerebral
Irritation to Mental Depression
As a precocious young student Wilhelm Griesinger travelled around the
continent for his medical training, receiving instruction from, among
others, François Magendie in Paris.2 Upon his return to Prussia, he
quickly rose among the ranks of a new generation of physicians advo-
cating a scientific, academic psychiatry, and assumed the first combined
chair of psychiatry and neurology at Berlin’s Charité in 1864. Among his
German contemporaries, Griesinger was best known and remembered as
the controversial physician who attempted to bring about a radical reform
of Prussian psychiatry. His bold modernisation programme presented
in 1867 aimed to bring mental disorders out of isolated rural asylums
and into a new generation of ‘city clinics’ situated in close proximity
to university hospitals in order to facilitate research and clinical training.
4 MELANCHOLIA AND THE NEW BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 91
The proposal generated discord within the psychiatric community in the
German states, a battle which would continue to rage after his premature
death from appendicitis in 1868.3
In 1843, a year after completing his psychiatric training under Alfred
Zeller at the asylum in Winnenthal, Griesinger published an article enti-
tled ‘On psychological reflex action’ (Ueber psychische Reflexactionen),4
in which he developed a physiological model of mental reflexion, and
discussed its implications for psychopathology. Griesinger constructed
much of his physiological model of reflexive action from what had
been observed during experiments on living animals and what had been
inferred from such research about that which scientists could not see. He
suggested that existing experimental data showed that, as well as move-
ments directed by the will, ‘one could observe in animals a number of
other muscle contractions triggered by centripetal sensory impressions’.
Such impressions would, he argued, pass through the brain without
alerting consciousness, and would result in muscle contraction being
performed ‘more completely’ than in the case of conscious movement.5
In other words, unconscious motor reactions were potentially more
powerful than those directed by conscious volition.
Griesinger then extrapolated this theory to suggest that involun-
tary and/or unconscious emotional reactions were more powerful than
mental operations directed by the will. Like Laycock, he suggested that
ideas could excite motor action as well as emotional reactions and the
bodily manifestations accompanying the latter, adding an element that
would become crucial to a physiological model for affective insanity.
For Griesinger, external stimuli (such as Laycock’s ‘sound’ or ‘mention’
of water) were not necessary to produce morbid emotion. Ideas kept
in mental storages (geistiges Vorraths) could spontaneously and inter-
nally react upon one another. The ‘totality of all exciting factors of [the
brain]’ was, he suggested, made up of both conscious and unconscious
impressions, which were merged together to become new mental repre-
sentations. That is, the brain stored and fused all impressions received,
some of which passed through consciousness, and some which were
stored without triggering awareness. All impressions were capable of
reacting upon one another, and in doing so could synthesise and create
new ideas, or mental representations (Vorstellungen), which could emerge
endogenously, independent of external stimuli. When new impressions
reached the brain from outside, ideas kept in mental storages were able to
react upon previously stored images to produce novel ones. In a healthy
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brain, this process was self-regulating, maintaining the ‘tone’ of the brain,
but in a disordered brain this kind of reactivity was the source of morbid
symptoms such as depressed mood.6
Griesinger has been hailed as the founder of modern biological psychi-
atry,7 but like most of his contemporaries he struggled to make sense
of the relationship between mind and brain. In the quest to explain
that which verged on the inexplicable, metaphors were an invaluable
device for nineteenth-century physicians. ‘Tone’ was one such metaphor.
It was widely useful in nineteenth-century psychological medicine, but
has not survived into the present. Tone came for Griesinger to denote
both something tangible, like the physical tone of a muscle, as well as
a kind of mental harmony, the maintenance of which was a prerequisite
for a healthy mind. The tone of the brain, i.e. of the cerebral ganglia,
was affected by the nature of mental images (Vorstellungen), so that, for
instance, ‘sad’ images could serve to ‘slacken’ the tone of the brain.8
Two things in particular should be noted about Griesinger’s physiolog-
ical explanation of how ideas and emotions were generated in the brain.
First, his theoretical framework must be understood against the backdrop
of pre-nineteenth-century philosophical models of the mind. As Gerlof
Verwey has shown, while Griesinger was explicitly committed to a biolog-
ical view of mental pathology, there was a strong philosophical undertone
throughout his work, which Verwey describes as ‘an exemplary manifes-
tation of the link between old and new’.9 This is demonstrated both by
the abstract language used, and more specifically by the description of
mental images as reacting upon one another to produce new ones. The
latter bears resemblances to eighteenth-century associationist psychology,
and would also re-emerge in mid-century Britain, where Herbert Spencer
developed similar ideas within a new physiological framework.10
Second, the ability of the brain to react both to external and internal
stimuli, and to produce from any combination of these entirely new
impressions and ideas, formed the basis of a new biomedical model
of mental disease. Moreover, as suggested above, for Griesinger it was
the unconscious ideational reactions that were the most powerful. If an
increasing number of negative impressions were stored and subsequently
reacting both with further external irritants and with each other internally,
the brain would be subjected to repeated ‘irritation’ [Reize]. Eventu-
ally, the process of automated or reflexive mental reaction would become
disordered. The brain would then begin to produce morbid reactions,
such as pathological feelings of displeasure, in response to factors that
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would not trigger such reactions in a healthy mind.11 Griesinger’s model
for describing the internal aetiology of mental disease followed the kind
of physiological description offered by Billing and other contemporary
European writers such as Müller (see Chapter 2). The ‘irritation’ of an
organ leading it to become more sensitive or, in Billing’s words, subject to
‘morbid sensibility’, served as a plausible metaphor for explaining affective
insanity within a biomedical framework. In other words, language used to
describe observable disease in organic tissue was now applied to make the
unseen and unknown familiar and explicable. The analogous transfer that
occurred here was ambiguous. The new physiological language was at
once applied to talk about an organ—the brain—and its perceived func-
tion—the mind, and the operations of both of these, which, while for
materialists like Laycock and Griesinger were perceived as strictly organic,
could nevertheless not be observed with the naked eye, but only theorised
according to language extrapolated from the observable somatic realm of
internal medicine. What occurred here was not, then, simply a transfer
from the physical to the psychological, but rather the creation of a new
sphere within medical science, one in which physiology and psychology
were not merely complementary to each other, but merged into a new
system of knowledge.
Griesinger ended his essay by outlining what he perceived to be the
implications of psychological reflex action for the study of insanity. In
doing so he suggested that there were two basic emotional ‘anomalies’
which were foundational to all forms of mental disease. One was charac-
terised by an ‘elevated sense of self’, and the other by a sense of ‘dejection’
and feeling of ‘mental displeasure’. He went on to argue that ‘in the infi-
nite majority of cases, almost without exception, the starting point for all
subsequent changes in mind which insanity entails are the latter states,
those of mental depression’.12 It follows that he discussed melancholia at
length in his textbook on mental pathology. He saw it as the first stage
in mental disease, suggesting that it was therefore more treatable than
other forms of insanity. The ability of physicians to recognise the onset of
melancholia early on was, he argued, essential in order to facilitate early
medical intervention. It was therefore imperative that all doctors were
able to correctly detect and diagnose this form of insanity.13
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‘Pain Is Awakened by the Slightest
Impression’: Griesinger’s Melancholia
Griesinger favoured a modern version of the traditional tripartite divi-
sion of insanity into melancholia, mania, and dementia, referring to these
as the ‘states of mental depression’, the ‘states of mental exaltation’,
and the ‘states of mental weakness’. He also adhered to the theory
of unitary psychosis which held that all forms of madness constituted
different stages in the same disease.14 For Griesinger, comprehensive
knowledge of states of mental depression [Depressionzustände] was imper-
ative if one was to understand the onset and progression of mental disease
more generally. These states, which included hypochondria and simple
and delusional melancholia, were discussed at great length in the second
extended edition of his textbook on mental pathology.15
The view that low mood was the first sign of oncoming mental disease
meant that Griesinger argued forcefully for the importance of early detec-
tion and diagnosis of this form of insanity, since the progression from
melancholia to mania and later dementia and death was a significant
risk if symptoms were left untreated. The sooner clinical attention was
brought to bear upon people displaying symptoms of melancholia, the
greater the chance of rapid recovery.16 In conjunction with his proposal
for urban clinics referred to above, he argued forcefully in favour of clin-
ical training of students and of utilising psychiatric wards as sources of
academic research. Psychiatry had to become a medical science, both
as a practised speciality and as an academic discipline, and all medical
students should receive proper instruction in how to identify and diagnose
mental disease so that the milder forms —in other words the first stages of
illness—would not go undetected.17 Central to Griesinger’s reform plan
was, then, an emphasis on milder forms of insanity—the states of mental
depression. It was essential that physicians were familiar with a clear and
comprehensive description of melancholia and that they understood what
emotional disorders entailed, how they functioned, and how to identify
them. Only the physician with proper psychiatric training could be sure to
correctly distinguish between melancholia and normal, non-pathological
low mood, a view that would often be repeated by British physicians later
in the century.
While one historian has suggested that Griesinger ‘based his definitions
on borrowed cases and views’,18 he drew on cases of melancholia which
he had come across when training under Alfred Zeller, as well as cases
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presented or published by other alienists.19 More importantly, however,
the significance of Griesinger’s work did not rest upon the originality of
the case studies he produced, but on the biomedical model for insanity
he presented. The framework for explaining affective insanity through
psycho-physiological reflexion as the basis of disordered emotion would
form an invaluable model for explaining affective disorders, particularly
melancholia, throughout much of the century. While earlier physicians
such as Pinel and Esquirol had begun to talk about ‘affective’, ‘moral’,
or ‘partial’ insanity, Griesinger fashioned such disorders with an internal
biomedical model which explained how emotion could become diseased,
using the language of empirical science.
The second expanded edition of Die Pathologie und Therapie der
Psychischen Krankheiten (1861), which was translated into English, began
with a lengthy discussion of brain anatomy and physiology. Griesinger
was unequivocal in the view that insanity had organic roots even when
visible lesions could not be found, since mental activity was a physiological
process, ‘a special life form of the organism’.20 The textbook incorporated
sections from his article on psychological reflex action and further elabo-
rated the principles developed in the 1843 paper. In doing so, Griesinger
highlighted an aspect of mind that constituted one of the more radical
claims to emerge from physiological psychology at this time, and which
he was not alone in making. Within a framework where all functions
of mind (or, as Griesinger termed it here, ‘Vorstellen,’ roughly ‘imagina-
tion’) could be explained through the same physiological principles, the
different mental faculties were hierarchically equal.21 Recalling his model
of mental operations discussed above, he held that ‘all the various mental
acts which were formerly designated separate faculties (fantasies, will,
emotions, etc.) are only different relations of the imagination with sensa-
tion and movement, or the result of the conflicts of mental representations
with themselves’.22
This act of constituting emotion, thought, and volition as equal, cere-
bral physiological processes, formed one of the cornerstones of theories
of insanity suggesting that the mind could be diseased without causing
delusion, and as such it helped facilitate and make plausible the medical
condition ‘simple melancholia’. By raising emotion to a level equal with
cognition and volition, Griesinger made it possible for automated, uncon-
scious interaction between these faculties to occur. Esquirol’s monomanie
and Prichard’s moral insanity had conceptually suggested that in certain
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forms of insanity the passions were chiefly affected, and often consti-
tuted the cause of mental disease, but these models nonetheless insisted
on some measure of intellectual derangement. The argument that one
could suffer from mental disease without exhibiting any delusion of intel-
lect or compromising of reason constituted a significant shift from earlier
perceptions of what madness was.23
Griesinger went on to further develop the analogy of sensory-motor
reaction as a model for how ideas and emotions were produced:
In the wider sense of the mind….every mental function, active or passive,
and naturally also emotion, is a form of imagination. Emotion is an imag-
ination which has arisen in the brain through immediate irritation of a
centripetal fibre. A great number of mental images are not immediately
provoked by irritation of the sensitive nerves, but are produced internally
by the functions of the brain, which are independent of all sensorial exci-
tation. They are also intimately dependent upon the traces which former
sensorial impressions have left in the brain, and on the inward phenomena
of sensation.24
As Griesinger had suggested in his article on the mental reflex, this
ability of mental representations to react upon one another internally was
key to understanding how mental disorders emerged. Just as reflexive
action could be triggered solely within the realm of the mind, so was
‘irritation’ able to occur without external influence. Vorstellungen could
be triggered into reaction ‘not only by their normal, external irritants,
but also by internal irritation’.25 Often, internal irritation would have
its source elsewhere in the body, meaning that the immediate cause
of insanity was in many cases some other bodily dysfunction or imbal-
ance escaping conscious awareness. However, even if the original source
of internal irritation was removed, the mental disorder may persist and
develop independently. Moreover, ‘such organic irritations do not usually
excite new, clear and definite ideas but, in the first place, they cause those
vague, indeterminate modifications of the mind which we call emotion
(Gemütsbewegung)’.26 The fact that such internal irritation was often not
consciously perceived helped explain, then, why the initial production of
morbid mental action was one affecting emotion before the intellect.
Such morbid cerebral action could then give rise to the kinds of symp-
toms associated with melancholia. In discussing these, Griesinger again
deployed the analogy of physical sensation, but this time explicitly. Mental
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images could, he suggested, be ‘accompanied by pain or pleasure’. A
disordered mind became subject to ‘mental pain’, which could at times be
specific, linked to a particular mental image, but more often it was vague
and diffuse, relating to ‘emotion or the intellect as a whole’: ‘Much like
in a bodily state of general pain and discomfort, so in the mind a causeless
feeling of trepidation, anxiety, etc., when long continued, will eventually
develop painful ideas’.27 It was in such general mental pain and ‘lowness
of spirits’ which melancholia consisted. Griesinger began his chapter on
the ‘states of mental depression’ by proclaiming that ‘[t]he fundamental
affection in all these forms of disease consists in the morbid influence of a
painful depressing negative affect – in a mentally painful state’.28 Recalling
the discussion of ‘depression’ in Chapter 3, Griesinger was explicit in
stating that he did not deploy the term in the strictly medical, physio-
logical sense of lowered function, but as a descriptive term to denote a
state of mind. In other words, mental depression did not denote ‘passivity
or weakness’, or a ‘suppression’ of cerebral phenomena, rather, ‘lively irri-
tation of the brain and a commotion of the psychological processes are
the foundation of this state; but the collective result of these (cerebral and
psychic) processes for the general mood is a depressive or painful state’.29
While melancholia was often, as suggested above, initially induced by
some form of internal bodily dysfunction subconsciously triggering cere-
bral irritation, it would at times also appear to be brought about in the
first instance by ‘normal’ sadness or dejection such as ‘grief’ or ‘jealousy’.
Griesinger noted the problem of distinguishing the mental pain of melan-
cholia from non-pathological ‘painful emotion’, but held that it would
mark itself as different ‘by its excessive degree, by its more than ordi-
nary protraction, by its becoming more and more independent of external
influences, and by the other accessory affections which accompany it’.30
What such ‘accessory affections’ consisted in depended in part upon
which type of melancholia a person was suffering from. Hypochondria,
according to Griesinger ‘the mildest, most moderate form of insanity’,
was distinguished by a range of pronounced bodily complaints. These
were in addition to ‘the generic character of dejection, sadness, depres-
sion of mind, diminution of the activity of the will, and of a delirium
which corresponds to this mental disposition’. However, in hypochon-
dria ‘the emotional depression proceeds from a strong feeling of bodily
illness’. While hypochondria resulted in ‘false conceptions’ the intellect
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was for the most part uncompromised and the patient was able to follow
logical reasoning.
The application of the mental reflex can be noted in the aetiology of
hypochondria. The psychological feeling of bodily illness often emerged,
Griesinger suggested, through ‘irritation of the nervous centres arising
from peripheral disease—often very obscured and concealed – of the
viscera’. However, the perception of somatic dysfunction would take on
a life of its own, persisting and growing independently of any bodily
malady, and the more mental attention was focussed on these perceptions
of illness, the stronger the feeling of bodily and mental discomfort would
become.31 The states of mental depression would often commence with
some measure of hypochondric features, at least if the original trigger
for the disease was located elsewhere in the body. If medical attention
was not brought upon the person afflicted, this ‘state of vague mental
and bodily discomfort’ would pass into a persistent melancholia proper,
characterised by a ‘state of mental pain’ which would be ‘increased by
every external mental impression’.32 This mental pain would soon begin
to eclipse every other feeling of the sufferer, consuming every aspect
of bodily and mental function. It ‘consists in a profound feeling of ill-
being, of inability to do anything, of suppression of the physical powers,
of depression and sadness, and of total abasement of self-consciousness’.
The entire character of the person so afflicted would eventually be trans-
formed. The process by which feelings and ideas were produced would
become so distorted, so diseased, that positive thoughts or feelings of joy
were no longer possible.33
The disease process could equally start not with hypochondria but with
simple melancholia. The two were similar in that both lacked the pres-
ence of proper delusion; the mind had not been fully consumed by the
disease in that patients would be able to reason about their morbid feel-
ings. However, with the physiological process of emotion having become
disordered, the will was also affected. While patients were able to under-
stand that their mental pain was unreasonable and unfounded, they were
completely unable to master their morbid emotions.34 They could prop-
erly assess the ‘objects of the outer world’, but these produced ‘an
impression utterly different from what they were wont to do, of which
the intelligent and educated sufferers can alone give a true description.
“It appears to me” says such a melancholic, “that everything around me
is precisely as it used to be, although there must have been changes.”’
At first, the patient would be fully aware of this shift in their mental
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state, ‘[h]e even complains himself that his sensations are no longer
natural, that they are perverted’.35 Simple melancholia, then, consisted
in a state of disordered feeling accompanied by diminished volition. This
disease model was made possible by the application of the reflex concept
to all mental processes. In this way, the model of psychological reflex
action developed by Laycock and Griesinger facilitated a view of insanity
in which the idea of pathological emotionality was a plausible medical
concept. The idea of disordered emotion as a physiological process was
widely appropriated by British physicians in the decades that followed,
bringing about a reconfiguration of melancholia in Victorian medicine.
Henry Maudsley: Disordered
Emotion in an Evolutionary Context
Henry Maudsley published extensively over more than four decades,
with the bulk of his publications concerning the mind–body relation-
ship and mental pathology.36 His preoccupation with mental disorders
extended to include insanity and the law, an interest that grew out of
his research on the physiology and psychology of ‘morbid impulses’. His
work was widely read by his peers, both in Britain and on the conti-
nent. Maudsley also published more on melancholia than almost any other
of his British contemporaries. He embraced a theory of mind heavily
anchored in physiological psychology, emphasising the significance of the
‘latest advances in physiology, and….the present state of physiological
psychology in Germany’, drawing a parallel between research emerging
from the German states and the theories of Bain, Spencer, Carpenter,
and Laycock in Britain.37 However, unlike the British writers from which
he derived his basic approach to the emotions, as a medical psycholo-
gist Maudsley was primarily concerned with the pathological aspects of
mental phenomena. He was keen to stress the importance of establishing
a solid theoretical foundation for his profession, and used his rising status
in British psychological medicine to work towards this end. Danziger
suggests that ‘[w]hen Maudsley became editor of the Journal of Mental
Science in 1862, its scope began to broaden to include relevant theoretical
articles of a psychological or even philosophical nature’.38 His writings
on mind and brain were at the core of the formation of British medical
psychology as a scientific discipline concerned with empirical research into
the causes, classification, and treatment of mental disease. Maudsley’s
physiological approach to mental pathology remained largely consistent
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throughout a career spanning more than four decades, but his nosology of
insanity underwent several significant revisions. Key to these changes was
that melancholia received increasingly more attention in his later work.
His conceptualisation of melancholia rested upon a macro-classification
developed early on in his published work that remained in place despite
later nosological restructurings, and which saw mental disease divided into
two umbrella categories: affective and ideational insanity.
Maudsley’s framework for explaining mental phenomena was
constructed around two related principles: reflex action, and organism–
environment interaction, with the former occurring as a result of the
latter. Maudsley perceived reflex action to be the most basic function
of the nervous system. Like Griesinger, Laycock, and Carpenter, he did
not reserve automated reactions only for unconscious bodily function.
Rather, reflexive action developed in an evolutionary fashion and served
as the core mechanism behind conscious thought as well as emotion.
In basic terms, Maudsley perceived reflexion as the ‘relation between
the individual organism and the external nature’, a process which could
become progressively more complex, and in its higher forms was under-
stood as ‘sensory perception’ and ‘sensorimotor reaction’.39 Drawing
on ideas about environment–organism interaction developed by British
psychologist Herbert Spencer in the 1850s, Maudsley suggested that a
state of equilibrium between the external and the internal was at the
core of all cerebral, and consequently all mental, functions. This was
key to understanding the difference between normal and pathological
emotionality:
Certainly [the nerve cells] are not inexhaustible centres of self-generating
force; they give out no more than what they have in one way or another
taken in; they receive material from the blood, which they assimilate, or
make of the same kind with themselves; a correlative metamorphosis of
force necessarily accompanying this upward transformation of matter, and
the nerve cells thus becoming, so long as its equilibrium is preserved, a
centre of statical power of the highest vital quality.40
This ‘statical power’ can be compared to Griesinger’s ‘tone’ discussed
above. Perceived by Maudsley as ‘the condition of latent thought’, of a
mind at rest, it constituted the epitome of psychological health. Equilib-
rium was thus both a physiological principle of ‘self-regulation’ as well as
a mental state. When perfect balance was maintained, the mind was in a
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state of rest—of ‘latent thought’. Following from this, ‘the manifestation
of thought’ could be understood as ‘the change or destruction of nervous
element’.41 Such a ‘change or destruction’ would be caused by a stim-
ulus triggering a reaction. Following Griesinger, Maudsley held that such
stimuli need not come from outside, but could equally have their origin
somewhere in the body. Interaction, then, was also an intra-organism
process. Equally, Maudsley perceived, like Laycock and Griesinger, a
type of non-motor reflex action occurring within the brain resulting in
ideas or emotional reactions rather than muscle contraction.42 And like
Griesinger, Maudsley suggested that emotional and ideational reactions
to internal or external stimuli could occur without conscious awareness,
producing a feeling of which the individual would not know the source,
meaning it was prone to result in ‘illusions with regard to the cause’. Such
illusions often constituted symptoms of insanity, and were most frequently
seen in asylum patients, he argued.43
In Maudsley’s model of the mind the gradual development of
consciousness, both within each individual and in an entire species
across time, began as a reflexive relationship between environment and
organism, where the former would act upon the latter, causing a corre-
sponding reaction and, subsequently, transformation. In higher animals,
this reflexive relationship formed the basis of the creation of new ideas.
Like Griesinger, he suggested that impressions received by the brain
would disperse internally and turn into ‘ideas or conceptions’, which
could be ‘pleasurable or painful, or have other particularly emotional
qualities’.44 As suggested above, Maudsley also followed Griesinger in
arguing that psychological reflex action could occur both subconsciously
and involuntarily; however, involuntary mental reflex action could also
take place with the consciousness alerted yet ‘in direct defiance of voli-
tional effort’.45 In the same manner as ideas and emotions the will was,
according to Maudsley, the product of ‘molecular change in a defini-
tively constituted nervous centre’, meaning that volition was, ultimately,
‘excited into activity by the appropriate stimulus’.46
For Maudsley, then, volition did not belong to a higher realm indepen-
dent from thought and emotion, it was a function of human biology, a
physiological reaction to stimulus, if one that could be honed through
persistent practice to function in a certain way. Not everyone who
submitted to a physiological theory of mind was equally prepared to do
away with the concept of free will. As discussed in Chapter 2, Carpenter
divided the nervous system into hierarchically organised sections, with
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the intellect (containing the will) belonging to the highest sphere and
immune from automated reaction. When describing psychological as
opposed to sensory-motor reflex action, Maudsley deployed Carpenter’s
term ‘ideo-motor’ action, denoting its function as analogous to sensory-
motor action. In Carpenter’s original use of this term the principle
extended as far as ‘emotions’ and ‘instincts’, and in some instances also
‘ideas’, but when it came to volition he would not concede to a reduction
of the will to physiological processes.
When Maudsley used Carpenter’s ‘ideo-motor action’, then, he also
subtly changed its meaning. For Maudsley, all reactions of the mind were
essentially equal. This meant that emotion was a reaction of the cerebral
hemispheres just like volition and ideation (cognition). However, Maud-
sley differentiated emotion in other ways. Recalling his earlier remarks
about a state of mental harmony, emotional reactions were for Maud-
sley what ensued in response to any form of imbalance, or unequal
relationship, between the individual and their environment:
As long as the ideas or mental states are not adequately organized in corre-
spondence with the individual’s external relations, more or less feeling will
attend their excitation; they will, in fact, be more or less emotional. When
the equilibrium between the subjective and objective is duly established,
there is no passion, and there is but little emotion.47
Since any mental reactions could be triggered by external and internal
stimuli alike, this was also the case for the emergence of pathological
emotionality. In describing the process by which emotion would arise
Maudsley stated that ‘[t]he equilibrium between the individual and his
surroundings may, in fact, be disturbed by a subjective modification, or
an internal commotion, as well as by an unwonted impression from with-
out’.48 The environment could act upon the individual, but so could the
individual’s own bodily operations, which in turn had the ability to affect
the external–internal balance.
The kind of internal commotion described above would generally
consist in some form of ‘derangement’ elsewhere in the body. This would
then affect the brain, resulting in cerebral morbidity. Once this state
had been reached, virtually any impression, including those that would
trigger feelings of pleasure in a mind free from disease, would cause
painful emotions.49 This mental pain was made into a coherent medical
phenomenon through being analogous to physical pain. This was the state
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that would prevail when the equilibrium of the mind was permanently
upset, or, rather, when the ‘tone’ was disturbed. There is no reference
to Griesinger here, but Maudsley’s description of how morbid ideas and
emotions emerge strongly echoes that of the German psychiatrist. The
kinds of mental reactions that were likely to occur in response external
or internal stimuli would depend on the ‘psychical tone, the tone of the
supreme nervous centres’, which was different in each individual as it was
the long-term product of ‘past thoughts, feelings, and actions, which have
been organised as mental faculties’.50
While emotional reactions were produced in the brain, they would,
through the various nervous connections of the human body, exert
influence over bodily functions and trigger reactions of ‘the organic
movements, or the more intimate processes of nutrition’.51 Emotion as
physiological mental reflex action was a two-way process, in that it could
be set off by some activity elsewhere in the body which would affect the
brain and produce emotion, the latter which would then effect some other
peripheral reaction (for instance, trembling). Moreover, yet another recip-
rocal action would occur from this: any emotion ‘is rendered stronger and
more distinct by the existence of those bodily states which it naturally
produces’.52 Cerebral and somatic reactions, both of which featured in
the production of emotions, were mutually constitutive and reinforcing,
maintaining the emotional state produced.53 This process was particularly
significant in the case of morbid emotional activity:
Consequently, it is found that, as the effect of the depressing passion is
felt by the victim of a local idiosyncrasy in his weak organ, so inversely
the effect of a weak or diseased organ is felt in the brain by an irri-
tability or disposition to passion, a disturbance of the psychical tone. The




According to Maudsley, not all individuals were equally prone to insanity.
While morbid states may at times appear to be produced by a partic-
ular event or sudden ‘mental shock’, this would only be the immediate
triggering factor. The conditions of mental disturbance consisted in an
accumulation of physical and psychological factors over time, thus the
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cause of mental disease could be correctly discerned by means of ‘[a]
complete biographical account of the individual’.55 The process whereby
the conditions of mental disease were gradually developed in a person
was dependent upon the individual’s capacity for adaptation. In conclu-
sion, then, the aetiology of mental disease was for Maudsley ultimately a
product of evolutionary law, where a healthy mind was ‘the consequence
and evidence of a successful adaptation to the conditions of existence’,
whereas mental disorder signified ‘a failure in organic adaptation to
external conditions’, leading to ‘disorder, decay, and death’.56
Such ‘disorder, decay, and death’ would in most cases begin with
affective disturbance. Because disordered emotion could, in Maudsley’s
view, manifest without intellectual delusion, he rejected ‘the present arti-
ficial classification, which is not really in conformity with nature’.57 This
classification or (various, similar) classifications which Maudsley referred
to were commonly the product of cumulated models of some of the
most often cited European alienists of the early nineteenth century,
specifically Pinel, Esquirol, Guislain, and Griesinger. The major standard
British textbook at the time, Tuke and Bucknill’s Manual of Psychological
Medicine,58 adopted a nosology broadly based chiefly on Griesinger and
Esquirol. In particular ‘monomania’, a British version of Esquirol’s disease
concept, served as an umbrella category for a number of sub-syndromes.
These were considered various forms of ‘partial’ insanity, in other words
disorders where some part of the power of intellectual reasoning was
preserved.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the French physician’s ‘monomania’ had
been primarily defined as insanity relating to one specific object.59 This
category, and the many modifications of it, allowed for madness to be
chiefly of emotional character, with only part of the intellect affected.
However, it did not categorically distinguish between madness with or
without delusion. In the 1858 edition of Bucknill and Tuke’s textbook,
melancholia was subsumed under ‘monomania’, though the authors
recognised a version of it presenting ‘without delusion’.60 A separate
category, ‘emotional insanity’, did not include forms of melancholia but
rather chiefly mania and various forms of morbid impulsivity such as
the ‘homicidal impulse’. In sum, forms of madness where some form of
ideational derangement was present.61 Such a system of classification was,
however, construed around an ‘artificial exactness’, Maudsley argued,
and did not correspond to the endless plurality and complexity of mental
disease. Would a nosological system not be more ‘scientific’, he asked,
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‘[i]f a broad division was made of insanity into two classes, namely,
insanity without positive delusion and insanity with delusion, in other
words, into affective insanity and ideational insanity; and if the subdi-
vision of these into varieties were subsequently made’?62 The nosology
Maudsley presented, then, insisted upon a marked division between
mental disorders where partial or complete delusion was present, and
illness where only the emotions were affected (Table 4.1).
One significant consequence of this division was that melancholia did
not appear as a single, unified disease category. It was not primarily
defined and organised according to its specific symptoms, but instead
according to their source and character: that is, according to whether
those symptoms consisted only in disordered emotion or in disordered
ideation (or cognition) as well. Melancholia shared the category affec-
tive insanity with mania and with Maudsley’s ‘moral alienation’, the latter
which can be seen as one of the many variations of Prichard’s moral
insanity. The term ‘moral’ could mean either ‘psychological’ or moral as
in ethical. Maudsley used it to mean the latter, a perversion of a person’s
moral character, resulting from a morbid emotional state. Maudsley’s
nosology was foundational for the idea of melancholia as a biomedical
disorder of the emotions, since it unambiguously established as a medical
principle the concept of pathological mood without concomitant intel-
lectual derangement. This chapter and Chapter 2 showed how Laycock
and Griesinger developed mental reflex models which allowed for the
idea of pathological emotions, and how the latter stressed the role of the
Table 4.1 Classification of insanity (The Physiology and Pathology of the Mind,
1867)
Affective insanity Ideational insanity
1. Maniacal Perversion of the Affective Life.
Mania sine Delerio
2. Melancholic Depression without Delusion.
Simple Melancholia
3. Moral Alienation Proper
1. General
Mania (acute & chronic)




3. Dementia (primary &
secondary)
4. General Paralysis
5. Idiocy (incl. Imbecility)
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emotions as the key to understanding the emergence and progression of
mental disease, arguing that all forms of insanity began with disordered
emotions and mental pain. With Maudsley’s nosology, disordered mood
was unequivocally cemented as a specific, distinct form of mental disorder.
Maudsley was aware of the significance and implications of his system
of classification; indeed, its implications for the diagnosis, treatment, and
future research into insanity were his motivation for presenting it. Any
nosology that did not fully and clearly recognise that a person could
be gravely disturbed without being delusional was highly problematic,
even dangerous. ‘To insist upon the existence of delusion as a crite-
rion of insanity’, Maudsley argued, ‘is to ignore some of the gravest and
most dangerous forms of mental disease.’ As discussed above, when the
brain would begin to produce morbid emotions, these would become
all-consuming, further entrenching the conflict between the internal and
external life which was at the core of this disordered process as well as of
healthy emotional reactions. Since this process occurred reflexively, anal-
ogous to automatic sensory-motor action, it was beyond the control of
volition. To sum up, then,
when there is perversion of the affective life, there will be morbid feeling
and morbid action; the patient’s whole manner of feeling, the mode of
his affection by events, is unnatural, and the springs of his action are
disordered; and the intellect is unable to check or control the morbid
manifestations, just as, when there is disease of the spinal cord, there may
be convulsive movement, of which there is consciousness, but which the
will cannot restrain.63
Yet, this total engulfment of the individual by mental pain could take place
without distorting the intellect. In the decades that followed a number of
physicians, including Maudsley himself, would argue that it was this very
feature which made the emotional pain of melancholia so difficult for
sufferers to bear, and as such was a crucial factor in driving melancholics
to suicide.
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Melancholia on the Continent: Folie
Circulaire and Psychische Neuralgie
The nosological status of melancholia was also being renegotiated on the
continent in the mid-to-late nineteenth century. As shown in Chapter 3,
Esquirol had proposed lypemanie as a replacement category for melan-
cholia, indicating that it was a subspecies of monomania. The term never
took off, but in the 1850s one of his protégés, Jules Baillarger, offered a
more durable reconceptualisation of melancholia. Medical writers across
Europe had occasionally suggested that the symptoms of melancholia
could in some cases pass into those of mania and back again. For Bail-
larger, this oscillating process constituted a variety of madness, which
he described in a paper read at the Imperial Academy of Medicine in
Paris in 1854, and which was translated for an English-speaking audi-
ence the same year. Baillarger argued that while the two conditions
appeared so much each other’s opposites as to be ‘strangers to each
other’, on the contrary, ‘in most cases melancholia follows mania, and
vice versa, as if there were a secret union between these two diseases’.64
A similar proposition had, apparently unbeknownst to Baillarger, been
made in a published article three years previously by fellow alienist Jean-
Pierre Falret, who in response to Baillarger’s paper remarked that he
had been observing this form of mental derangement for some time on
asylum wards, and had concluded that it was not merely ‘a variety, but
a specific form of insanity’. Falret had named this condition folie circu-
larie—circular insanity. He viewed it as a more or less lifelong, chronic
illness, but with milder symptoms than were often found in melancholia
and mania proper.65
The apparent discovery of this new disease was noted in Britain and
was often referred to in discussions of melancholia in the decades that
followed. While it was never widely appropriated in Victorian medical
literature, British writers told of similar observations among asylum
patients. Maudsley, for instance, suggested that melancholic symptoms
could sometimes be a precursor to mania, and were prone to return
again during the convalescent phase of the disease.66 Thomas Clouston
noted the presence of a form of mental disease that had ‘been called by
the French “circular insanity”’, but suggested that a more appropriate
term was that of ‘alternating insanity’, as in his view this type of madness
was marked by distinctive changes in the person’s overall character. ‘Such
men have three distinct lives’, he argued, ‘each of which is characterised
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by its own tastes, habits, dispositions, and modes of intellectual activ-
ity’.67 George Savage remarked in a discussion on mania that a form of
illness referred to as folie circulaire had been observed, in which ‘mania
is succeeded by melancholia, to be again succeeded either by a period
of health, or by a fresh attack of mania.’68 However, Savage held such
cases to be ‘extremely rare’ among English lunatics, suggesting that in
most of the patients under his care who had exhibited such a circular
symptom picture, the proper diagnosis was one of ‘recurrent mania’,
sometimes ending in dementia.69 This statement largely reflected the view
of his peers; while some writers used the term ‘circular insanity’ or folie
circulaire, it was predominantly to talk of a subvariety of melancholia or
mania.70
If the French model of circular insanity failed to gain widespread
theoretical popularity or practical use in Britain at the time, German
late nineteenth-century conceptions of melancholia were more extensively
appropriated. By the mid-1870s, psychiatry was an established academic
discipline across German-speaking Europe, particularly in former Prussia.
Proponents of the new, scientific psychiatry were keen to define their work
in opposition to the more traditional asylum-focused alienism, where
both clinical practices and theoretical discussions had been chiefly aimed
at management and confinement of lunatics. There was a strong focus
on diagnostics, treatment, and clinical instruction for medical students
of mental disease, and the discipline had from the start assumed a
heavy leaning towards neurological conceptions of madness. As noted
above, Griesinger had prior to his untimely death been a driving force
in the early stages of this process, aptly symbolised by his appoint-
ment to the first combined chair in psychiatry and neurology at the
Charité in Berlin in 1865.71 However, Griesinger’s model of melan-
cholia remained partly wedded to traditional ideas; he maintained the
old tripartite division of insanity, and while melancholia was fashioned
with a modern, biomedical explanatory model, the symptom picture was
little changed from that found in the works of earlier writers. While
highlighting the modern ‘mental depression’ as a defining symptom,
grief, despondency, and sadness were also primary features of Griesinger’s
melancholia, and he placed significant focus on the patient’s overall
constitution, physiognomy, and temperament. There was, moreover, little
talk of suicidality.72
Less than a decade after Griesinger’s death, in 1874, Austrian neurol-
ogist and psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing published a short mono-
graph entitled Die Melancholie: Eine Klinische Studie. Krafft-Ebing would
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later become famous across Europe for his widely appropriated work on
sexual pathology; however, his impressive catalogue of publications also
included a comprehensive general textbook on mental disease aimed at
students and practitioners, which appeared in several editions.73 While
the monograph on melancholia was never translated into English, signif-
icant parts of it were later absorbed into the English language version
of his textbook on insanity, thus reaching a wider audience in Britain.74
Krafft-Ebing’s approach to emotion can be seen as closely aligned with
Laycock’s and Griesinger’s. Emotion was a neurophysiological reaction
analogous to action elsewhere in the body. In this way, melancholia
was for Krafft-Ebing a form of ‘mental neuralgia’ (psychische Neuralgie),
which was functionally different from physical neuralgia. The latter took
the form of a ‘bodily pain’ along the ‘sensory paths’ of nervous trans-
mission. In its psychological equivalent the brain was the object of
‘excitement’, producing ‘an alteration of consciousness’ manifesting as
‘mental (geistiger) pain, a feeling which finds its expression through a
change in mood’.75 This psychic pain defined and dominated the overall
mental state of the melancholic, and arose from internal rather than
external causes.
Similar to Griesinger’s model, this painful state of mind in Krafft-
Ebing’s melancholia was the result of repeated irritation of the brain.
Mental neuralgia characterised the early stage of the illness, at which
point neither the physiological process nor external symptoms were neces-
sarily qualitatively different from those of a healthy mind. It follows
that someone not trained in the skill of detecting mental disease would
look for and expect to find the real cause of the mental pain. Here,
however, lied the distinction between ordinary suffering and the suffering
of simple, or non-delusional melancholia: the latter must be understood
as an abnormal reaction to normal circumstances. Following Griesinger,
Krafft-Ebing held that the melancholic brain would ‘overreact’ to external
stimuli, so that all events, even those that would normally be a source of
happiness, produced painful emotions.76 ‘Under such circumstances’, he
suggested, the origin of the mental pain ‘is not psychic, but organic. It
is the expression of a disturbance of nutrition in the psychic organ’.77 In
this pathological state, painful emotions would become self-perpetuating,
with every impression brought upon the sick person becoming a source
of further pain. Even the kinds of ‘distractions’ that would normally have
a soothing or comforting influence, such as religion, would only produce
further agony. Eventually the melancholic would reach a state where they
110 Å. JANSSON
were ‘unable to rejoice over anything, but…equally unable to experience
sadness’.78
Krafft-Ebing’s work, then, contains one of the earliest descriptions of
melancholia as a mental state characterised not by excessive low mood,
but rather by an absence of feeling. Profound melancholia was, he argued,
characterised by a lack of emotion—the patient becoming ‘feeling-less’
(Gefühllos) and ‘mood-less’ (Gemühtlos). This state of emotional apathy
would often become so intolerable that the melancholic sufferer would
eventually be driven to take their own life, prompting Krafft-Ebing to
suggest that ‘[t]he majority of people who commit suicide are melan-
cholics’. As will be seen in the next chapter, this perceived suicidality
of melancholics placed a significant burden and responsibility on asylum
staff, as such patients had to be kept under constant surveillance. In
Krafft-Ebing’s words, ‘[t]he cunning and perseverance exhibited by such
sick people in the pursuit of their suicidal intentions’ was so ‘remarkable’
that even the ‘straitjacket is no guarantee against suicide’.79
Mood Disorder or Nervous Exhaustion?
Melancholia and Neurasthenia
Krafft-Ebing’s melancholic would sink so deeply into despair that they
would eventually lose the ability to feel anything at all, even sadness,
a defining symptom of traditional melancholia. This kind of emotional
apathy was equally characteristic of neurasthenia, or nervous exhaustion,
a ‘disease of civilisation’ emerging in the second half of the nineteenth
century. Melancholia and neurasthenia were two separate conditions,
situated within different explanatory frameworks and with different symp-
tomatologies. But much like in the present, diagnostic boundaries in the
nineteenth century were often fuzzy and fluid, and the neurophysiological
framework for explaining mental disease expounded by Griesinger, Maud-
sley, Krafft-Ebing, and others coexisted with a more general discourse
on ‘nerves’ as a source of a wide variety of mental and physical symp-
toms for which no organic cause could be found. As one historian notes,
much in the same way as ‘an epileptic fit might be explained in terms of
excessive build-up and then discharge of nervous energy, so the symp-
toms of depression, fatigue, melancholia, and nervous breakdown could
be attributed to the ebbing of the same force’.80 ‘Mental depression’ in
particular, a symptom denoting a mind ‘pressed down’, served to bridge
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melancholia and neurasthenia, and have led scholars to discuss nineteenth-
century experiences of low mood, fatigue, sadness, inertia, anxiety, and
despair under the general heading of ‘depression’.81
While it is not possible to fully disentangle the two conditions from
each other, it is important to note their clear differences as well as their
similarities. Neurasthenia emerged in the United States in the 1860s.
E.H. van Deusen and George Beard are both credited with coining the
term, but the latter is generally regarded as its chief proponent. The
symptoms of neurasthenia as described by Beard in his famous mono-
graph on the condition tell of a diffuse and all-encompassing illness,
a mental and bodily malaise that left few parts of the human anatomy
untouched. Sufferers of this disease would, according to Beard, complain
of a diverse assortment of symptoms, including headaches, tenderness
of the scalp, digestive problems, visual disturbances, noises in the ears,
cramps, heart palpitations, back pain, dry skin, tenderness of the teeth and
gums, insomnia, drowsiness, mental irritability, hopelessness, and morbid
fear.82 Misbach and Stam suggest that neurasthenia was seen by some as
a more attractive diagnosis as it was predominantly conceptualised as a
somatic condition rather than a mental disorder, and therefore came with
less stigma attached.83 This made it particularly popular with the upper
classes, and to the extent the diagnosis was deployed in Europe this was
primarily in the context of private practices rather than on asylum wards.
Much like the language around emotion, the discourse on nerves that
underpinned neurasthenia underwent a reconceptualisation in the nine-
teenth century. The idea of ‘nerves’ as the cause and manifestation of
poor mental and physical health had been popular in early modern Britain,
and was famously discussed at length by eighteenth-century physician
George Cheyne in his treatise on ‘the English malady’.84 The eighteenth-
century explanatory framework was, however, different from that of the
following century, the former attributing nervous suffering to ‘weak,
loose, and feeble or relaxed nerves’,85 suggesting that this was a problem
primarily affecting the higher social strata whose way of life had made
them particularly sensitive. Weak nerves were linked to ‘the high-living,
prosperity, and progress unique on such a wide scale in eighteenth-
century England’.86 From the mid-nineteenth century onward, however,
nervous disorders became explicitly understood as exhaustion resulting
not from affluent living, but from the increasing pressures of ‘brain work’
in a rapidly expanding capitalist society.87 Moreover, it was no longer
the loss of vital fluid that was the main source of disease, but rather
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the loss of ‘force’.88 As Anson Rabinbach has shown, the human body
became metaphorically perceived as an engine subject to the same laws
as heat powered machinery.89 This new way of conceptualising health
and sickness borrowed its language and explanatory model from the
theory of thermodynamics, which merged with terminology derived from
economics. The increasing popularity of the word depression as a medical
symptom must be understood in the context of these developments,
which highlight the role of this symptom in blurring the line between
emotional disorders such as melancholia and the more somatically framed
concept of nervous exhaustion. In this context the word ‘depression’
became a more frequent and prominent part of medical terminology,
specifically in regards to mental states.90 The growing popularity of this
word as a feature both of nervous exhaustion and medical melancholy can
no doubt in part account for the tendency among contemporary scholars
to equate nineteenth-century nervous conditions as well as melancholia
with ‘depression’ as understood in late twentieth- and twenty-first-century
medical discourse.
Both melancholia and neurasthenia were somatically framed, and both
were unlikely to turn up structural organic evidence of disease. In this way,
both conditions could be seen to straddle the increasingly fluid boundary
between normal and pathological states, but while there was certainly
some overlap between the two, it is crucial to note that they were funda-
mentally different conditions. Nervous exhaustion was brought about
by external pressures, whereas melancholia was primarily the result of
an internal pathology—though as we have seen, this mental state could
be triggered by both internal and external factors, making the aetiology
of melancholia ambiguous. Neurasthenia was a poorly defined, diffuse
somatic condition whose validity was contested among many psychia-
trists, whereas melancholia was a clearly demarcated mental disease with
a coherent symptomatology centred on depressed mood, mental pain,
and suicidality, and in the more severe stages of the illness inertia,
bodily retardation, delusions and hallucinations, and in some cases cata-
tonia. Melancholia was unequivocally perceived as a form of insanity.
However, while neurasthenia is today an object of study for historians
of psychiatry, its status in the late nineteenth century was less clear. It
was originally conceptualised as a somatic condition, but towards the
turn of the century as physicians had repeatedly failed to turn up organic
evidence of disease, the symptoms were increasingly seen as ‘functional’.
As a consequence, the category moved into the realm of psychiatry,
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eventually becoming reconceptualised as ‘neurosis’ within the emergent
psychoanalytical tradition.91
Melancholia Across the Atlantic
The complex relationship between melancholy and neurasthenia must also
be understood with reference to geographical and cultural differences.
The neurasthenia diagnosis never really took off in Europe’s medical
circles. Beard himself remarked that neurasthenia was far more common
in North America than in Western Europe, highlighting a divergence
between the two realms. Melancholia was deployed as a diagnosis in
North-American asylums and US physicians published on the disease,
but the diagnosis was primarily shaped and standardised through the
works of British and German authors. Descriptions of the condition in
North-American journals demonstrate the influence of European psychi-
atry on US conceptualisations of melancholia. In a lecture on melancholia
delivered in 1876 Daniel Kitchen, head of New York’s Blackwell Island
asylum, endorsed a model of disordered mood anchored in physiolog-
ical psychology. Echoing Griesinger, Kitchen noted that all forms of
insanity began with disordered action of ‘the emotional reflex centres’.
Like Griesinger, he also appeared to subscribe to the unitary model of
mental disease, referring to melancholia as the ‘first stage’ of insanity.
Kitchen described the progression from simple, non-delusional melan-
cholia to more severe forms, in which both delusions and hallucinations
could develop. He also noted the prominence of suicidal tendencies,
which, he argued, may cause patients to try to convince the physician that
they were well enough to be released ‘in order to obtain their object’.
Kitchen’s description of melancholia illustrates the extent to which the
diagnosis was becoming standardised in the West in the second half of
the century as a clearly defined condition with a largely coherent symp-
tomatology. Indeed, Kitchen remarked that diagnosing melancholia was
‘not difficult’ as ‘nearly all cases’ were ‘self-evident’.92
Ira Russell, writing for the Alienist and Neurologist in 1881, equally
placed melancholia in a psycho-physiological framework. Drawing on the
works of British physicians such as Tuke and Bucknill, Crichton Browne,
and Maudsley, Russell suggested that ‘[m]orbid states…of the centres
of organic sensation in reciprocal action and reaction may give rise to
hypochondriasis or melancholia’.93 He moreover strongly emphasised the
importance of being vigilant towards suicidal propensities in melancholics,
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arguing that the ‘tendency of melancholics to commit suicide, renders
it absolutely necessary that they should be carefully watched.’94 Here
Russell echoed a claim forcefully made by Maudsley, Savage, and other
British physicians of the period, as will be seen in the next chapter. In
explaining the suicidality of melancholics he cited Maudsley, who ‘says
it is due to the loss of the love of life’. Speculating about the physio-
logical basis for this deviation from what was at the time considered an
evolutionary fact, Russell pondered whether there might ‘be a cerebral
center that presides over the instinctive love of life’ and that in the case of
suicidal melancholics ‘that center’ had become ‘organically or functionally
diseased’.95
Conclusion
By the last quarter of the century, a biomedical model of melancholia
as a condition of disordered mood was widely endorsed across Western
Europe and North America. This chapter has shown how Griesinger
developed a theory of psychological reflex action similar to that put
forward by Laycock, which he subsequently deployed to explain how
emotion became disordered through repeated irritation of the brain,
eventually resulting in pathology. This pathological mental state, which
in the early stages would usually manifest as simple melancholia, or
sometimes hypochondria, could deteriorate to the point where delusions
and hallucinations developed. For Griesinger and some other contem-
poraneous writers, melancholia was the first in three stages of mental
disease, meaning that if left untreated it was likely to progress into mania,
and eventually dementia and death. Others, such as Maudsley, did not
subscribe to the unitary psychosis model, conceiving instead of melan-
cholia as a distinct illness category (or categories). These differences
should not, however, be overstated. From the point of view of aetiology
and diagnostics, the internal model and the symptomatology of melan-
cholia were largely the same whether classified as an independent disease
or as the first stage of insanity. Towards the end of the century, the diag-
nosis was increasingly standardised in published literature, where it came
to centre on four key symptoms: mental pain, depression, suicidality, and
religious delusions. This is the focus of the next chapter.
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and the Standardisation ofMelancholia
No class of diseases with which man is afflicted are as various in their mani-
festations, as those known under the general term of insanity. No diseases
present such an infinite variety of light and shade belonging to their own
nature, or to their own intermixture with other maladies, or to the influence
of temperament, of individual peculiarities of habit, or of social position; and
therefore the diagnosis of no other class of diseases taxes nearly so much the
integrity and the patience of the physician.1
John Charles Bucknill (1856)
Classification is not the dry exercise of putting things into pigeonholes but the
act of creating the holes into which to put things.2
Roger Smith (2007)
When Bethlem physician George Savage stated in the 1880s that ‘[a]ny
classification of insanity must necessarily be provisional’,3 he expressed
perhaps the one aspect of classification upon which most Victorian
alienists could agree. The classification of mental disease was a hotly
contested topic among nineteenth-century physicians—no standard,
universally accepted nosology existed, and diagnostic practices, labels,
and criteria could differ a great deal between different asylums and
hospitals. The British Lunacy Commission attempted to institute a
unified system with considerable success, but many physicians continued
to favour alternative nosologies, each often with their own idiosyncratic
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twist. Biomedical models of mental disease dominated in the second half
of the nineteenth century, and internal, physiological explanations for
melancholia displayed notable coherence. However, such disease models
were of little use when it came to diagnostics. While Savage and many of
his peers expressed hope and confidence that it would one day become
possible to identify and diagnose various forms of insanity according
to ‘the physiological changes which take place in the nerve centres’,4
they were presently guided in their diagnostic work by the presence or
absence of external symptoms. Symptoms of melancholia were observed
through the spectacles of physiology, and were shaped through biomed-
ical language, giving prominence to ‘depression’ and ‘mental pain’,
terms reconceptualised within a modern scientific framework. Another
key symptom, ‘religious delusions’, emerged from patient interviews,
which suggested that significant number of melancholics experienced
their suffering as punishment from God. Finally, late-nineteenth-century
physicians were in particular trained to look for ‘suicidal tendencies’ in
melancholic patients, a problem believed to be so prevalent as to lead
one physician to remark that ‘[t]he question of the patient being suicidal
should never in any case of melancholia be left unconsidered, and the risk
of his becoming suicidal should never in any case be left unprovided for’.5
The belief that a majority of melancholics were suicidal became some-
thing of an axiom for late-Victorian asylum physicians, and informed
decisions about confinement, surveillance, and treatment of melancholic
patients. The term itself emerged as a medical concept through the certifi-
cates of insanity that had to be filled out prior to a person’s admission to
the asylum, and which required a yes or no answer as to whether the
suspected lunatic was ‘epileptic, suicidal, or dangerous to others’.6 This
information was subsequently transferred into asylum admission records
and casebooks, where it was entered alongside various other information
about the patient, including the type of disease they were believed to
suffer from. When statistics on suicidality were merged with diagnostic
figures, these suggested that patients who entered the asylum with the
label ‘suicidal’ on their certificate were far more likely to receive the diag-
nosis melancholia than other patients, leading to the assumption that all
melancholics were potentially suicidal.7
Edwin Schneidman, a prominent twentieth-century British psychia-
trist, wrote in 1993 that ‘suicide is caused by psychache’, a term he used
to denote ‘intolerable psychological pain’.8 Perhaps unbeknownst to the
author, this phrase echoes the words of nineteenth-century physicians
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who more than a century earlier suggested that melancholia was char-
acterised by a ‘psychic ache’, ‘mental pain’, or ‘psychalgia’ that often led
patients to become suicidal.9 Schneidman’s work has formed the basis
for more recent research into the relationship between suicidality and
mental pain.10 In twenty-first-century psy-literature, the close relationship
between these two phenomena is apparently taken for granted—intoler-
able mental pain produces suicidal thoughts and gestures, which some-
times lead to suicide. In the twenty-first century, ‘depression’11 conjures
up similar anxieties about suicidality. Today the term is chiefly used in
psychiatry to denote a specific condition—clinical depression or Major
Depressive Disorder. The view that this condition carries a significant risk
of suicide is accepted across Western medicine, and suicidality is listed as a
diagnostic criterion of depression in the most recent editions of both the
DSM and the ICD.12 Much like the relationship between mental pain and
suicidality, the causal bond between depression and suicidal thoughts and
actions appears to be taken as self-evident in the present, in medical and
non-medical contexts alike. In the Victorian period, there was no illness
with this name, but the term was used with growing regularity, primarily
to describe the overall mental and bodily state of the melancholic—a
pressing down, a dulling of the individual’s internal processes of ‘nutri-
tion’. Used in this way, the term denoted low mood, inertia, sluggishness,
and a general slowing down of bodily functions such as respiration, diges-
tion, speech, and, in some cases, even hair growth. Melancholia was often
referred to in nosological literature as the ‘state of mental depression’,13
contrasted with ‘mental weakness’ and ‘exaltation’.
Religious delusions were frequently noted as a symptom of melan-
cholia in case notes as well as published literature. Patients who arrived
in the asylum and were diagnosed with melancholia commonly expressed
profound feelings of guilt. Casebook descriptions tell of ‘imaginary’ sins
committed, of desperate accounts of having ‘caused the ruin of’ and
‘brought shame upon’ one’s family, of having done such horrible things
that one was unworthy of life and must be punished by God. Such
expressions of guilt and shame were noted by physicians as ‘delusions’
of a religious nature, a symptom of mental disease that contributed to
melancholic patients’ suicidal propensities. To the historian, this symptom
illustrates the uneasy yet close relationship between old and new ideas,
between spiritual and scientific worldviews and ways of experience. While
it is not possible to access the ‘true’ experience of patients whose stories
emerge only as case notes scribbled by their physicians, fears of God’s
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punishment and of having brought shame upon one’s family through
sinful acts must be seen as very much real and present in what was, despite
the arrival of modern science, still a largely Christian society, one that
placed high value on ‘virtues’ such as respectability, godliness, purity, and
self-help.14
As a symptom of melancholia, religious delusions have important
contrasts with mental pain. The former were commonly described in case
notes, admission documents, and published case studies, but were rarely
held up as a defining criterion in textbook definitions of melancholia in
the same way as the latter. Mental pain, conversely, was listed as a primary
psychological symptom of melancholia in nosological descriptions, but
was rarely used as an expressive term in asylum casebooks. From what can
be deduced from patient records, it was not a word patients themselves
used to talk about their suffering, however it did to some extent feature
as a descriptive term in popular language. For Victorian physicians, its
usefulness was chiefly as a unifying diagnostic term, a form of shorthand
for a range of emotional expressions that asylum physicians took to be
the manifestation of psychological pain. While the term itself had spiritual
roots, as a medical symptom it was a distinctly modern one, presented in
the literature as a physiological state analogous to physical pain.
The terms ‘suicidal tendencies’, ‘depression’, ‘mental pain’, and ‘reli-
gious delusions’ were produced as medical concepts in significantly
different ways, through a range of practices and theoretical discussions.
They did not emerge at the same time, yet they were mutually rein-
forcing as descriptive terms of melancholia in the late nineteenth century.
The nineteenth-century origins of depression as a mental symptom were
considered in Chapter 3. Mental pain has an equally multifaceted history
that can be traced in part to early modern religious texts, and in
part to physiology, whence it was borrowed as an analogy to describe
an emotional state that was perceived as a psychological equivalent
of physical pain. The physiological notion of mental pain was more
complex, however, as within the new physiological psychology (outlined
in Chapter 2), the ‘mental’ was not merely abstract, but rather under-
stood as the manifestation of physiological processes in the brain. ‘Suicidal
tendencies’, conversely, have more clearly traceable roots, becoming a
prominent symptom through the medical certificates of insanity that were
introduced in the early decades of the nineteenth century, and through
which it became a significant statistical marker for melancholic patients.
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A strong link was forged in the mid-to-late nineteenth century between
melancholia and mental pain, depression, and suicidality, and, to a lesser
extent, religious delusions. This relationship proved useful in a number
of ways, two of which are of particular significance for the present story.
First, it played a key role in the nosological reification and standardi-
sation of melancholia in late Victorian medico-psychological literature.
Secondly, it offered a useful tool within endeavours to establish psycho-
logical medicine (later psychiatry) as a modern scientific discipline and
branch of medicine. While this story is focussed on the British context,
it is important to note that the standardisation of melancholia was not a
strictly domestic development. British physicians read the works of many
of their European counterparts; journals were increasingly publishing
English translations of foreign (chiefly German, French, and Italian)
articles, and ideas and concepts from continental psychiatry were appro-
priated by British medical psychologists to various extents. In much of
the literature, mental pain and depression were held up as a driving
force in the suicidality of simple, non-delusional melancholia, whereas
religious delusions, particularly a belief in having committed ‘the unpar-
donable sin’, was perceived as triggering suicidal intent in people suffering
from more severe forms of the disease. This chapter traces these themes
through some of the most widely read textbooks of mental disease to
emerge in late Victorian Britain by influential medical psychologists such
as Henry Maudsley and George Savage, as well as through a number of
journal case studies on melancholia published in the last few decades of
the nineteenth century.
Central to the standardisation of melancholia was the growing use of
medical statistics. The practice of collecting and disseminating patient
data in numerical tabular form played a key role in the development
of diagnostic practices in the mid-to-late nineteenth century. As will be
seen below, in the case of melancholia, this is illustrated by the emphasis
placed on suicidality as a symptom of the disease, and by the use of
simple key terms to describe a patient’s mental state, in particular ‘depres-
sion’. Historians have drawn upon the large body of asylum statistics
that emerged in the wake of the creation of the Lunacy Commission
in 1845 in attempts to recreate the Victorian asylum milieu and make
sense of the practices and experiences of doctors and patients. However,
despite the wealth of existing research into the nineteenth-century lunacy
trade and the key role asylum statistics has played in such research, the
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relationship between statistical knowledge and diagnostic theory and prac-
tices remains remarkably underexplored. Lunacy administration, statistical
collecting and reporting, and the dissemination of clinical data in profes-
sional fora such as meetings, journals, and textbooks were key processes
in the creation of modern diagnostic categories. Two events in particular
facilitated the reification of melancholia as a modern biomedical mental
disease with a relatively standardised set of diagnostic criteria. The first
of these was the creation of a large body of asylum statistics, as well as
increasingly standardised practices for recording symptoms. The second
was the emergence of a professional community of medical psychologists,
where the question of classification was widely debated, and whence a vast
field of published material on nosological and diagnostic questions was
emerging. The apparent prevalence of ‘suicidal propensities’ in patients
diagnosed with melancholia serves here as an illustration of the role of
administrative practices, chiefly statistical reporting, in the standardisation
of melancholia in this period.
Statistics and classification were contentious topics among late Victo-
rian asylum doctors, and lively discussions took place at meetings of
the Medico-Psychological Association, as well as on the pages of its
periodical, the Journal of Mental Science. Such debates occurred at a time
when British alienists were trying to assert the status of their profession
as a medical science and academic discipline. Yet, while published articles
and textbooks flourished, gradually establishing a solid theoretical frame-
work for psychological medicine, debates regarding asylum admission,
treatment, diagnosis, and protection of patients tell of a profession
where doubts and anxieties were pervasive and answers few. This chapter
begins with a look at the emergence and reification of suicidality as
a key symptom of melancholia in the second half of the century, and
the role played by statistics in this development. It then maps two of
the other key symptoms referred to above—mental pain, and religious
delusions—asking how these became part of an increasingly standardised
definition of melancholia. Finally, the chapter concludes by discussing
the increasingly coherent diagnosis that emerged in the last decade of
the century, and the growing medical attention brought to bear upon
simple or non-delusional melancholia, a mental state that straddled the
boundary between normal and pathological emotions.
The next and final chapter follows the narrative presented here to the
pages of asylum casebooks, where the key symptoms of melancholia were
seen to manifest in a wide range of acts and expressions. Taken together,
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the last two chapters of this book aim to highlight a tension within psychi-
atric classification that has been a feature of this kind of knowledge since
its inception. They show how, on the one hand, the defining symptoms
of melancholia emerged as melancholic patients frequently manifested
behaviour that appeared to indicate that they suffered from patholog-
ical low mood, painful emotions, and thoughts of suicide. In this way,
an increasingly standardised symptomatology can be seen as a response
to ‘typical’ psychological phenomena clustering together in a significant
section of asylum populations. On the other hand, however, the perceived
need for coherent diagnostic categories, swifter recording practices, and
more efficient data collection, created an environment in which a vast
range of human acts and expressions were increasingly interpreted as
homogenous and made to fit the standard description of melancholia
with its key criteria. What these chapters—and the book as a whole—
aim to show, then, is that the emergence of a key set of criteria for
melancholia that centred on low mood and suicidality was not inevitable,
but neither was the diagnosis simply ‘constructed’. The production of
knowledge about human beings is always a complex, negotiated, multi-
faceted process, and the creation of modern mood disorders, of which
nineteenth-century melancholia was the first, is no exception.
The Problem of Diagnosis
in Psychological Medicine
British textbooks on mental disease greatly proliferated in the last two
decades of the nineteenth century, with a growing number of asylum
physicians deciding to turn their clinical experience into educational mate-
rial for students and fellow practitioners. It is difficult to speak of the
‘standard’ psychiatric textbook as physicians differed a great deal in their
approach to mental disease, both in terms of diagnostics and treatment
as well as aetiology and internal explanatory models. Nevertheless, a
few general remarks can be made about the late Victorian textbook of
insanity. First, while aetiology and treatment were undoubtedly signifi-
cant areas of psychiatric knowledge, far more attention was devoted to
diagnostics, that is, the question of how to identify various forms of
mental disease. It follows that textbooks were overwhelmingly devoted
to classification. Secondly, different asylums deployed different diagnostic
systems, with variations being national, regional, local, and even individual
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to each physician. At the same time, a measure of de facto standardisa-
tion was gradually instituted, in part as a result of Lunacy Commission
recommendations and directives. Textbooks and articles also suggest that
a gradual consensus emerged around major diagnostic categories such
as melancholia, mania, and general paralysis. Thirdly, the melancholia
diagnosis received growing attention in many British textbooks in the
last quarter of the century, and diagnostic descriptions became increas-
ingly homogenous, coalescing around mental depression and suicidal
tendencies as the core distinguishing symptoms of melancholia. Fourthly,
the process of creating and reifying diagnostic categories was complex
and contested, depending upon a number of factors: formal guidelines
relating to recording practices, statistical tables, growing concern for
patient safety and the often conflicting concern for patient liberty, as
well as contradictory systems of knowledge (e.g. religious versus scien-
tific, lay versus medical). Equally important, however, were such mundane
factors as habit and convenience, made all the more significant with the
introduction of standardised printed forms for recording symptoms and
diagnoses.
At a time when an increasing number of asylum physicians chose to
publish books and articles on their research and clinical experience, noso-
logical concerns were at the forefront of professional debates. What kind
of system one adhered to was a statement about one’s epistemological
approach to insanity—as Maudsley had suggested in 1867, a correct
classification system was one that was grounded in scientific knowledge
and ‘in conformity with nature’.15 But what ‘nature’ suggested about
the classification of mental disease was not universally self-evident. A
rapidly expanding catalogue of publications on insanity meant a rapidly
growing number of different systems. From the multitude of nuances
and more marked differences between nosologies, three ways of labelling
and categorising insanity can be identified that were particularly common:
classification according to stages (e.g. acute or chronic), classification
according to causes (e.g. alcoholic insanity, puerperal insanity, climac-
teric insanity), and classification according to observable symptoms (e.g.
melancholia, mania, general paralysis). Many physicians used a combina-
tion of all three, rather than selecting one, and all three systems prevailed
in some form or another throughout the Victorian period. What is
perhaps most telling about the different systems proposed is that the one
thing physicians largely agreed on was the difficulty in translating clinical
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observations into consistent theoretical frameworks. To label and cate-
gorise the multitude of human activity that was met with on asylum and
hospital wards was a challenging task. Henry Monro noted as much in
the 1850s:
All who have charge of asylums must well know how very different the
clear and distinct classification of books is from that medley of symptoms
which is presented by real cases, where each case seems to bear as peculiarly
its own idiosyncrasies of detail, as hardly to allow of very minute division.16
Nevertheless, despite their own admission as to the problems inherent
in trying to attach strict medical labels to the unpredictability of
human emotions and actions, Victorian medical psychologists remained
persuaded of the necessity and usefulness of classification, setting the tone
for psychiatric diagnosis ever since.
Classification and Medical Statistics
While many British physicians were keen to add their own version
of popular nosologies to the ever-growing catalogue of systems, a
universal system of classification was proposed in the 1844 report of
the Metropolitan Commissioners in Lunacy to the Lord Chancellor. The
Metropolitan Commission had been set up in 1828 by the Madhouses
Act to oversee the management of lunatic asylums and licensed houses
in London and surrounding areas,17 with its authority extended to all
of England and Wales in 1842.18 The nosology presented in the report
brought together old and new categories, suggesting nine different types
of mental disease: mania (divided into acute, ordinary, and periodical),
dementia, melancholia, monomania, moral insanity, congenital idiocy,
congenital imbecility, general paralysis, and epilepsy. The report remarked
that melancholia, monomania, and moral insanity were ‘sometimes
comprehended under the term Partial Insanity’, and further suggested
that ‘delirium tremens’ might be considered as an additional category to
those stated. Despite numerous individual attempts by physicians to put
forward their system of classification as the most ‘correct’ and ‘scientific’,
a somewhat simplified version of the nosology endorsed by the London
Commissioners proved enduring in the context of asylum diagnostics. Its
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apparent popularity can be explained in large part through the require-
ments placed on asylum medical officers by the Lunacy Commission in
the second half of the century, as will be seen below.
In its 1844 report, the Metropolitan Commission emphasised the
importance and value of statistics in the management of asylums. The
report lamented the inconsistent nature of existing figures, which were
perceived as incomplete and fragmentary, failing to give an accurate
account of the number of lunatics residing in Britain. Following from
this, an inquiry was undertaken, whereby the managers of asylums and
licensed houses in England and Wales were asked to supply their latest
figures, with the investigation being extended ‘to a certain degree, to
Scotland and Ireland’. In order that such inquiries could be carried out
more efficiently and comprehensively in the future, the Commissioners
proposed the nationwide introduction of ‘certain forms of Registers and
Medical Books, to be kept at all Asylums, with a view to the preparation
of Statistical Returns, at stated and uniform periods’.19 When the national
Lunacy Commission was created in 1845 (see below), such a system was
rapidly instituted, and had significant and lasting consequences for how
melancholia was defined and diagnosed.
The classification and diagnosis of melancholia took place against
the backdrop of a wider context of a culture increasingly preoccupied
with categories and numbers.20 The natural historians of the eighteenth
century, such as Linnaeus and Blumenbach, had cemented classification
as a central component of their work; to know the living world, one must
organise it—name, label, and categorise it. When Linnaeus put together
his Systema Naturae, he considered his own work to be that of an identi-
fier, whose task it was to find the correct boxes for each thing existing in
nature.21 As Foucault has suggested, however, the birth of modern clas-
sification ‘was not an age-old inattentiveness being suddenly dissipated,
but a new field of visibility being constituted in all its density’.22 In the
nineteenth century classification became a totalising practice; ‘[p]eople
classified, measured, and standardized just about everything – animals,
human races, books, pharmaceutical products, taxes, jobs, and diseases’.23
Classification of mental disease was helped by another nineteenth-
century favourite preoccupation: statistics.24 Terrence Murphy has traced
the early years of modern statistics among French scientists such as
Condorcet, who hoped to establish ‘a science of decision making’, a
tool with which decisions in political society could be made according to
calculated probability and thus protected from rash judgments motivated
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by passion.25 Numbers would tell people which course of sociopolitical
action to take by suggesting probable consequences of various options.
While Condorcet did not complete his visionary project of a decision-
making science, the foundation was laid, and others continued to build
upon it, most notably Laplace.26
The theory of probability was picked up and utilised by Philippe Pinel,
who had taken over the running of Paris’ large asylums during the first
republic. Pinel believed that persistent recording of data that allowed the
medical scientist to compare and contrast symptoms and their treatments
would result in improved therapeutics and consequently better outcomes
for those diagnosed with various forms of insanity. He separated medicine
into two branches, nosography and therapeutics, suggesting that proba-
bility theory applied only to the latter.27 Some decades later, however,
it became productive of the former. In the second half of the century,
reasoning about the regularity of events became paramount to the diag-
nosis of melancholia, and in particular to the almost universal belief that
suicidality was a defining symptom of the disease. According to statistics
produced by British asylums, expressions and actions collated under the
term ‘suicidal tendencies’ were seen to occur in the disease with frequent
regularity, resulting in the expectation that a diagnosis of melancholia
meant the likely presence of suicidality. This assumption significantly
affected how such patients were cared for—if melancholic patients were
expected to harbour suicidal intentions, strict precautions must be taken
to ensure that they were unable to injure themselves. It also altered the
interpretation of symptoms at the moment of diagnosis. ‘Suicidal tenden-
cies’ became central to the ontology of melancholia—but this was not a
simple or inevitable development. It relied upon, and was produced by, a
set of legal guidelines generating changes to recording practices and vast
amounts of new kinds of statistical data.
Asylum Statistics and the Standardisation
of Recording Practices
Wynn’s Act of 1808 had allowed for county asylums to be established
as institutions providing for pauper lunatics.28 In the subsequent years,
admission to licensed private houses came to require legal documenta-
tion certifying the mental state of the person taken into care, a provision
that was eventually extended to pauper asylums.29 As noted above, insti-
tutions in the Greater London area had since the late 1820s been subject
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to inspections and directives from the Metropolitan Commission, which
had its powers extended to oversee the running of asylums throughout
England and Wales in the last two years of its existence. When the
Lunatics Care and Treatment Act and Regulation of Asylums Act30 (here-
after ‘the Lunacy Acts’) were passed in 1845, these constituted to a
degree ‘a consolidation of “lunacy reform”’ begun at the end of the
previous century.31 Such earlier developments can also be seen as the first
bricks in the bureaucracy that was rapidly constructed in the aftermath
of the Acts. Every county in England and Wales was compelled to erect
its own pauper asylum within three years. The Acts moreover created
a permanent body, the Lunacy Commission, to oversee the implemen-
tation of the Acts.32 While the practice of collecting and disseminating
statistical information pertaining to asylum populations had begun under
the administration of the Metropolitan Commissioners, with the creation
of its successor body this process became vastly more comprehensive,
organised, systematised, detailed, regular, and wide-reaching. In the first
instance, the yearly reports that asylums were required to submit to the
Commission produced a wealth of statistical information about the people
residing in these institutions. In addition to this, almost immediately after
the initial stipulations of the Acts had come into force these were built
upon through a relentless flow of circular letters from the Commission
to the asylums requesting various kinds of information, from ‘a copy of
your present Diet Table’33 to whether post-mortem examinations were
performed on a regular basis.34
The Lunacy Acts had set out detailed instructions for the management
of asylum populations, including the various administrative tasks required,
and attached to the main documents were a number of appendices with
templates for some of the paperwork relating to admission and care of
lunatics under the new law. Of primary concern for the present story are
the medical certificates of insanity and accompanying reception orders, as
well as the asylum admissions registers and casebooks. The 1845 Lunacy
Acts extended the scope of medical certificates and explicitly set out their
legal framework. The Acts stipulated that a patient admitted to the asylum
must be legally certified as ‘a lunatic [or an insane person, or an idiot,
or a person of unsound mind] and a proper person to be confined’.35
They distinguished between private and pauper patients; for the latter
one certificate was enough, while for the former two (signed by different
physicians) were required.36 Appendices to the Acts provided doctors
with a clear template for the medical certificate and reception order, the
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latter listing the various ‘particulars’ required, such as ‘age’, ‘sex’, ‘place
of abode’, whether this was the patient’s ‘first attack’, and whether he
or she was ‘epileptic’, ‘suicidal’, or ‘dangerous to others’.37 In the case
of private patients, this statement was often filled out by a spouse, rela-
tive, or friend, while reception orders belonging to pauper patients were
customarily filled out and signed by a magistrate or workhouse official.
Upon arrival at the asylum, the data on these forms would be transferred
to the admissions register. Asylum physicians were legally required to add
a diagnosis to this information within a week of admission.38
Following the establishment of the Lunacy Commission, asylum physi-
cians were obliged to compile yearly reports on the state of their
institutions, including statistics on a large number of aspects pertaining
to the asylum population. This meant that for the first time a large body
of data was created from which one could extract virtually any thinkable
piece of information about every county asylum in Britain,39 organised
in tabular numerical form. Asylum physicians, the county Board of Visi-
tors,40 and Lunacy Commissioners were able to learn from such figures
how many men and women resided in each asylum, what proportion of
these were married, single, or widowed, which professions and religious
persuasions were represented among them, the average age of patients,
the most common form of mental disease (usually mania), how many
people were admitted and discharged each year, how many patients died
in the asylum and how many autopsies were performed, what treatments
were administered, and so on.
One of the provisions set out in the Lunacy Care and Treatments Act
of 1845 was that each asylum had to keep a casebook where detailed
information about each patient’s condition was to be entered at regular
intervals. The instructions of the Act had been relatively vague regarding
the casebook, stating merely that such a book should be kept by every
asylum and that the presiding physician should in this book ‘from time
to time make entries of the mental state and bodily condition of each
patient, together with a correct description of the medicine and other
remedies prescribed for his disorder’.41 Shortly after the Lunacy Acts had
come into force, however, the secretary of the Commission sent out a
letter to all county asylums with guidelines on the use of the casebook,
which were subsequently also incorporated into an 1853 legal amend-
ment. The Commissioners left the format of the casebook to be decided
by each superintendent, since a strict template ‘might tend to cramp and
fetter the Practitioner in his detail of individual cases’. However, clear
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directives were provided concerning the content of the casebook. Physi-
cians were instructed to enter much of the basic information derived from
the admissions register, such as name, sex, and occupation of the patient.
Secondly, a detailed description of the patient’s external bodily condition,
and of respiratory and visceral organs, was to be given, along with a pulse
and state of the tongue and skin. Thirdly,
A description of the phenomena of mental disorder which characterize the
case; – the manner and period of the attack; – with a minute account
of the symptoms, and the changes produced in the patient’s temper or
disposition; – specifying whether the malady displays itself by any, and
what, illusions, or by irrational conduct, or morbid and dangerous habits
and propensities’.42
Bearing in mind, then, that the Lunacy Acts had already stipulated that
for each patient a diagnosis had to be entered; this diagnosis also had to
be accompanied by a detailed description of the disease, listing emotional
and intellectual symptoms, as well as noting whether the patient was
considered to harbour any ‘morbid propensities’.
With the Lunacy Commission’s strong emphasis on the importance
of collecting and disseminating statistics, asylum physicians inevitably
devoted a considerable amount of time and energy to the gathering of
such data, and consequently also to discussions about how to best go
about this task. Statistics became a central topic of discussion at the annual
meetings of the Medico-Psychological Association. Unlike in Germany,
where a number of different psychiatric associations and journals had
been created at this time (sometimes in opposition to each other),43
the Medico-Psychological Association was the chief forum within which
British asylum physicians could meet and discuss their trade and their
nascent discipline. Its professional periodical, the Journal of Mental
Science, offered a space for physicians working in the field of psycholog-
ical medicine to present their research and partake of and comment on
the work of others. The Journal of Mental Science moreover published
the proceedings from the Association’s quarterly and annual meetings.
In 1864, the members of the Association appointed a committee
consisting of Henry Maudsley, C. Lockhart Robertson (of the Sussex
County Asylum at Hayward’s Heath), and John Thurnam (of Wiltshire
County Asylum) whose task it was to look into the question of data
collection in the asylum, and consequently ‘to draw up a series of tables,
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and a form of register which might be the basis of a uniform system of
asylum statistics’. The intention was that ‘these tables be submitted to the
Commissioners’ who would be ‘asked to sanction and promulgate them’.
The Committee of Asylum Statistics proposed six tables, revised from
those already in use and intended to homogenise and streamline asylum
statistics. The tables concerned statistics on admissions, discharges, and
deaths, but did not include columns for specific diagnoses.44 At the Asso-
ciation’s annual meeting in 1867, the Committee was pleased to report
that twenty-six English asylums, two Scottish, and one Irish had adopted
the new tables.45 These had also received the blessing of the Commis-
sioners in Lunacy, who praised the initiative of the Medico-Psychological
Association in facilitating the collection of numerical data from asylums
around the country, and who had endorsed the new tables in their annual
report the previous year.46 The Commissioners suggested that in addition
to the existing tables, it would also be ‘desirable’ to draw up uniform
tables showing ‘the ages of patients on admission, the duration of the
exiting attack, and the form of mental disorder under which they labour’,
expressing ‘hope’ that ‘the medical officers of asylums may see the great
importance of coming to some agreement upon these points’.47
The Committee on Asylum statistics proposed three additional tables
that partially redressed the Lunacy Commission’s concerns. New forms
asked for causes of insanity to be listed, as well as length and number of
attacks, and causes of death. The latter included indications of the type of
disorder that the deceased patient had suffered from with the heading
‘maniacal or melancholic exhaustion or decay’ listed alongside other
causes such as ‘epilepsy’, ‘apoplexy’, and ‘general paresis’.48 However,
the Medico-Psychological Association failed to adopt a uniform system
of classification of mental disease; not surprisingly, perhaps, considering
the vastly conflicting and diverse opinions of its members on this matter.
In the 1879 edition of his textbook, Henry Maudsley remarked that
‘as many as forty or fifty different systems of classification have been
propounded’,49 and the problems attached to developing a correct system
were, he suggested, the same as in the 1840s and 50s: ‘until we know
exactly the obscure constitutional conditions which are at the bottom
of the differences of symptoms – of which we know nothing yet – we
cannot dispense with a symptomatological classification’.50 George Savage
echoed this claim a few years later, adding that he himself chose to use
the system that was most ‘convenient’ from a clinical point of view.51
138 Å. JANSSON
The problem of uniform classification was not in the end to be
resolved through theoretical discussions in the forum of the Medico-
Psychological Association or in textbooks or journal articles. Rather, the
instituting of practices aimed at facilitating the collection and coherence
of medical statistics had the effect of producing a de facto standard-
ised nosology. While physicians themselves were unable or unwilling to
agree on a nationwide system of classification, the increasing number of
directives issued from the Lunacy Commission regarding the collection
of asylum statistics encouraged the use of certain specified categories.
In the 1870s the Lunacy Commission introduced pre-printed forms for
recording the different types of mental disease in the asylum. As noted
above, medical officers were already required by law to record a diag-
nosis in the casebook within one week of a patient’s admission, and this
information was included in each asylum’s annual report to the Commis-
sion. However, with different nosologies favoured by different physicians,
cross-comparison between asylums in this area was blatantly problematic.
In an attempt to redress this, attached to a circular letter sent out to all
asylums and licensed houses in 1876 was a pre-printed form for the main
register of patients, with five columns provided under the heading ‘form
of mental disorder’: mania, melancholia, dementia, congenital insanity,
and ‘other forms of insanity’ (general paralysis was also listed, but as a
symptom alongside epilepsy rather than as a separate disease entity).52
While the implementation of directives from the Commission neces-
sarily varied between asylums, and while some physicians were more likely
to make frequent use of the last column than others, the Commissioners’
persistent attempts to derive uniform, comparable data from asylums
were crucial in shaping what kind of data was recorded. Melancholia was
a term that had existed in medical literature in some form or another
since antiquity, it was recognisable and came, increasingly, with a number
of well-known features attached to it. The two most easily distinguishable
types of insanity on the asylum wards were generally considered to be
melancholia and mania. That the Commission’s pre-printed table listed
these two categories was significant in ensuring their continued usage on
the wards. Consequently, a sample survey of statistics from a number of
asylums around the country between the 1860s and 1880s indicate that
the two most common forms of mental disease diagnosed were mania
and melancholia (in that order).53 While physicians continued to battle
out their disagreements over classification in journal articles and at profes-
sional gatherings, it can nonetheless be concluded that by the 1870s the
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beginnings of a standard nosology existed in Britain, one which held
melancholia to be a distinct form of mental disease. Mid-to-late Victorian
physicians offered concise diagnostic descriptions of melancholia which,
in contrast to those of earlier writers like Conolly, centred upon the
definition of a disease entity, rather than of the person(s) seen to embody
the illness. Despite persisting disagreements over what kind of system
should be used, the nosological status of melancholia was conversely
strengthened and homogenised during this period.
Melancholia and Suicidal Tendencies
While physicians might have preferred to use their own system of
classification, they were nevertheless keen on using the statistical data
collected for their annual reports to the Commission in their own theoret-
ical discussions on mental pathology. Such information overwhelmingly
suggested that a majority of melancholic patients harboured suicidal
tendencies, and of all patients admitted to the asylum, the majority of
those who received the ‘suicidal’ label were diagnosed with melancholia.
In the first half of the century physicians across Europe had become
increasingly preoccupied with suicide and insanity, as illustrated by Forbes
Winslow’s popular The Anatomy of Suicide published in 1840. Winslow’s
work was a comprehensive lesson in suicide statistics, making the most
of the science of numbers as a tool for explaining why people would
commit what had long been an unforgivable sin but which was now
more frequently perceived as the product of an unsound mind. Winslow,
Esquirol, Falret, and other early nineteenth-century medical scientists
with an interest in suicide had two things in common. First, they were
almost exclusively concerned with completed suicides, and the statistics
they compiled and/or drew upon were of people who had died (presum-
ably) at their own hands. The adjective ‘suicidal’ was a recent addition
to the English language. It was used sparingly in the first few decades of
the century, but by the late 1800s it had become a standard diagnostic
term. Secondly, they paid only marginal attention to suicide in relation to
melancholia.
This was in stark contrast to their late nineteenth-century successors.
In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, ‘suicidal tenden-
cies’ became a defining symptom of melancholia.54 This shift can in
part be attributed to one of the obligatory questions on the reception
order which accompanied the medical certificates of insanity. As noted
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above, the reception order required a yes or no answer as to whether
the patient to be admitted was ‘suicidal’. Once the suicidal label had
been affixed to the individual certified as a lunatic, it followed them
into the asylum casebook, where it was noted together with other symp-
toms, bodily condition, and diagnosis. This information became part of
each asylum’s annual statistical reports, which indicated that a significant
portion of patients were considered suicidal. This category of patients
became a particular concern of the Commissioners in Lunacy; suicidal
patients posed a threat to the reputation of each asylum and thus to the
competency of the Commission.
Less than a decade after the passing of the Lunacy Acts, Thomas Brush-
field, medical superintendent at Parkside Cheshire County asylum (and
later at Brookwood in Surrey), concluded from his annual data that 42
out of the 102 patients admitted to Parkside that year were recorded as
having exhibited ‘suicidal impulses’.55 Alluding to the significance such
figures were rapidly taking on for physicians and Commissioners alike,
he suggested that ‘[t]his class at all times causes great anxiety to the
medical officers, as notwithstanding the greatest vigilance on the part of
the attendants, fatal cases will sometimes occur; no instance of the kind
has, however, happened during the past year’.56 Parkside was representa-
tive of the norm. The figures reported to the Lunacy Commission and the
Scottish Board of Commissioners from British asylums each year showed
a persistently high (and rising) level of ‘suicidal propensities’ in patients
diagnosed with melancholia.
Anxieties generated by asylum statistics led to an increasing focus
on prevention. Patients considered to harbour suicidal tendencies were
assigned a pink caution card to be worn at all times, and extra night duty
staff were deployed to ensure that suicidal patients were never left unsu-
pervised.57 Concerns about how to best care for suicidal patients also
led to a revival in support for mechanical restraint, a practice that had
been rejected by the new ‘humanitarian’ practice of moral treatment that
had emerged at the turn of the nineteenth century. As the relationship
between melancholia and suicidality gradually became circular and mutu-
ally constitutive, the necessity of restraining such patients for their own
good was increasingly presented as a key argument for having melancholy
and suicidal patients admitted to the asylum. Physicians were expected
to treat patients and keep them safe, meaning that a suicide within the
walls of an asylum, or resulting from an escape, was a black stain on that
institution’s reputation. At the same time, however, there was political
5 STATISTICS, CLASSIFICATION, AND THE STANDARDISATION … 141
opposition to restraint, as well as to arbitrary confinement. Tension also
existed between the workhouse and the asylum, with disagreement over
who should ultimately be responsible for the treatment of pauper lunatics.
The relationship between these two institutions had consequences for the
emergence of suicidality as a medical concept and defining symptom of
melancholia. For a troublesome patient to be transferred from the (usually
more crowded and comparatively scarcely resourced) workhouse infirmary
to the asylum, the staff at the former generally had to be able to demon-
strate that the patient could not be properly cared for or managed in the
workhouse. This was most easily done by affirming that the patient was a
danger to other residents, or to themselves—in other words, ‘suicidal’.
Concerns about a patient’s suicidal intent were not, however, alleviated
by their presence in the asylum. The Commissioners in Lunacy, whose
responsibility it was to ensure that Britain’s lunatics were properly cared
for, were anxious about potential suicides in the asylum, and consequently
instructed medical officers to ensure that such patients were being appro-
priately watched over. Death by suicide was, in fact, rare in the asylum;
nevertheless, preoccupation with statistics over suicidal tendencies grew
steadily in the decades following the 1845 Acts. The Commissioners took
measures to ensure that concern over and precautions against suicidality
were a priority in every asylum by repeatedly emphasising the matter in
their correspondence with asylum medical officers.58
There was, however, some controversy surrounding the suicidal label,
particularly in regard to the reliability of asylum data on the prevalence of
suicidality. Bethlem superintendent George Savage questioned the justifi-
cation to keep suicidal patients under constant surveillance on the basis
that the statistics on suicidality were flawed. Many patients who were
given the suicidal label upon certification or admission were not, he
argued, ‘actively suicidal’. While ‘many speak of suicide’, he said, ‘but
few really determine to attempt it’.59 Consequently, he concluded that ‘I
do not think that more than five per cent of our admissions are “actively
suicidal”’.60 Many of his peers were equally critical of the validity of statis-
tics. While the members of the Medico-Psychological Association had
made efforts to comply with the Lunacy Commission’s requirements for
the recording and collecting of statistical data, many physicians expressed
scepticism about the usefulness of such numerical information. At the
1865 annual meeting of the Association, a number of its members became
involved in a discussion about the ‘fallaciousness’ of statistics, which led
Henry Monro to declare that ‘of all the humbugs of the present day
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that of statistics is the greatest’.61 Most of the members who partici-
pated in the discussion were in agreement that figures collected were too
diverse, fragmented, and arbitrary for any meaningful cross-comparison
to be made between asylums. Maudsley summed up what appeared to be
the general sentiment of the group when he ventured that numerical data
was ‘generally so insufficient as to be not only not useful but positively to
mislead. Strictly comparable cases are not taken; conditions and circum-
stances of importance are neglected, or are not observed as they should
be, so that the statistics lose all their value, and are positively used for the
purpose of inculcating what is not true’. While he suggested that statis-
tics could indeed be useful ‘if properly collected’, he implored his peers to
remember that they ‘never do establish laws or exact facts of any kind’.62
The sciences of classification and statistics were undoubtedly embraced
by nineteenth-century medical psychologists, but it would be wrong to
assume that the adoption of these practices occurred in an uncontested
and unproblematic way. On the contrary, the role and the reliability of
statistics in the diagnosis and treatment of mental disease was a topic of
contention among Victorian physicians.
Brushfield, who had moved to Brookwood asylum in Surrey in 1869,
echoed Maudsley’s warning in one of his annual reports to the Lunacy
Commission. He suggested that the flawed nature of statistics on suicidal
patients were due to the way this data was collected.63 As noted above,
the reception order accompanying the medical certificates of insanity
required an answer to the question of whether the person to be certi-
fied was ‘epileptic, suicidal or dangerous to others’. Unlike the ‘facts
indicating insanity’ on the medical certificate, which was filled out by a
physician, the information requested on the reception order was usually
provided by a relative, friend, or workhouse official. Moreover, the
format of the two documents differed significantly. If reliable data was
to be collected, he argued, these discrepancies had to be addressed.64
In their present state, the forms resulted in incorrect information about
a patient’s mental state, in particular relating to suicidality, as the forms
obscured a distinction between patients who were ‘a danger to them-
selves’, conflating the patients with ‘no suicidal motive’ who nonetheless
‘imperils his own life by various acts’, and those with genuine ‘suicidal
tendencies’. He illustrated the first category with the case of a woman
who was admitted to the asylum after having ‘cut her left hand off because
she thought it was Scripturally wrong’. While this patient was described
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as ‘suicidal’ on her certificate, the label was incorrect since her motive for
mutilating herself was ‘a non-suicidal one’.65
When it came to suicidal melancholics, however, Brushfield was clear,
declaring that ‘I would urge upon all medical practitioners the neces-
sity of regarding all cases of melancholia as having suicidal tendencies’.
Such tendencies could be deduced from patient interviews as well as from
conversations with friends and relatives, and these should, he argued, be
cited on the medical certificate under the section requesting the ‘facts
indicating insanity’.66 He went on to suggest what such facts might
consist of Suicidal tendencies in melancholic patients could manifest, he
argued, in the expression of ‘melancholy views’, especially of a religious
nature, such as believing oneself to have committed sins, or more overtly
in the form of attempts at self-destruction.67
The question on the reception order requiring a yes or no answer
to whether the lunatic was suicidal merged a wide range of acts and
behaviours into this category. This homogenising process was at the same
time productive of a wealth of purported psychopathological knowledge
about the people to whom these categories were seen to apply. As will be
seen in Chapter 6, a vast number of acts and expressions were collapsed
into the single term ‘suicidal’, such as talking about death, refusal of food,
thoughts of guilt and damnation, fear of persecution, and self-inflicted
bodily harm. Increasingly exact knowledge was produced by allowing
standardised categories to obscure the eclectic nature of human life that
terms like ‘suicidal’ were deployed to explain. By mapping the work done
by standardised forms and recording practices we can learn something
about the process whereby ‘a seemingly neutral data collection mecha-
nism is substituted for ethical conflict about the contents of the forms’.
When this occurs, then, ‘the moral debate is partially erased. One may
get ever more precise knowledge, without having resolved deeper ques-
tions, and indeed, by burying those questions’.68 Through the recording
practices and data collection in asylums following the creation of the new
bureaucracy presided over by the Lunacy Commission the term ‘suici-
dal’ simplified and obscured the complex and varied; it neutralised the
contested and conflicted.
When statistical data from reception orders and medical certificates was
merged with information derived from asylum case notes and registers,
this showed that the ‘suicidal’ label was applied more frequently to people
diagnosed with melancholia than to any other disease category. This facil-
itated the argument that melancholics were by far the most suicidal of all
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lunatics. Eventually this argument became self-perpetuating, and physi-
cians began to suspect suicidal tendencies in melancholic patients even
when these were not openly manifested. In this way, suicidality went
from being a marginal symptom of melancholia early in the century, to
becoming a key defining criteria of the condition on par with ‘depression’.
Suicidality and melancholia became mutually constitutive: increasingly the
presence of one was enough for the ‘discovery’ of the other.
The Historical Roots of ‘Mental Pain’
While the emergence of suicidality as a defining symptom of melan-
cholia was closely tied to the medical certificates of insanity and the
growing body of asylum statistics, ‘mental pain’ had rather different
origins. Mental pain was conceived of as analogous to somatic pain, and
like the latter had a solid biomedical explanation and trajectory. However,
the patients to whom the melancholia diagnosis was affixed appeared to
speak of their pain as something quite different. Patients’ own expressions
of sin and guilt, and stories offered by distressed relatives and spouses,
were interpreted by physicians and presented in medical language. This
practice of interspersing curt keyword descriptions of symptoms with
verbatim patient quotations created a language of diagnosis and classi-
fication in which medical and lay descriptions were awkwardly fused. This
is equally apparent in descriptions of religious delusions as a symptom
of melancholia, as will be seen below. Both mental pain and religious
delusions as symptoms of melancholia illustrate the tension between spir-
itual and scientific worldviews in the period, reflecting a culture where
the two were simultaneously conflicting and closely intertwined.69 In the
late nineteenth century the term mental pain was deployed by physicians
as a predominantly biological description of melancholic suffering, but its
meaning had gradually shifted from earlier spiritual language to eventu-
ally enter medico-scientific nomenclature through early modern medical
writings that more comfortably straddled the emerging divide between
scientific and spiritual conceptions of the human condition.
Much existing scholarly work on the history of pain is concerned with
the medieval and early modern periods70; however, a rich literature has
begun to emerge that seeks to historicise nineteenth- and twentieth-
century conceptions of pain.71 Javier Moscoso’s Pain: A Cultural History
(2012) addresses ontological evolutions of pain from medieval Christian
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conceptions to modern scientific ones. With the advent of nineteenth-
century scientific medicine, he perceives a shift whereby the sufferer’s
‘private experience’ was objectified through new ways of constituting,
explaining, and labelling pain. In a context where pain, like so many other
aspects of society, had to be measurable, there was no room for ‘unjusti-
fied claims and disproportionate laments’ from the suffering subject. ‘As
opposed to introspection and testimony’, he argues, ‘the new science of
the intimate sense had to be rooted in physiology and physics’.72 What
emerged within psychological medicine, however, was a more complex
picture. The circular relationship between clinical practice and theoretical
discussions created a space within which psychological pain was consti-
tuted as physiological, and as an object that could be recorded and
measured in statistical tables. Yet doctors were only able to access the
nature of this mental pain through patient testimony. The trouble of
recording and diagnosing the abstract pain of emotional life lay in the
fact that its chief manifestation was through language, which revealed
nothing about the internal neural processes that were believed to be the
‘real’ source of patients’ mental pain.
An important consequence of medico-psychological perceptions of the
mental suffering that melancholic patients expressed as one having trace-
able (but regrettably not observable) physiological roots, was that any
references to God, sin, and divine retribution were translated into patient
journals and medical literature as ‘religious delusions’. However, when
mapping the shifting meanings of mental pain from earlier non-medical
usages to its later emergence as physiological metaphor and finally a
psychological phenomenon with an explicable biological basis, the source
of the melancholic patient’s perception becomes apparent. In a series of
letters written at the turn of the eighteenth century, clergyman and reli-
gious thinker John Norris and philosopher Mary Astell73 debated the
relationship between mental pain and sin. Astell asserted that ‘I cannot
form to my self any Idea of Sin which does not include in it the greatest
Pain and Misery’. Committing a sin against God would, she argued, result
in mental pain. In much the same way as ‘a musical Instrument, if it
were capable of Sense and Thought, would be uneasie and in pain when
harsh discordant Notes are play’d upon it; so Man, when he breaks the
Law of his Nature, and runs counter to those Motions his Maker has
assign’d him…must needs be in Pain and Misery’.74 For Astell, then, to
act against God and nature was to act sinfully and to cause pain. A similar
understanding of mental pain as sin was expressed a few years later by
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another English clergyman, Richard Fiddes, who in his Fifty Two Practical
Discourses on Several Subjects (1720) explained that ‘what I principally
here intend, by mental Pain, is, that Anguish and Remorse of Mind, which
Sinners so naturally feel, and all of them, more or less, when they call their
own Ways to remembrance, and reflect upon their sins.’75
It is significant to note the unambiguous way in which this point
of view established a causal trajectory between unnatural and ungodly
conduct and the experience of mental pain. A century and a half later,
British physicians turned this argument on its head, suggesting that the
mental pain felt by melancholics would render the act of suicide—the
ultimate crime against God and nature—both ‘logical’ and ‘natural’.
Victorian medical psychologists were keen to assert the irrelevance of
moral judgement when explaining the symptoms and causes of mental
disease, but their case notes allude to people for whom the moral impli-
cations of their painful emotions were a great source of distress. The
association between religion and mental pain was rooted in a centuries-
old spiritual worldview where Man’s duties to God were foremost, and
where to act against divine law was for faithful Christians an unequivocal
source of pain and despair. It is not surprising that a relationship between
religious morality and emotional distress that had endured in some
form or another for centuries appeared to prevail among melancholic
patients against medico-scientific explanations that were, by comparison,
embryonic.
The medico-psychological understanding of mental pain that emerged
in the nineteenth century arose chiefly from a different epistemolog-
ical context, that of experimental physiology, yet the two conceptions
remained in a close and often antagonistic relationship throughout the
period. It should also be noted that in early modern literature, spiri-
tual and medical conceptions of pain were not mutually exclusive, and
such perceptions were not simply erased with the advent of physiological
psychology in the nineteenth century. It follows that early modern ideas
about mental pain as an ‘evil’ or as ‘sin’ cannot be simply excluded from
late nineteenth-century meanings of the term.76 Moreover, the adop-
tion of mental pain as a medical phenomenon was not a straightforward
production of nineteenth-century physiological psychology, but, like the
creation of modern physiology itself, a gradual process where old and new
terminology was fused to espouse medical theories about body and mind
set in current explanatory frameworks.77
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When mental pain entered the realm of nineteenth-century physi-
ological psychology and psychological medicine, then, it did so from
an eclectic past. Victorian medical scientists used the term in specific
ways to explain the psychological suffering that was the manifestation
of cerebral irritation producing a state of disordered emotion. Earlier
chapters showed how the perceived ‘irritation’ of the cerebral nerves
would over time affect the ‘tone’ of the brain, causing painful emotional
and ideational associations to occur. Andrew Hodgkiss has traced the
history of ‘pain without lesion’ in nineteenth-century European medicine,
investigating precisely this conception of how mental pain was perceived
to materialise. He pays particular attention to how ideas about cerebral
irritation and reflexive action functioned to constitute a physiological
model for pain without traceable organic cause in the work of Johannes
Müller, Wilhelm Griesinger, and Thomas Laycock. Key to making sense
of nineteenth-century psycho-physiological conceptions of pain without
lesion is, Hodgkiss argues, the argument, proposed by Laycock, that
mental sensations alone were enough to cause irritation of the nerves.78
Central to psycho-physiological ideas about mental pain favoured by
British medical psychologists in the late nineteenth century was a belief
that such pain functioned in much the same way as physical pain. In
a similar manner to cerebral irritation and psychological reflex action,
mental pain in nineteenth-century physiological psychology held the
ambiguous status of being at once metaphorical and literal. Experimental
data concerned observable bodily reactions, and knowledge derived from
empirical research was extrapolated and analogously applied to speak
about mental operations—that which could not be observed. At the
same time, however, analogies were believed to represent what was actu-
ally occurring in the brains of people. Terms like ‘irritation’, ‘reflexion’,
‘tone’, and ‘pain’ when applied to speak of the mind were seen as expli-
cating cerebral processes as well as psychological operations. This can be
seen in Griesinger’s discussion of mental pain in the second, extended
edition of his textbook.79 He suggested that it resulted from mental irri-
tation, both of the kind that manifested in psychological exaltation, and of
its opposite, depression, and that such pain could be triggered by external
as well as internal factors. Citing recent experiments by German physiolo-
gist Moritz Schiff,80 Griesinger held that the sensation of pain ‘could only
be transmitted through the grey substance’, suggesting that pain orig-
inated in the brain. This explained, he argued, how mental pain could
arise endogenously, through a ‘special irritation’ of the cerebral tissue.81
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Older meanings did not simply vanish, however, and they continued
to facilitate conceptions of self for the melancholic patients to whom this
label was affixed. As will be seen below, where patients communicated a
spiritual suffering, their physicians saw a physiologically constituted pain
that manifested as a psychological phenomenon. Nevertheless, mental
pain was a useful medical concept in the building of a solid biomedical
foundation for mental disease. The sensation of pain was an important
tool in physiological experiments on nervous function, particularly in
its relationship with automated muscular reactivity. It was helpful if one
could show that the same connection existed between psychological pain
and involuntary action. Such arguments became problematic towards the
end of the century, however, when physicians focussed their attention
on the perceived prominence of suicidal actions in non-delusional melan-
cholics, as will be seen below. It was more difficult to maintain that
suicide, suicidal attempts, and suicidal tendencies were morbid impulses
(as was often the case earlier in the century) when the subject was believed
to be capable of rational thought. In this context, then, suicidality was
reconceptualised, so that mental pain and depression came to function
as ‘logical’ and ‘rational’ causes of suicidal intent in people perceived to
suffer from simple (non-delusional) melancholia.
‘Religious Delusions’ and ‘The Unpardonable Sin’
While ‘religious delusions’ was not put forward as a defining charac-
teristic of melancholia to the same extent as depression, suicidality, and
mental pain, this symptom nevertheless featured frequently in published
case studies and descriptions of the disorder. Much like the other key
symptoms of melancholia, religious delusions became a standardised term
that physicians could use in their work that would make sense to their
peers and students. These symptom descriptions recorded by physicians
in asylum casebooks and drawn from their interpretations of what patients
communicated reveal much about the tensions between lay and medical
conceptions of self, and about the negotiations that took place when
medical scientists attempted to label and categorise their patients’ disor-
dered emotionality. Only the medico-psychological expert could correctly
interpret this chaos of human experience; it followed that patients’ percep-
tions of their own misery were, for the most part, wrong. Thomas
Clouston remarked that:
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In nine cases out of ten, melancholic patients assign as a cause of their
misery what is not its cause at all. Here it is where their insane delu-
sions, their false ungrounded beliefs, come in. I have analysed the “causes”
assigned by melancholics that I have had under my care during the past
seven years for their own depression, and I find them to be wrong in ninety
per cent of the cases.82
This is illustrated by the frequent use of ‘religious delusions’ as a descrip-
tive term. A large number of patients expressed sin and the wrath of
God as the source of their mental suffering. For melancholic patients,
these experiences were very real, but for physicians such spiritual expla-
nations were a clear example of patients assigning an incorrect cause to
their suffering.
In a case presented by Maudsley in The Pathology of Mind as the first
of several ‘ordinary illustrations of melancholia’, a thirty-six-year-old man
described as ‘religious and of exemplary character’ became, according
to Maudsley, weighed down by a ‘great depression’ that soon produced
‘blasphemous ideas’ in his mind. Despite his best efforts to rid himself of
these thoughts they continued to torture him; ‘he was much distressed
by this state of things, his gloom increased more and more, and at last he
concluded that “he had done it,” – namely, committed the unpardonable
sin’.83 A belief in having committed ‘the unpardonable sin’ was repeat-
edly cited by Victorian physicians as a cause of their patients’ suffering,
and frequently constituted the focal point of the latter’s ‘delusions’. The
specific nature of this sin was, however, rarely addressed directly; its
meaning was firmly rooted in the Christian culture shared by patients
and doctors, and appeared to require little explanation. However, while
the concept was awarded scant attention in medical literature beyond
its repeated appearance as psychological illusion that was a symptom of
disease, it was widely discussed by theological writers of the period, both
within the Church of England and among the evangelical denominations
in Britain and North America.84
While ‘the unpardonable sin’ was a familiar concept in mid-nineteenth-
century writings on Christian morality, there appeared to be no clear
agreement on exactly what kind of act constituted such a sin, which was
often referred to in imprecise terms as a ‘sin against the Holy Ghost’. In
the first volume of Sermons, an 1864 monograph on Christian doctrine,
the famous American clergyman and public speaker Henry Ward Beecher
sought to settle this matter by providing a clear explanation of what was
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meant by this notion, suggesting that ‘we are to regard the unpardonable
sin, not as any one single offence, but as the state of heart which gives rise
to conduct that is not pardonable. It is not an action; it is a condition of
disposition or heart from which certain kinds of actions are developed’.
Beecher’s definition illustrates how Victorian melancholics expressed their
religious distress, according to how this was interpreted and noted by
their physicians. ‘The unpardonable sin’ appeared to convey a profound
sense of guilt, sometimes for an abominable act that the patient claimed
to have committed and sometimes for thinking of committing such an
act. The overlap between lay and medical conceptions is evident also
in Beecher’s work—he suggested that an erroneous belief in having
committed the unpardonable sin ‘sometimes leads to insanity, and often
is the leading feature of religious mania’.85
George Savage remarked upon the frequency of religious delusions,
noting in melancholics ‘a strong tendency to explain their misery by
means of some text or religious dogma’.86 However, there existed a
particular category of melancholic lunatics, Savage suggested, usually
people who had been subject to a severe religious upbringing, particularly
in ‘narrow religious sects’, whom he liked to refer to as ‘the unpardonable
sinners’ in reference to the common delusion discussed above. His idea
of what this most abominable of all sins was meant to refer to was notably
different from the kinds of explanations offered by Christian thinkers. A
man of science, Savage had no qualms about discussing particular sinful
acts, and offered a more specific definition of ‘the unpardonable sin’ than
that of ‘the state of heart which gives rise to conduct that is not pardon-
able’ given by Beecher. ‘In many cases’, Savage suggested to his readers,
‘it refers to some sexual abuse’. Thus, the idea often arose following a
period of excessive masturbation.87
While ‘the unpardonable sin’ was frequently noted by contempora-
neous writers as a recurring delusion in melancholia, Savage appeared
to be alone in his reference to immoral sexual conduct. Maudsley did,
however, elaborate on the historical origins of this delusion, suggesting
that the ‘conviction of having committed the unpardonable sin’ had
existed as ‘a common delusion of melancholics since the disciples of Christ
introduced that doctrine to mankind’. Thus, the same delusion would
not have been possible for ‘an ancient Greek who was suffering from
the same form of disease’; rather, he would have believed himself ‘to be
pursued by the Furies’.88 George Blandford, who spent most of his career
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in private practices in London, found the presence of this particular delu-
sion to be a useful diagnostic guiding tool, since it suggested ‘that the
patient’s condition is one of melancholia’.89 Blandford did not, however,
hold the delusional belief in having committed the unpardonable sin to
be a particular cause of suicidal intent in melancholic patients. Rather,
he suggested that the suicidal tendency was often strongest in patients
suffering from simple, or non-delusional melancholia, but that, on the
whole, all melancholic patients were ‘to be looked upon as suicidal’.90
As we shall see below, while delusions of guilt were often seen in late
Victorian medico-psychological literature as a driving force in the suicidal
intent of many melancholics, the symptom was equally perceived as being
particularly prominent in individuals suffering from ‘simple’ melancholia,
where no delusions were present, and in such cases it was the very absence
of delusions that was given as the chief cause of the suicidal tendency.
Nosological Shifts: Maudsley Revisited
Henry Maudsley’s published work on mental disease serves as a useful
reference point for the changing character of melancholia in the second
half of the nineteenth century, as it exemplifies many of the wider debates
and tensions that existed in relation to the status and definition of this
diagnosis. When the first edition of Maudsley’s textbook on mental phys-
iology and pathology was published in the late 1860s, melancholia was
variably seen as an independent disease category, or as a form of mono-
mania, moral or partial insanity, or as variation of mania proper. As
shown in Chapter 4, in 1867 Maudsley had classified non-delusional
melancholia together with non-delusional mania under ‘affective insanity’,
while melancholia proper was assigned to the broader category ‘ideational
insanity’, together with mania, general paralysis, dementia, and idiocy.91
In 1879, a third revised edition of the second half of The Physiology
and Pathology of the Mind was published as a separate volume entitled
The Pathology of Mind.92 Like many of his peers, Maudsley noted the
difficulties arising when attempting to categorise mental disease correctly
and maintained that, for the time being, a system whereby illnesses were
divided according to symptoms rather than their ‘real nature’ was, while
provisional, necessary for practical reasons, in order to make the process
of diagnosing patients less complex and laborious.93 When observing
patients in the asylum, Maudsley argued, the most striking contrast in
terms of symptoms was that between mania and melancholia, which
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could be further divided into ‘general’ and ‘partial’, the latter suggesting
that ‘the intellectual disorder is limited to a few ideas’.94 He suggested
that this separation of insanity, with the third addition of general paral-
ysis, corresponded to the traditional symptomatologic division that could
be found in the work of Esquirol. These three types were, Maudsley
remarked, discernible even to the untrained eye of a layman. However,
upon closer examination of an asylum population the medical expert
would soon discover a more complex and rich picture. Most importantly,
one would not be able to escape the fact that in many lunatics the mental
disease was one in which any intellectual derangement, even of the partial
kind, was wholly absent. The skilled observer would find that such forms
of madness where emotion was only or primarily affected were by far
the most common; indeed, Maudsley went so far as to suggest that ‘the
affective disorder has been the fundamental trouble in almost all cases
that have not been produced at once by direct physical injury’.95 Thus,
he reaffirmed his previous assertion from 1867, when he had cautioned
his peers against the dangers of failing to recognise disorders of affect as
proper forms of madness.96
Maudsley had made some changes to his nosology from previous
editions, but maintained the separation between ‘affective’ and
‘ideational’ insanity, to which a third umbrella category, ‘amentia’, was
added. Both melancholia and mania were placed in the second category
of ideational insanity together with monomania and dementia, whereas
affective insanity contained only two subclasses, ‘instinctive’ and ‘moral’.
Impulses to commit suicide were, Maudsley argued, particularly common
in forms of madness where only the affective life was disordered, and was
presented as closely related to homicidal and other destructive impulses.
The classification system presented in the 1879 edition of The Pathology
of Mind had a strong air of a work in progress about it. Maudsley
suggested as much himself, stating that ‘I might abolish the division of
affective insanity altogether, and place the varieties belonging to it under
mania and melancholia, dividing these respectively into mania with delu-
sion, and mania without delusion, and into melancholia with or without
delusion’.97 However, while he remained formally equivocal on whether
or not melancholia should be classified as a single disease entity, he never-
theless proceeded to award an entire chapter to this form of insanity, a
significant change from previous editions of the textbook. In a fourth
edition of The Pathology of Mind published in 1895 Maudsley’s nosology
was revised in much the same way as anticipated, with the result that
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melancholia—particularly in its simple, non-delusional form—received
more attention than any other form of madness.98
A comparatively strong focus on non-delusional melancholia was
already apparent in the 1879 edition, where Maudsley suggested that
it commonly appeared as the first stage of the disease, and sometimes
persisted for the duration of illness. While the absence of delusion meant
that the patient was able to conduct rational thought processes, their
mental state would become ‘profoundly changed notwithstanding: his
feelings regarding persons and events are strangely perverted, so that
impressions which would naturally be agreeable are painful’.99 One of
the most difficult aspects of melancholia for those who suffered from it,
Maudsley argued, was the fact that the morbid feelings and ideas appeared
so wholly unnatural and without reason, and often seemed to the patient’s
mind to have appeared quite suddenly, as if from out of thin air. For this
reason, he argued, the melancholic patient would often draw the conclu-
sion that the mental suffering had supernatural causes, as a form of divine
retribution. However, the patient’s belief that the emotional suffering was
in response to having committed ‘the unpardonable sin’ had, Maudsley
argued, a medical explanation. Morbid ideas and emotions might appear
to arise ‘spontaneously’ as if they were conjured up by ‘the suggestion
of an evil spirit’, but in actual fact they were the result of a traceable
physiological process:
There is, first, a possible organic suggestion coming from a particular organ
of the body in consequence of the special sympathies which the brain
has with the different organs; secondly, there is that constant unconscious
mental operation – more active perhaps when the brain is in an abnormal
state – whereby the revival of latent ideas and feelings frequently takes
place without our being able to give any account of it; thirdly, impressions
from without, which seem so trivial as to be hardly noticed at the time,
may still have their effects upon the mind, and, when the brain functions
are disordered and overclouded by gloomy feeling, may be worked up into
strange morbid ideas; and lastly, an idea may be excited sympathetically by
another idea to which it has no apparent relation, particularly in a morbid
brain, just as the muscles may notably be sympathetically excited some-
times by the contraction of certain other muscles with which they have no
normal functional connection.100
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Maudsley agreed with Clouston’s remark that melancholic patients, while
often able to think rationally, were not aware of the correct source of
their altered mental state, and this was in itself one of the most difficult
aspects of this disease, Maudsley suggested. Because melancholics were
often able to think quite clearly and engage in rational conversation, their
simultaneous inability to explicate their own apparently irrational suffering
constituted a tremendous source of despair.101 This was also one of the
main reasons why they were often driven to suicide. The key to under-
standing suicide lay, Maudsley argued, in ‘the instinctive love of life’,
which he held up as the ‘real effective force against suicide’. This instinct
was built into the constitution of each individual in the same way as the
automated actions ‘of the heart and of respiration’. Following from this,
suicidal tendencies were evidence that ‘the organic element’ of the melan-
cholic sufferer was ‘so wanting in this fundamental quality that it could
not assimilate and increase, but must be assimilated and decrease’.102 In
this way, the apparent contradiction of suicidality in melancholic patients
suffering from religious delusions could be explained. It might seem ‘curi-
ously inconsistent’, Maudsley remarked, that a person who perceives their
mental suffering to be the result of having sinned against God and who
fears ‘eternal damnation’ should be driven towards the very outcome they
fear the most and which they believe is the cause of their suffering. This
showed, he argued, that ‘nature’ was ‘deeper and stronger than creed’,
driving the melancholic towards suicide ‘by an impulse whose roots go far
down below any conscious motive’.103 This observation would later lead
Maudsley to suggest that people suffering from simple or non-delusional
melancholia were the most likely to commit suicide, and that such indi-
viduals were able to arrive at the decision through rational deliberation,
as the only evident solution to intolerable mental pain and depression.
Towards a Standardised Diagnosis
In the last quarter of the century melancholia was solidified and
homogenised chiefly in two ways. On the one hand, biomedical explana-
tory frameworks for mental disease were the norm for British physicians
in the second half of the century, and in this context variations on
physiological reconstitutions of melancholia as ‘disordered emotion’ were
widely adopted. On the other hand, the range of symptoms listed was
more focussed with less variation in the terminology used by different
physicians. While earlier conceptions of melancholia were arguably more
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coherent and unified than descriptions of other forms of madness, the
symptoms described by medical writers and the language used in such
descriptions exhibited a far greater degree of idiosyncrasy than those of
the late Victorian period. This shift was particularly pronounced in the
nosological sections of textbooks on mental disease, and in published
journal articles. But much is also revealed in the language used in patient
journals and other asylum records, as well as in the case studies physi-
cians liked to attach as illustrations to their nosological writings. However,
as will be seen below and in the next chapter, the unifying symptom
terms that were increasingly deployed in late nineteenth-century Victorian
literature functioned in different ways. Mental pain and depression were
both symptoms emphasised as defining features of melancholia in noso-
logical writings, but the former rarely featured in case studies involving
direct descriptions of individual patients’ mental states. Its chief useful-
ness can be seen as streamlining diagnostic criteria for the purpose of
textbook descriptions of melancholia; in other words, mental pain served
as an umbrella term, a sort of professional shorthand, for a multitude of
different expressions of distress and suffering.
In the last two decades of the century, case studies of melancholia
made regular appearances in medical journals (particularly the Journal
of Mental Science). Suicidal tendencies were frequently highlighted as a
key symptom, such as in an article by one of Thomas Clouston’s assistant
physicians at Morningside in Edinburgh. Recounting a case of ‘profound’
and ‘suicidal’ melancholia, Carlyle Johnstone described the patient, a
forty-year-old woman, who was admitted after a period of insanity lasting
‘several weeks’. The patient’s history, as derived from her medical certifi-
cate, suggested that she had been ‘threatening to commit suicide’ and
‘had taken very little food’. Overall, ‘[h]er mental condition was one
of profound depression’, she was described as anxious and agitated and
‘exclaiming that she was lost’. After several months in the asylum, she
was still considered to exhibit suicidal tendencies, she reportedly stated on
several occasions that ‘she wants to be killed’, and ‘attempted to commit
suicide’ a number of times while on the ward.104
In a case of ‘melancholia followed by monomania of exaltation’, a
twenty-nine-year-old woman was equally described as ‘suicidal’, with the
propensity chiefly brought on by religious delusions: ‘She felt that she
was doomed to everlasting punishment’.105 A forty-year-old woman was
admitted to the pauper asylum in Worcester in a state of ‘acute melan-
cholia’. Several ‘superficial scratches’ to the skin were found on her body,
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believed to have been ‘self-inflicted with suicidal intent’. She claimed to
have inserted a needle into her stomach ‘with the object of taking her
life’, but none was discovered upon examination. The author noted that
she continued to be ‘very suicidally inclined’ until she eventually died,
presumed to be suffering from phthisis. During the autopsy, a needle was
discovered buried in her abdomen.106 Twin sisters were admitted to the
Warwick County Asylum in 1900, and were both diagnosed with melan-
cholia upon admission. Arthur Wilcox, head physician at the hospital,
described them both as having ‘the same dominant delusion, viz., that
she herself was the most wicked woman alive and was unfit to live, and
both attempted suicide just before admission’.107
George Savage described a similar case of a young woman who was
admitted to Bethlem after a brief melancholic episode reportedly trig-
gered by the birth of her child. As her mental state deteriorated, ‘she
became suicidal and violent, refused food, said she was inhumanely
wicked, that she has ruined her husband, and ought to be got rid of’.108
Savage wrote extensively on melancholia in his major textbook, Insanity
and Allied Neuroses, which was published in several editions from the
mid-1880s onward, and paid particular attention to suicidal tendencies
in melancholic patients. In addition to a handful of monographs, he was
a regular contributor to the Journal of Mental Science (which he also
co-edited with Daniel Hack Tuke between 1878 and 1892) as well as
general medical journals.109 In the first (1884) edition of his textbook,
Savage regretfully noted that the physiological basis of mental disease was
at present poorly understood. At the same time, he was optimistic that
it was only a matter of time until the microscopic functions of the brain
would be revealed to medical scientists.110 Like Maudsley, he argued that
at present the different forms of mental disease must be organised and
described according to their external manifestations. He did, however,
envisage a time when mental disorders could be classified ‘according to
the physiological changes which take place in the nerve centres’. While
certain forms of insanity resulted in observable structural changes to brain
tissue, other forms ‘depend for their origin on the existence of some
bodily defect or degeneration, which, causing irritation at the periphery,
in the end sets up brain disease by a continuity of the nervous tissues, or
by some other reflective process’.111
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Thus, while Savage expressed greater reservations about what phys-
iological research could presently reveal about the internal nervous
operations of people believed to suffer from mental disease, he never-
theless recognised the prevailing model for explicating disordered mental
functions. While advising his readers that ‘the pathological basis of melan-
cholia’ remained, as yet, uncertain, it appeared that the disease could
be attributed to ‘impaired nutrition of the nervous centres and the
conducting system’.112 Savage offered the following descriptive summary
of melancholia:
Melancholia is a state of mental depression, in which the misery is unrea-
sonable either in relation to its apparent cause, or in the peculiar form it
assumes, the mental pain depending on physical and bodily changes, and
not directly on the environment.113
On the pathology and aetiology of the disease, Savage explained that
the ‘mental pain’ in melancholia could be the result of ‘change in the
nutrition of the brain depending on some general or local disease’, but
equally this ‘disordered process’ could occur through the ‘nervous system’
becoming exhausted.114 In addition to these possible origins, Savage
warned that ‘any cause, bodily or mental, which worries the body or
mind, any cause which by its constancy, or by its frequent repetition, gives
no chance of repair, may also cause melancholia’.115 Thus, Savage equally
allowed for the idea, put forward by Griesinger, Laycock, and others, that
morbid cerebral action could be triggered by negative thoughts alone.
As the works discussed above illustrate, towards the end of the century
the melancholia diagnosis was increasingly coherent and standardised,
coalescing around four key symptoms: depression, suicidal tendencies,
mental pain, and religious delusions. The focus on suicidality also facil-
itated another development that would have profound and lasting conse-
quences for the ways in which psychiatric knowledge is brought to bear
upon emotional states. The suicidal impulse was often seen as strongest
in people suffering from simple, or non-delusional, melancholia, as they
were able to reason about their suffering. This meant that physicians were
increasingly concerned with this milder form of the disorder, which sat
uneasily on the border between sanity and insanity. In this way, a final
key development in the reconceptualisation of melancholia as a modern
biomedical disorder, and a precursor to twentieth-century depression,
occurred: the expansion of the realm of psychiatric knowledge to include
emotional states not considered strictly pathological.
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Obscuring the Boundary between Normal
and Pathological Emotions
As noted in Chapter 4, Griesinger had argued for early intervention
to prevent melancholics from deteriorating into more severe forms of
insanity. This argument was echoed by British physicians in the last
quarter of the century. George Savage emphasised that early diagnosis and
treatment of melancholia was imperative. In its simple form, which often
constituted the early stages of illness, melancholia might not manifest as
a full-blown mental disorder; in some cases it was only distinguishable by
‘slight perversions of feeling and intellect of a gloomy nature’. However,
echoing Griesinger, Savage argued that it was of ‘the utmost importance’
that even this mild form or stage of the disease was recognised as patho-
logical and that patients gain access to diagnostics and treatment. If simple
melancholia was not properly acknowledged, the disorder ‘may become
chronic and incurable’.116 Treatment and confinement was also important
for another reason—to prevent melancholics from committing suicide.
Despite his sceptical stance towards statistics on suicidal patients noted
above, Savage held that one of the most significant features of melancholia
was the frequency with which its sufferers exhibited suicidal tendencies.
He suggested that the suicidal propensity could arise from a number of
causes, some of which were associated with delusions, particularly of a reli-
gious kind. However, while patients suffering from other forms of insanity
were sometimes known to attempt or commit suicide, such instances were
often accidental, whereas ‘suicide must ever be looked upon as one of the
dangerous symptoms connected chiefly with melancholia’.117
William Bevan Lewis also noted the problem of suicidal intent in non-
delusional melancholics, who were able to reason about their suffering
and search in vain for a rational cause. As medical director at the Wakefield
Asylum in West Riding, Yorkshire, and successor to the famous neurolo-
gist James Crichton-Browne, Lewis readily embraced a biomedical model
for melancholia. This can at least in part be attributed to the context in
which he worked; at West Riding there was a significant focus on cerebral
post-mortem examinations and diagnostics were constituted within a solid
biological framework.118 His commitment to neurology and neurophys-
iology was in strong evidence in his textbook, which commenced with a
substantial section on anatomy and histology, made up of several detailed
chapters on the various parts of the brain and spinal cord. He went on
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to describe simple melancholia as ‘forms of a purely emotional or affec-
tive insanity, where there is mental pain or emotional distress apart from
obvious intellectual disturbance’.119 It was not, however, the intensity of
the mental pain that set it apart from similar feelings in healthy individ-
uals, but rather its cause. If ‘the mental pain is the result of trivial exciting
agencies, if moral or physical agencies arouse emotional states out of all
proportion to what would occur in a healthy mind, then we infer that the
grey cortex of the brain is so far disordered as to functionate abnormally,
and we speak of the result as pathological depression’.120
Lewis quoted Griesinger on the topic of mental pain as a ‘“dispropor-
tionately excessive” reaction’ in melancholia, suggesting that ‘[e]motional
disturbances as the result of disease differ from the normal reactions of
health, not only in volume, but also in nature’. Drawing upon Herbert
Spencer’s psychology, Lewis went on to suggest that part of the problem
lay in ‘pain’ being a ‘non-relational’ emotion. This meant that it could
not easily coexist with other emotional states, making it difficult to esti-
mate ‘the degree of mental alienation in melancholia’.121 This perceived
inability to deduce the extent of the melancholic patient’s psychological
pain and deterioration made the threat of suicide all the more insid-
ious. He suggested, however, that because patients were often capable
of rational thought, they struggled to resist their suicidal propensities.122
This tension between rational thought and emotional pain in suicidal
melancholics was discussed in detail by Charles Mercier in his Sanity and
Insanity (1890). A consulting physician on mental disease at Charing
Cross Hospital in London, Mercier encountered melancholic patients
outside the asylum walls, and paid particular attention to suicidality in
melancholic sufferers in the earlier, non-delusional stages of the disease.
He alerted his readers to the ‘tendency to suicide’ that was a common
feature of melancholia, and went on to emphasise the unnaturalness of
self-inflicted death. ‘Suicide’, he argued, ‘is so complete and violent a
reversal of the strongest and most fundamental of instincts – the instinct
of self-preservation – that its origin, and the frequency of its occurrence,
are extremely puzzling’.123 However, when describing this phenomenon
in melancholic patients, Mercier offered an explanation for the apparent
enigma of suicide. With a nod to the growing body of non-medical
research on the causes and prevalence of suicide in Europe, he observed
that suicides were clearly committed by sane individuals in many cases,
and could result from of a host of factors, such as financial troubles or
unrequited love. In light of this knowledge, Mercier suggested that
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the way out of a misery which is autogenetic, and does not correspond with
or depend on adversity of circumstances, may be the same as that out of a
misery, the same degree, which is justified by the circumstances in which
the organism is placed. There may be no justification in his circumstances
for the misery which the melancholy man experiences, but his misery is
as acute, as real, as profound as that of the man whose circumstances are
extremely adverse; nay, there is no such misery as that of melancholia; and
under the pressure of this feeling suicide may be the natural and quasi-
normal course to take. Here, then, a large class of suicidal cases receives
an explanation on grounds which import no new principle of action into
human motives, and which harmonize with the general course of human
nature.124
While suicidal intent may in a healthy individual arise from organism–
environment interaction where an adverse event might trigger a desire
to commit suicide, in melancholic patients a similar kind of event would
occur internally, with the diseased mental state itself, rather than some
external cause, producing the adverse reaction. In this way, from the
argument that suicide was the antithesis of the fundamental evolutionary
principle—the organism’s struggle for self-preservation—Mercier arrived
at the conclusion that when held against the pain and misery of melan-
cholia, suicide would in fact appear as a natural act and a reasonable
solution to intolerable suffering.
Maudsley arrived at much the same view a couple of years later. In
an article entitled ‘Suicide in Simple Melancholy’, which appeared in
the Medical Magazine in 1892, he presented a narrative of melancholic
suffering that was much revised from his earlier published work on the
disease. Maudsley’s choice of word is important to note—the use of
‘melancholy’ rather than the medical ‘melancholia’ speaks to an emphasis
on the very early stages of the disease, when the sufferer’s state of mind
was not yet disordered to such an extent that one might speak of insanity
proper. Yet, like Savage, Maudsley firmly maintained that this condition
warranted medical attention, primarily due to the often overwhelming
desire to commit suicide in such individuals. Indeed, he suggested that the
suicidal propensity was as a rule much more intense, persistent, and ulti-
mately more dangerous than in people suffering from melancholia proper.
In the latter, suicidal thoughts might plague the patient for years before
any action would be taken, whereas the simple melancholic was far more
likely to end their life swiftly.125
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Why was this so? It was not the case, Maudsley argued, that the
pain was more intense in simple melancholy than in melancholia proper.
Rather, the problem lay in the fact that, in the absence of any intellec-
tual derangement, the individual was able to reason about their condition
and thus fully appreciate the absurdity and hopelessness of such misery
without apparent cause. It was this absence of any traceable external
circumstances to explain the mental pain that marked this state of mind as
disordered, despite the patient being otherwise ‘sane’. If such misery was
caused by ‘misfortune, bereavement, soured hope, disdained love, crosses
or losses in business, or other sufficient blow to self-love or self-interest’,
then the reaction was to be considered normal, and the individual would
soon recover. However, if the suffering arose ‘due to internal failure of
the springs of re-action, without external cause or in measure and dura-
tion out of all proportion to such cause as there may have been, then it
is morbid’.126
The mental pain of simple melancholics was consequently of a partic-
ularly excruciating kind. They would find themselves able to take in their
surroundings and engage with the world, yet feeling utterly trapped in a
permanent state of emotional suffering:
Sane enough to feel keenly what they suffer and to contrast their woeful
deadness with the joyous energy around them, crushed to despair by the
serene continuity of things in contrast with the discontinuity of their
interest in them, in the world but not of it, sufferers not doers – they
cannot bear the burden of a wretched existence.127
For such persons, then, ‘[o]ne way of escape alone suggests itself, dim
and undefined in his mind and shrunk from with horror at first, but
viewed more nearly and clearly when he feels his anguish too great to
be borne longer: it is suicide’.128 Thus, in simple melancholy the unnat-
ural act of suicide appeared as the only natural solution to intolerable
suffering. Following from this, Maudsley argued that upon examination
every suicide could be found to have an ‘explanatory’ cause. In cases
of non-delusional melancholy, the expounding factor was unequivocally
clear:
Suicide of this sort, springing from suffering that is intolerable, is natural
in motive and logical in fact, whatever may be thought of it from a moral
standpoint: the outcome in consciousness of the sum of the despair of
162 Å. JANSSON
the life-lacking organic elements, it is a supreme, final and (if we may
use the word in this connection) fit act of adjustment to the outer world
with which the individual can no longer contend. It is the remedy for the
malady of life which has become insupportable.129
Such an unambiguous rationalisation of suicide is noteworthy even for
a medical scientist of Maudsley’s convictions.130 Within a philosophy
of mind firmly rooted in an evolutionary paradigm, suicide resulting
from the internal conflict of melancholic suffering could nevertheless be
construed as natural and logical. Indeed, it was precisely the conflict
between each organism’s desire for self-preservation and the profound
mental pain of simple melancholy that allowed the suicidal propensity to
arise with such force and intensity. ‘[W]here the love of life is struggling
against its ebb’, Maudsley warned, ‘the misery is the greatest and the
danger most urgent’.131
While the Medical Magazine article referred to the condition as ‘simple
melancholy’ and emphasised its ambiguous status in relation to insanity
proper, a few years later Maudsley reworked the article to fit into a chapter
on melancholia in the final, much revised, edition of The Pathology of
Mind (1895). This version of the textbook contained two, significantly
expanded, chapters devoted to melancholia, including a comprehensive
section on ‘simple melancholia’. This largely mirrored the article on ‘Sui-
cide in Simple Melancholy’, with a notable modification being the use of
‘melancholia’ in place of ‘melancholy’. Maudsley described this milder
form of melancholia proper as ‘a class of cases of mental depression’
where ‘there is neither delusion nor actual disorder of thought’. He main-
tained that such conditions were not melancholia ‘in strict sense, since
there is no real derangement of mind’, rather in these states there was
‘only a profound pain of mind paralysing its functions – an essential
psychalgia’.132
While in the 1860s Maudsley had issued a sharp caution against the
failure to properly recognise non-delusional, affective disorders of mind
as forms of true madness, three decades later he arrived at a conclusion
that appears, at first glance, to contradict his former argument. However,
what we are witnessing here is the infancy of a process whereby medico-
psychological (and later psychiatric) attention was increasingly brought
to bear upon aspects of the human emotional and cognitive life that were
not considered to be states of insanity in the proper sense.133 It is not
possible within the scope of this book to address this important shift
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in how post-nineteenth-century medical psychologists and psychiatrists
would constitute the relationship between human emotion, behaviour,
and pathology. However, the implications of Maudsley’s revision of his
earlier argument must not be overlooked. The decision to award signifi-
cant attention in a textbook on mental pathology to the description and
analysis of an emotional state which by his own account was not a form
of disease, was, while perhaps more subtly done, nonetheless at least as
critical a revolution in medical thinking as the early nineteenth-century
argument that some forms of madness were chiefly of the affective kind.
Conclusion
This chapter has mapped the key ways in which melancholia as was
modernised and standardised in the final decades of the nineteenth
century. Through this process, the diagnosis came to centre upon four
key symptoms: depression, suicidal tendencies, mental pain, and reli-
gious delusions. It is important to note, however, that the developments
described here were neither universal nor did they occur in a simple, linear
fashion. Biomedical ways of explaining the mind continued to rely in
some instances on terminology and concepts that pre-dated nineteenth-
century experimental physiology. Much like psychiatry today, Victorian
medical psychologists struggled to make sense of the mind in strictly
scientific terms, and despite their strong epistemological commitment to
biomedicine, they were forced to make use of other tools in order to carry
out many of the practical aspects of their work. In particular, physiolog-
ical explanations of mental operations were of little use when it came to
diagnosing patients arriving at the asylum or hospital. Here, observable
and communicated ‘symptoms’ provided the major source of information
about which type of disease physicians were faced with. However, the
symptoms described in this chapter were not, as a rule, communicated
as such by the patients. The intellectual work required to turn the chaos
of human emotions that met physicians on the asylum wards into record-
able, classifiable symptoms was thus considerable. The uneasy relationship
between what was observed, communicated, recorded, and published is
the focus of the next chapter, which traces melancholia as a diagnosis on
its journey between the casebook and the textbook.
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CHAPTER 6
DiagnosingMelancholia in the Victorian
Asylum
A typical case of melancholia, as we shall see, runs a somewhat definite
course, like a fever, and has often all the characters of an acute disease, in
this being to the physician unlike a mere feeling of melancholy .1
Thomas S. Clouston (1883)
On 15 August 1874, a young doctor was admitted as a private patient into
the Royal Edinburgh Asylum at Morningside. On the medical certificate
and reception order that accompanied his arrival it was stated that the
patient, Moses B., was ‘suicidal’. The two certifying physicians testified
that the patient had communicated to them a belief that his soul was
lost. He was reported as having taken ‘a poisonous dose of Belladonna’,
and his father and brother had seen it necessary to have him sent to the
asylum since they felt that he could not ‘be left alone’ for the fear ‘that he
would seek to destroy himself’. Upon admission, the attending physician
determined that his ‘depression’ was ‘considerable’, and made a note of
his ‘suicidal tendencies’, which consisted in ‘taking belladonna, refusing
food, &c’. The patient’s recent mental symptoms were listed as ‘delu-
sions such as that his soul is lost, that he ought to die, and thinks he is
committing great sins’. He was given the diagnosis melancholia, with a
special reference made to his persistent suicidal tendencies.2
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Moses was what today might be referred to as a ‘textbook case’ of
melancholia in the late-Victorian period: profound depression of mind,
delusions of a religious nature, and persistent suicidal tendencies. Once
inside the walls of Morningside, his case notes tell of repeated attempts by
the patient to take his own life. Moses was considered such an exemplary
case of melancholia that Joseph Brown, assisting physician at the asylum,
proceeded to write up the case as an article for the Edinburgh Medical
Journal later that year, presented as a typical case of ‘suicidal melan-
cholia’ that served as a ‘striking illustration of the great difficulty there
exists in preventing a determined suicidal patient from accomplishing his
object’.3 According to Morningside’s superintendent, Thomas Clouston,
such cases were becoming increasingly common. In his annual report
submitted that same year to the Board of Commissioners, the body over-
seeing the management of Scottish asylums, Clouston remarked that in
1874,
[t]he number whose malady was characterised by depression of mind was
most unusually large. I find no fewer than 88 under the head of Melan-
cholia, a number greater by 70 per cent than the average number classified
under that heading during the previous ten years, though, as we have
seen, the excess of admissions this year was only 14 per cent. Many of the
worst of these cases were more desperately intent on taking away their own
lives than any patients I have ever had. The ingenuity, determination, and
persistence of this suicidal propensity in some of them would scarcely be
believed by any one who had not experienced it.4
The statistical tables accompanying the report confirmed Clouston’s
assessment: of the 88 melancholic patients admitted, 67 were listed as
exhibiting ‘suicidal tendencies’. It certainly appeared that an unusually
large number of people suffered from melancholia in 1874, and that a
significant majority were intent on taking their own lives. However, like
many of his peers Clouston suggested that statistical tables did not neces-
sarily represent a simple, discoverable truth. The Union of Chargeability
Act5 passed in the previous decade had made pauper lunatics in England
and Wales chargeable to unions instead of single parishes, resulting in a
rise in admissions of pauper patients in English asylums. This, Clouston
argued, had been held up by a number of people ‘as proof that lunacy
was rapidly on the increase’ across the border in the south, but in fact it
‘merely shewed how the numbers of the registered insane were increased
by an Act of Parliament’.6
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When deploying Clouston’s own reasoning to the statistics on melan-
cholia, a similar picture could be seen to emerge. The increase in
melancholic patients coincided with Clouston’s appointment as super-
intendent of Morningside the previous year following the death of his
predecessor, David Skae. This event produced a shift in the type of diag-
nostic categories used in the hospital, as Clouston replaced the existing,
somewhat eclectic, system based on Skae’s aetiological classification with
a more uniform and standardised one. Following Clouston’s own logic,
then, the statistical increase in patients diagnosed with melancholia was
at least in part the result of different diagnostic practices. While key
symptoms were often initially noted on the patient’s medical certificate,
a formal diagnosis was assigned by an asylum physician once the patient
had been admitted. To recap briefly from Chapter 5, when a person was
to be admitted into the asylum they would first be examined by two
physicians7 who would each sign a medical certificate including descrip-
tions of the ‘facts indicating insanity’ in the person to be certified. This
would include any ‘symptoms’, such as ‘mental depression’, ‘excitement’,
‘incoherence’, ‘delusions’, ‘poor memory’, and so on. Accompanying the
medical certificates would be a reception order signed by whoever was
having the patient committed—usually a relative, friend, guardian, or
poorhouse official. This person would have to note on the form whether
the suspected lunatic was ‘epileptic’, ‘suicidal’, or ‘dangerous to others’.
When the patient arrived in the asylum, the information about their state
of mind would be transferred to the casebook, and added to this would be
various details about the lunatic’s mental and physical state upon admis-
sion. Finally, within a few days, a diagnosis would be entered based upon
the information given.
These acts had to take place before a person was counted as ‘melan-
cholic’ in asylum statistics, and in this process various phenomena were
observed in light of those already noted. A noteworthy feature of the vast
number of melancholics admitted into Morningside during Clouston’s
reign was the widely diverse range of human activities and expressions
that were merged under the melancholia banner and read as signs of
mental depression and suicidality. This is particularly striking when one
considers that during the period considered here—from the mid-1870s
until the turn of the twentieth century—melancholia was in published
material, including the several editions of Clouston’s textbook, described
in remarkably standardised language with a relatively homogenous range
of symptoms. As melancholia was solidified as an independent diagnosis
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with a precise symptom picture in the last quarter of the century, the
contrast between the casebook and the textbook was significant. Typical
‘textbook’ cases were at times noted on the pages of casebooks—patients
described as suffering from a profound depression, suicidal tendencies,
and delusions of guilt and wrongdoing. But just as common were cases
marked by difference and individuality who corresponded poorly to
the formally defined criteria of the diagnosis. Following from this, it
should also be noted that one of the symptoms repeatedly emphasised
by Clouston as a defining feature of melancholia—‘mental pain’—was
virtually absent as a descriptive term in Morningside’s patient records.
A comparison between asylum case records and published literature
illustrates the complex procedures and negotiations that took place when
Victorian physicians attempted to define, delineate, and diagnose mental
disease. It also sheds further light on one particular symptom of melan-
cholia that was a key focus of Chapter 5: suicidal tendencies. Clouston
and his peers pointed to the annual statistical reports of their institution
as evidence for the growing incidence of suicidality among the insane,
and in particular the overwhelming prevalence of suicidal behaviour in
melancholia. While each asylum necessarily had many of its own character-
istics in this period, a number of clinical and administrative features were
equally shared. In large part this was a result of attempts by the Lunacy
Commission to standardise practices, but the increasing move towards
professional association and a sharp rise in the number of asylum physi-
cians who published books and articles based on their clinical observations
also played a significant part in facilitating an increasingly homogenous
professional environment. The Scottish Board of Commissioners allowed
greater managerial freedom for its asylum superintendents than did the
English Lunacy Commission; however, in the case of Morningside this
had the effect of bringing this institution closer to the standard prac-
tices advocated by the English Commissioners. Clouston was a prominent
figure in the emerging profession of psychological medicine, he was a
moderniser and a prolific publisher, inspired by the latest advances in
physiological psychology and internal medicine. The Royal Edinburgh
Asylum serves as a fitting space within which to investigate the role of
clinical and administrative practices in the production of melancholia as an
increasingly standardised diagnosis. Its records serve as the primary case
study of this chapter, alongside records from Bethlem (London), Brook-
wood (Surrey), and Ticehurst (Sussex). As the records of these institutions
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show, significant intellectual work was required in order to forge a demon-
strable correspondence between what was observed on asylum wards and
what was presented in textbooks and journal articles.
A Note on Asylum Records
To describe the existing scholarly literature on the Victorian asylum as
extensive is an understatement. Volumes have been written about virtu-
ally every aspect of what went on inside the walls of these institutions
as well as about their place within wider social structures.8 Andrew Scull
has suggested that any ‘grand’ or general claims about insanity can ‘be
adequately tested, refined, and extended only on the basis of careful
case studies of a range of asylums: studies which grasp the relationship
of local developments to the broader national picture, but which simul-
taneously exploit the opportunity offered by the possibility of a more
intensive examination of the history of an individual asylum’.9 Elsewhere,
Scull has lamented what he sees as historiography of psychiatry and of the
asylum largely divided along disciplinary lines, with the ‘broader scholarly
perspective’ having chiefly fallen within the purview of sociology while
historians have tended to focus ‘on the micro-politics of insanity’.10
It has certainly been the case that many historians of the asylum have
tended to favour the local; what such studies search for, perhaps, is ‘not
generalizable laws, but contextualised meanings of madness’.11 Scholars
have made extensive use of the staggering wealth of paperwork left behind
by the large pauper asylums produced by Victorian bureaucracy. From
oversized casebooks, to pecuniary records, to diet tables, building plans,
and both private and official correspondence, these documents with their
faint odour of disinfectant and mould have allowed historians to speak
about the place of the asylum in Victorian society, and the place of
the patient in the asylum. Analyses of admissions records offer data on
gender, class, religious persuasion, and, of course, diagnoses. Casebooks
recount a plethora of ‘delusions’, vast amounts of drugs administered,
methods of force-feeding, and recoveries, as well as conflicts, frustrations,
deaths, and autopsies. Melling and Forsythe’s study of the Devon county
asylums briefly referred to in the Introduction sought to do what Scull
prescribed—situate the local in a broader context.12 Other narrators have
used asylum records to trace changing practices in a specific context,13 or
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to draw attention to previously obscured factors in admission and diag-
nosis, subjecting asylum records to scrutiny which seeks to problematise
the data on offer rather than take the recorded figures for granted.14
Such rich histories have demystified the Victorian asylum for contem-
porary readers, and highlight the central role these institutions played
in the foundation of psychiatry as a modern discipline and branch of
medicine. Crucially, asylums were key to the development of diagnostic
practices and categories. Anne Goldberg suggests that medical diagnoses
such as melancholia ‘present solely the voice of the physician, and an
abstract voice at that. They tell us something (but not much) of medical
practices at the time, but next to nothing about the patient’.15 It is
certainly doubtful whether much can be learnt about the patients behind
the medical labels from studying asylum records, but the development
of diagnostic categories was closely intertwined with medical practices in
a mutually productive relationship. Diagnostic literature informed clinical
practices, and vice versa, as is still the case today. It follows that a compre-
hensive understanding of either of these necessitates an interrogation of
their relationship. While physicians presented their nosologies and note-
worthy case studies in textbooks and journals, published material gives
only a partial picture of the process whereby diagnostic categories were
produced, refined, and standardised.
Three of the institutions whose records are drawn upon in this chapter
have been the focus of rich historical studies that, taken together, illustrate
the complex relationship between local practices, central directives, and
theoretical works on psychopathology.16 This chapter does not, however,
go into detail about the individual asylums, about life inside their walls
or the people who resided or worked there. The aim in this chapter is
not to say something meaningful about the people who went into the
asylum and became patients, or the family members or workhouse offi-
cials who had them committed, or the physicians who diagnosed them.
The concern here is with the production of psychiatric knowledge about
people. As noted in the Introduction, asylum records are here read as
textual sources; as a crucial component of the intellectual work that
produced melancholia as a biomedical mental disease with an increasingly
standardised symptomatology. While the previous chapters considered the
various theoretical and administrative frameworks that were central to
this process, the present chapter maps how the melancholia diagnosis
was shaped as it travelled back and forth between the textbook and the
casebook.
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Thomas Clouston
and the Modernisation of Morningside
The Edinburgh Royal Asylum at Morningside offers a fitting space for
interrogating the relationship between asylum case notes and published
literature in the late nineteenth century. The hospital’s superintendent,
Thomas Clouston, was one of the period’s most prolific and influential
writers on mental disease, and Morningside was at the time one of the
largest institutions for the insane in Britain. It admitted both pauper and
private patients (at various rates), and a significant portion of its patients
were admitted from across the border, from as far away as Newcastle.
Morningside’s medical records and the publications of its staff are the
focal point of this chapter, situated in the wider context of published liter-
ature on melancholia at the turn of the century, and contrasted with case
notes from three other asylums.
English lunacy law and administration were briefly outlined in
Chapter 5. In Scotland, legal reform of the asylum system came more
than a decade after the Lunacy Acts were passed for England and Wales.
Following reports of ill-treatment and neglect, a Royal Commission
was appointed in 1855 to investigate the care of lunatics in Scotland’s
asylums and licensed houses. The Commission concluded that abuse was
widespread and drastic reform was required.17 With the Lunacy (Scot-
land) Act passed in 1857, a centralised system similar to the English one
was created, to be overseen by a Board of Commissioners who were
tasked to inspect Scottish asylum on an annual basis and ensure that
standards of management, care, and treatment were upheld.18 Physicians
were to submit yearly reports on the state of their institutions, including
statistical tables pertaining to the asylum population. By the 1860s the
British lunacy bureaucracy was largely complete, with institutions across
England, Scotland, and Wales operating under similar centralised systems
and regularly producing a wealth of statistical data about the patients
residing within their walls. The Scottish Lunacy Act contained much the
same provisions as the two British Acts, but a number of practical differ-
ences existed. For instance, Scottish asylums were more likely to house
both private and pauper patients, and in some cases did not deploy these
two distinct categories. There were beds available for people of various
means, and Clouston took pride in Morningside’s ability to provide high-
quality care for patients of modest middle-class backgrounds who would
not qualify for subsidised treatment but who would not be able to pay
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the same rate as private patients from the higher social strata.19 Another
significant, and related, difference was that two medical certificates were
required for both private and pauper patients. In addition a ‘petition’
(later reception order) needed to be signed, usually by a relative or poor
law official. All documentation would be submitted to the Sheriff who
would then decide whether or not the person should be sent to the
asylum.20
Clouston took over the running of the Morningside Asylum near Edin-
burgh upon the death of its former superintendent, David Skae, in 1873.
Clouston had received his medical training at Edinburgh, where he had
studied under Thomas Laycock among others. He went on to train under
Skae immediately after obtaining his medical degree, after which he was
offered the role of medical superintendent at Cumberland and Westmor-
land Asylum in Carlisle where he remained for a decade. Clouston was the
definition of a rising star among his peers—by the time he took charge
of Morningside he had already been co-editor (with Maudsley) of the
Journal of Mental Science for a year, and had published a number of
articles on mental disease. He would go on to become one of the most
prolific writers of his peer group, and remained the head of Morningside
until well into the first decade of the next century.21
Clouston was firmly wedded to a modern scientific approach to mental
disease, and was inspired by the work of physiologists such as Carpenter
and Laycock. The latter had assumed the chair of the practice of medicine
and clinical medicine at Edinburgh University in 1855, and also gave
the university’s lectures on mental diseases.22 When Clouston took over
as head of Edinburgh’s major asylum the two men made a ‘private
arrangement’ to combine their theoretical and practical knowledge of
mental disease. In a lecture delivered at the university three years after
Laycock’s death, Clouston praised his friend and mentor for his leading
contributions in the field of ‘cerebral physiology and pathology’.23 He
subsequently filled Laycock’s role as a lecturer in mental diseases, allowing
him to combine his clinical experience with the theoretical teaching of
psychological medicine. Clouston’s early lectures at Edinburgh formed
the foundation for his first textbook, Clinical Lectures on Mental Diseases
(1883).
Clouston’s ascent to the position of superintendent at the Royal Edin-
burgh Asylum was immediately noticeable in the practice of taking patient
notes. Mid-way through 1873, the system of classification used at Morn-
ingside was transformed rather abruptly, with the result that it conformed
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more closely to the standard nosology recommended by the English
Lunacy Commission. As discussed in Chapter 5, in England and Wales
the Lunacy Commission strongly encouraged nosological unity across
asylums, urging physicians to adopt its recommended system of clas-
sification, and providing asylums with pre-printed forms for recording
signs and symptoms of mental disease. However, the Scottish Board
of Commissioners took a different approach, allowing physicians to
choose the system they found most useful. George Robertson, Clouston’s
successor at Morningside, praised this decision in a 1920 historical review
of the Scottish lunacy system, suggesting that it encouraged innovation
and prevented stagnation.24 In the case of Edinburgh, it meant that the
asylum was reformed along modern scientific lines when Clouston was
appointed to run it, as he chose to steer Morningside largely along the
lines favoured by the Lunacy Commission across the border.
The freedom awarded to Scottish asylum physicians in the management
of their institutions meant that Skae had been able to deploy a wholly indi-
vidual nosology. He had developed his own system of classification based
on the presumed causes of mental disease rather than observable symp-
toms, divided into twenty-five categories (and two subcategories), such as
‘phthisical insanity’, ‘post-connubial insanity’, ‘ovarian insanity’, ‘asthenic
insanity’, and ‘traumatic insanity’.25 Under Skae’s management, his own
system was used in conjunction with more widely accepted categories such
as melancholia, mania, monomania, moral insanity, and dementia, so that
some patients received a diagnosis from Skae’s system, and some received
one of the more common labels. When Clouston took over in the summer
of 1873, the more standard categories were immediately deployed across
the board. From this point onwards, the majority of patients arriving at
Morningside were diagnosed with mania, melancholia, general paralysis,
or dementia, with the odd case of monomania, moral insanity, and imbe-
cility. Skae’s system was initially preserved as a secondary diagnostic tool
in addition to the primary diagnosis, but gradually fell out of use.
As well as enforcing a standardised system of classification, in 1874
Clouston introduced casebooks with pre-printed headings. The old case-
books used under Skae had consisted of numbered blank pages, whereas
the new ones came with several pre-printed sections with various subhead-
ings, including basic information such as age, sex, religion, and occu-
pation. When a patient was admitted to Morningside, the attending
physician was now required to state whether there was a ‘hereditary
history of insanity’, what the patient’s ‘first’ and ‘recent’ ‘mental’ and
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‘physical’ symptoms were, whether they harboured any ‘morbid habits
or propensities’, and whether the patient was ‘suicidal’ or ‘dangerous’.
Following these sections, the ‘facts indicating insanity’ given in the two
medical certificates was to be entered. The second page of a new case
was devoted solely to the patient’s ‘state on admission’, requiring the
attending physician to note any signs of ‘exaltation’, ‘depression’, ‘excite-
ment’, or ‘enfeeblement’, whether the patient was ‘coherent’, had a
reasonable ‘memory’, and whether they exhibited any ‘delusions’. At the
bottom of the page, after a long list of bodily functions to be assessed,
a diagnosis was to be entered. This was followed by a separate heading
asking for a second diagnosis according to ‘Skae’s classification’; this space
was, however, for the most part left blank.
The information entered on the first two pages of each new patient’s
records constituted the foundational data for the statistical report
compiled by Clouston and submitted to the Board of Commissioners on
a yearly basis. He composed Morningside’s annual reports with impres-
sive breadth and detail, and included his own analytical discussions of
the statistics presented therein.26 Clouston’s meticulousness and emphasis
on rigorous standards and consistency in recording practices were made
explicit in his first report to the Board of Commissioners at the end of
1873:
On the admission of every patient, as complete a medical history of the
causes of his disease, and his previous symptoms, as can be obtained from
the person who accompanied him from the Asylum, is taken down by one
of the Assistant Physicians, who then examines carefully into the symptoms
present, and afterwards keeps a record of the changes that take place. This
procedure I regard as of the utmost importance to the patient in every
way, if done thoroughly and systematically. I have brought into use for
the purpose printed forms with suitable headings, so that nothing may be
omitted in any case.27
These ‘printed forms’, then, ensured that certain types of information
were noted in every case. The presence of pre-printed headings also meant
that it was possible to note various aspects of the patient’s condition
with a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’, or with other brief affirmative or negative
responses. Thus, the attending physician only had to give a single word
answer to questions of whether the patient was ‘suicidal’ or exhibited
signs of ‘depression’. The forms left the choice of diagnosis open-ended;
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thus, while Skae’s nosology was no longer used as a source of primary
diagnoses, the statistical tables of diagnostic categories would change
subtly from one year to the next. Certain types of mental disease featured
in every annual report, specifically mania, melancholia, general paralysis,
and dementia, with the first two being further divided into a number
of subcategories. In the first report under Clouston, we find in addition
twelve cases of ‘moral insanity’ and one case of ‘monomania’ among the
new admissions of that year. As noted above, the following year Clouston
remarked upon a notable increase in the number of melancholic patients
admitted, suggesting that this development was ‘very striking, and of
great interest’, emphasising the importance of vigilance in the face of the
persistent suicidal tendencies of such patients.28
For the year 1874, 67 patients were reported to be ‘suicidal’, of whom
38 were diagnosed with some form of melancholia. In a detailed anal-
ysis of the annual reports of Morningside, Allan Beveridge suggests that
Clouston recognised eight subtypes of melancholia: ‘simple; hypochron-
driacal; delusional; excited; restive; epileptiform; organic; and suicidal and
homicidal’.29 The categories Beveridge lists are drawn from Clouston’s
Clinical Lectures on Mental Diseases. However, the categories presented
in the book took some time to refine. In 1874 we meet with some addi-
tional subtypes of melancholia which appear to bear the traces of Skae’s
classification, such as ‘traumatic’, ‘puerperal’, ‘senile’, and ‘melancholia
of lactation’.30 Between 1873 and 1900 melancholia was gradually and
subtly standardised in Clouston’s report to the Board of Commissioners.
Certain subcategories disappeared and others became more common. At
the same time, the ‘very striking’ proportion of melancholic cases which
prompted Clouston’s comments in 1874 would from thereon become the
norm; indeed the most striking thing about these figures is perhaps that
while melancholia continued to be diagnosed with growing frequency,
Clouston never again remarked upon this development.
A ‘Typical’ Case of Melancholia
The description of melancholia offered by Clouston in Clinical Lectures
was clear and precise: it was an illness characterised by ‘emotional depres-
sion’ and ‘mental pain’, often leading to ‘uncontrollable impulses towards
suicide’, and sometimes accompanied by a ‘loss of self-control’ or ‘delu-
sions’, a lack of interest in a capacity for most common activities, and with
slowed bodily functions. Like Griesinger, Clouston placed melancholia
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under the banner ‘states of mental depression’, which he also referred
to as ‘psychalgia’, fusing to an extent the symptoms of depression and
mental pain in the same way Griesinger had done. Moreover, like the
German psychiatrist had also done some decades earlier, Clouston empha-
sised that these states were ‘of all forms of mental diseases those that are
nearest mental health’. Following from this, he highlighted mental pain as
a particularly interesting symptom, as this was a sensation also experienced
by healthy people:
To be able to feel pain implies an encephalic tissue for the purpose. To
be very sensitive to pain implies that the tissue is acutely receptive of
impressions. So with mental pain there can be no doubt that the healthy
physiological condition of the encephalic tissue in the brain convolutions
through which ordinary or mental pain is felt is one between extreme
callousness to impressions and extreme sensitiveness. A man in robust
health, well exercised, does not feel pain nearly so acutely, and bears it
better than when he is weak and run down. Those principles apply equally
to the feeling and bearing of mental pain. To experience emotion at all –
to feel – implies an encephalic structure for this purpose. The most casual
study of the affective capacity in humans show us that it differs enormously
in different persons.31
Added to a brain’s level of sensitivity was its inhibitory power—its
capacity for enduring pain. These two aspects of the cerebral physiology
of pain together held the key to understanding the potential ability for
mental pain to become pathological: ‘when a brain is sensitive, and has
little inhibitory power, this combination is a source of weakness and of
disease’.32 Such mental pain was a defining feature of melancholia, a
diseased state that could be easily distinguished from ‘a mere feeling of
melancholy’ since a ‘typical case of melancholia […] runs a somewhat
definite course, like a fever, and has often all the characters of an acute
disease’.33 Clouston suggested that melancholia was by far the easiest
form of mental disease to examine and diagnose, as patients were gener-
ally aware of their suffering and able to communicate it and answer
questions. At the commencement of an examination, he suggested, the
melancholia patient ‘will tell you in the first place very likely that he is
unhappy, and feels mental pain and depression’. The ‘unsoundness of
mind’ would manifest when asking patients for the cause of this suffering,
as they would almost invariably ‘assign as a cause of their misery what
is not its cause at all’.34 However, as will be seen below, there was no
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mention in the Morningside casebooks of patients themselves using the
words ‘depression’ and ‘mental pain’ to express their emotional state.
Any student consulting Clouston’s textbook would be furnished with
clear instructions for how to identify melancholia: look for the expres-
sion, in words and countenance, of mental pain and depression, a general
lack of interest, and be attentive to any signs of suicidal intent. More-
over, patients would most likely attribute their suffering to an illusionary
cause, such as having committed a terrible sin. Cases of simple melan-
cholia, by far the most common, would rarely be sent to the asylum as
they could be treated at home, but were nonetheless important to iden-
tify and diagnose to prevent deterioration of the condition. In these cases,
‘the affective depression or pain is far more marked than the intellectual
and volitional aberrations’.35 Clouston presented a ‘typical’ case of this
form of the disease, a gentleman in his sixties whose emotional health
had begun to decline following ‘a big piece of intellectual work’. He
became tired, depressed, lost interest in his usual duties, and was unable
to feel the same affection for his wife and children as he had previously
done. Confused by these feelings, he believed that they ‘must be a judge-
ment on him for some sin’. With time his mental suffering grew more
severe, his delusions of guilt more profound, and his whole constitution
became affected. Upon examining the patient, Clouston recommended
rest, a journey to the sea, and an ‘easily digested but fattening diet’.36
Clouston supplemented this case with a line of similar ‘typical’ cases
of simple melancholia, followed by the closely related hypochondriacal
variety, before proceeding to the more profound, ‘delusional’ melan-
cholia. Contrary to Maudsley, Clouston found the suicidal propensity
to be more common in this than in the simple form, as the mental
suffering was usually more severe. In these forms of delusional melan-
cholia, Clouston argued, many patients experienced real or imagined
abdominal discomfort, often resulting in a refusal of food, which in the
most critical cases could only be resolved through force-feeding with the
stomach pump. He recounted a number of such typical cases, charac-
terised by profound depression of mind, delusions both of a religious
and a hypochondriacal nature (pertaining to the gastric region), persistent
suicidal tendencies, and a refusal of food leading the patients to be force-
fed. With some variations, the similarities with Moses B., the typical case
of suicidal melancholia met with at the start of this chapter, are striking.37
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However, Clouston also noted a type of melancholia—Excited (Motor)
Melancholia—that exhibited some more uncommon, markedly excited,
features, resulting from ‘epileptiform attacks’. Such involuntary reactions
were attributed to the relationship referred to above between the brain’s
sensitivity and its inhibitory power, whereby a combination of an intense
response to stimuli and a lack of cerebral inhibition resulted in violent
involuntary motor reactions. This type of melancholia was particularly
common in ‘the Celtic race’ and in women in general, Clouston argued,
illustrated by the ‘wailing and weeping, the gesticulations and motor grief
of an Irish woman’, reactions that were ‘usually out of all proportion to
the mental pain’. Recounting a typical case of this form of the disease,
Clouston described the familiar symptoms of melancholia, suggesting
that the female patient ‘attempted suicide’, was upon admission ‘greatly
depressed’, and ‘confessed to feeling exceedingly miserable’. After a few
days in the asylum her depression grew deeper, and she ‘thought she was
to be killed, and that everything was going wrong with her; did not take
her food well; attempted to drown herself by jumping into the asylum
shallow curling pond’. The excited motor features were exhibited as an
expression of her despair: ‘She wrings her hands; sways backwards and
forwards, contorting her body; rushes about from place to place, and
cannot settle for a minute’.38 Again the reader was presented with a
typical case featuring all the usual symptoms of melancholia, but with
the added aspect of involuntary motor action arising from, and reflecting,
the particular quality of this mental disturbance.
In a lecture delivered to the asylum staff a few years later, in 1887,
Clouston reiterated his earlier definition of melancholia as predominantly
characterised by mental pain, suggesting that ‘[l]ove of life is a natural
instinct, but when the brain is diseased, as in Melancholia, the love of
life is lost. Melancholia is the least marked kind of insanity; every kind of
insanity begins with it as the first symptom. The feelings, intellect, &c.,
are all disturbed, and the chief symptom is mental pain’.39 Like many
of his peers, Clouston held this mental pain to be a significant cause
of the suicidal propensity in melancholia. He emphasised that ‘while no
tendency to suicide exists at all in many melancholics’, it should nonethe-
less always be carefully watched out for since ‘it does exist in some form
or other, in wish, intention, or act, in four out of every five of all the
cases’.40 Nevertheless, Clouston found it useful to note a separate cate-
gory of ‘suicidal melancholia’ closely related to a less common ‘homicidal’
type. This type of the disease was, he argued, ‘the most striking and most
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important’. In a remark similar to those made by Maudsley and Mercier
a few years later,41 Clouston perceived suicidality as a complete reversal
of the evolutionary drive for self-preservation:
When the love of life, that primary and strongest instinct, not only in
man, but in all the animal kingdom, through which continuous acts of
self-preservation of the individual life of every living thing take place, when
that is lost, and not only lost but reversed, so that a man craves to die as
strongly as he ever craved to live, we have then the greatest change in the
instinctive and affective faculties of man that is possible, and have reached
the acme of all states of mental depression.42
However, like Maudsley and Mercier, Clouston went on to note that this
utter reversal of the natural instinct could, paradoxically, at the same time
constitute a natural, indeed sane reaction when occurring as a response to
profound mental pain. ‘The determination to commit suicide is in some
cases one come to in the calmest and most reasonable way’, he suggested,
and in such instances was ‘nearest in character to the suicides among sane
persons’. However, in a large number of cases of melancholia, the suicidal
tendency was equally bound up with severe and frightening delusions
arising from mental pain and depression, most often delusions of guilt
tied to the belief that the patient had committed a great sin against God
and her or his family and friends, and therefore did not deserve to live.
The suicidal tendency in melancholia was thus a feature of the disease that
much preoccupied Clouston, not just from the point of view of patient
safety, but also as a riddle in the philosophy and biology of life. This
interest in suicidality was much in evidence both in his annual reports
to the Board of Commissioners, and in the way patients’ symptoms were
assessed and noted in the Morningside casebooks. Indeed, most of these
distinctions between different types of melancholia listed in Clouston’s
published work and annual reports were not made in the Morningside
casebooks, with the exception of suicidality. The single diagnosis would
be entered, and often followed by an abbreviated reference to suicidal
tendencies in brackets. The notes made as to a patient’s suicidality would
be tallied up at the end of the year and entered into neat columns listing
the total number of ‘suicidal’ patients, which diagnoses were represented
among them, and how many had ‘meditated’ or ‘attempted’ suicide.
Through these different acts of recording, counting, summarising, and
listing, then, a vast range of activities and expressions communicated and
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observed on the wards created two categories that featured in reports and
published literature, not just in Edinburgh, but across Britain—the ‘typi-
cal’ case of melancholia, and the ‘suicidal’ patient. A closer look at asylum
records reveals that both categories suggested simplicity and coherence
that was not mirrored in the myriad of symptoms displayed by asylum
patients who received these labels.
Typical and Untypical Cases: Melancholia
from the Textbook to the Asylum Ward
In the final decades of the century, an increasing number of asylums intro-
duced casebooks with pre-printed sections for recording patient history,
symptoms, and diagnosis. This formed part of, and helped facilitate,
a broad shift in record taking from longer, discursive descriptions of
patients’ mental states to briefer statements and descriptive keywords.
Two concerns in particular drove this development. On the one hand, the
requirement to provide uniform and comparable statistical data on patient
populations and diagnostics produced a need for standardised recording
practices. On the other hand, these changes to how patient data was
recorded were also facilitated by time constraints at a time when asylums
and their populations were rapidly expanding across the country. This
shift in the practice of note-taking was mirrored across much of Western
medicine in the second half of the nineteenth century; a development
that one historian has referred to as a ‘new epistemological and aesthetic
sensibility, expressed as a narrative preference for what was universal and
precise over what was individual and discursive’.43
The casebooks at Morningside illustrate this shift. In earlier years,
under Skae’s management, case notes had been comprehensive, discursive
narratives of each patient’s history, state of mind, and bodily condition.
With the pre-printed casebooks introduced by Clouston in the 1870s, a
few key terms were often deemed sufficient. While the amount and format
of the information entered varied, sometimes considerably, depending on
which physician entered it, the overall trend was towards briefer, more
precise descriptions, centring on single words or abbreviated sentences.
The trend for briefer language was particularly prominent in the descrip-
tion of symptoms. The act of condensing information was notable in
the ‘facts indicating insanity’ transferred from the medical certificates to
the casebook, where the explanations given by the two certifying physi-
cians were increasingly summarised into a few keywords. In the case of
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Isabella K., a rather typical case of melancholia admitted in the summer of
1893, the first of the medical certificates accompanying her to the asylum
suggested that the patient ‘talks incoherently and has delusions that she
has ceased to live. She does not know the year nor the day of week. Has
great depression. Melancholia’. Added to this were the ‘facts’ told by her
husband, who was said to confirm this assessment of her mental state,
adding that ‘she has been ill for about ten days and has lost her memory’.
The second medical certificate claimed Isabella K. to be ‘very depressed
and melancholic, says that she is lost and that her maker has devised a
punishment for her disobedience to his will to be burning in Hell’, and
that ‘her husband states that for ten days she has been very depressed,
forgetting everything’.44
On the first page of her casebook entry, this already brief informa-
tion about the patient’s state of mind was entered under the heading
‘Facts of Medical Certificates’ simply as ‘Looks depressed. Delusions. Bad
memory’. She was further noted as ‘suicidal’ and where the physician was
required by the pre-printed headings to note the presence or absence
of ‘depression’, the answer given was ‘Considerable. Looks unhappy’.
It was not stated in what her suicidal tendency consisted, except in the
single word ‘threatened’.45 Overall the format of casebook entries under
Clouston’s management produced these kinds of brief, concise descrip-
tions where patients’ mental states were described as key symptoms, such
as ‘depression’, ‘delusions of a religious nature’, and so on. This practice
had the effect of creating an increasingly homogenous set of symptoms,
as the more personalised narratives of individual patients were gradually
erased. We meet, then, with a large number of ‘typical’ cases of melan-
cholia, similar to that of Isabella K. above, and of Moses B., the young
suicidal doctor whose case was discussed at the start of this chapter.
One such typical case, fifty-five-year-old Dorothy D. admitted in 1876,
was described in the following terms: ‘Became depressed and melan-
choly’, ‘Refused Food’, ‘Has attempted suicide several times; by knife,
hanging, &c. and wishes to drown herself’. ‘Is very depressed in spirits,
and imputes blame to herself for all sorts of imaginary sins’. Her state
of mind upon admission was noted as ‘Depression great – shown by
her conversation and the expression of her countenance; says that she
has ruined her husband and family, that she injures and destroys every-
thing near her, that she has done great wrong, &c’. Such typical cases of
melancholia abounded; individuals who came into the asylum and ticked
most of the boxes for common forms of melancholia: mental depression,
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suicidal tendencies, and religious delusions, but who were generally clear-
headed enough to answer questions and express how they felt. Pauline
N., admitted in the same year as Dorothy, was an equally typical melan-
cholic, her most prominent mental symptoms noted as ‘depression and
suicidal tendency’, and according to both of the certifying physicians
believed herself to be ‘under a curse from her birth’, due to which she
had ‘ruined her family’. Her state upon admission to Morningside was
recounted as characterised by ‘great depression shown by her depressed
self-absorbed expression and demeanour’. Twenty-five-year-old Margaret
L. was an equally typical case, having become ‘depressed’ as a result of
‘anxiety’ relating to her work. An assistant in her grain merchant father’s
business, the exciting cause of her melancholia was believed to be her
sister’s recent move to America, ‘throwing the whole charge of business
on her’. Described as ‘suicidal’, one of the physicians certifying her lunacy
stated that she had declared ‘that she wished to destroy herself, that she
may not be a burden to her parents’, adding that according to her father
‘she took poison on Thursday, and this morning she threw herself over
the window from a height of three flats’. When first examined upon her
arrival at the asylum, her mental state was given as one of ‘considerable
depression, shown by her expression, and by her conversation. She says
she wishes to destroy herself, as she is the cause of ruin to her father’.46
Similarly, Alexander H., admitted in 1877, was described as ‘depressed’
and ‘low in spirits’ and having ‘attempted suicide by taking laudanum’.
The attending physician at Morningside assessed his mental condition as
‘Depression great, shown by his expression, manner, and conversation,
and by the nature of his delusions. Says that he feels very dull and that he
is lost forever’.47
Apparently absent from these and many more ‘typical’ cases were,
however, any account by the patients themselves of suffering from
‘depression’, or from ‘mental pain’. Indeed, the latter did not feature
as a symptom in the Morningside casebooks at all. What these case-
books reveal, then, is the process, today standard practice in psychiatric
diagnostics, of translating patients’ various complaints, verbal and non-
verbal expressions, past and present acts, and reported medical history
into certain symptom terms—universally applicable keywords that serve to
merge together the chaos of human activity into simplified medical labels.
With a rapidly growing asylum population, and a perceived need for a
more unified language between medical psychologists, the increased use
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of unifying keywords such as depression and mental pain served impor-
tant practical uses for late Victorian asylum physicians. It enabled swifter
description and recording of a patient’s mental state, as well as facilitating
the assembly of statistical tables over diagnoses and symptoms. It also
aided the dissemination and publication of cases within the wider peer
community by producing a nomenclature that was accessible and compre-
hensible to anyone with professional knowledge in the field of mental
disease. When one physician published an article about a particularly inter-
esting or representative case, such as that of Moses B., the use of terms
such as ‘suicidal’ and ‘depressed’ would immediately make the patient’s
state of mind appear familiar to the professional reader.
However, while the act of merging an endless range of human activities
into simplified key terms made descriptions of symptoms and diagnoses
of disease more precise, it equally served to flatten out a highly uneven
field of psychological phenomena. The use of singular keywords precluded
the need for more detailed narrative descriptions of individual experi-
ences—one of its greatest benefits to the busy physician, but equally an
act that had the effect of producing new information about people. As
noted above, in the decades following Clouston’s ascendancy to the posi-
tion of superintendent at Morningside, the casebook descriptions grew
increasingly brief and concise, and included less and less variation in the
terminology used to note the patients’ mental states. One of the shifts that
took place with the introduction of pre-printed headings was a decline in
reasons given for assigning a particular symptom. In other words, descrip-
tions became decidedly un-descriptive. This was particularly the case with
‘depression’, one of the key features that required noting as part of a
new patient’s state upon admission. In the case of Dorothy D. referred to
above, her ‘depression’ was observed in ‘her conversation and the expres-
sion of her countenance’. Similarly, Janet G.’s ‘depression’ was described
as ‘Great, looks very unhappy, cries’,48 Alexander Duffle’s depression
was noted as ‘Great. Expression is one of misery and he is continually
crying’,49 Jane Ann C.’s depression was ‘exhibited in manner, appearance,
and communication’, Isabella Hutton’s depression was ‘marked, exhibited
in appearance and conversation’,50 Robert G.’s depression was ‘Consid-
erable. Looks unhappy and confused, and cried while being examined’,51
and Catherine G.’s depression was simply ‘present in her expression’.52
Contrary to Clouston’s remark in his textbooks, patients did not
themselves appear to express a feeling of being ‘depressed’. As noted
above, depression, mental pain, and suicidal tendencies were descriptive
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terms deployed by physicians as identifiable symptoms, keywords to
describe a certain state of mind that was perceived as widespread among
asylum patients, but which said little about what those patients them-
selves expressed about their emotional states. David Walker and Anita
O’Connell have noted the homogenising function of depression as a
single descriptive term for a range of emotional states associated with low
mood, remarking that it ‘not only replaced a wider vocabulary for a variety
of experiences’, but that it ‘also flattened out the individuality’ of those
experiences.53 Only fragments of individual expressions can be glimpsed
in the brief narratives given of patient interviews, where a vast range of
thoughts and feelings were described. John W., whose depression was
stated as ‘marked’, expressed according to the attending physician a fear
‘that the persons around him are wishing to injure him, and is constantly
crying out “You won’t kill me, you won’t kill me”’,54 whereas Eliza-
beth F. told the medical officer examining her that she believed herself
to have been poisoned as a result of ‘some sin she committed in her
youth’, and that she was now eternally lost.55 Isabelle H. expressed that
‘she is not human, that she has no feelings and that she would like to
die’,56 and Peter S. claimed that ‘the devil is after him and that people
are suspicious of him’. Other patients said very little at all, appearing
reluctant and unable to answer any questions put to them. Robert M.,
a pauper patient admitted in 1887, would ‘not answer any questions or
answers them incoherently, constantly repeats the same words, as “the
man”, “the man”’,57 while Isaac W. was described as ‘taciturn and disin-
clined to answer questions’,58 and Isabella M. ‘Refuses to answer all direct
questions’ and displayed a ‘vacant look’.59
This conflation of different expressions under the label depression
was equally reflected in the casebooks of other British asylums in this
period, such as Surrey Country Asylum at Brookwood, which was run by
Thomas Brushfield. The casebooks at Brookwood tell a similar story to
those of Morningside, and contain a large number of typical and untyp-
ical cases of melancholia. Frances H., a 38-year-old nurse admitted into
Brookwood in 1879 and diagnosed with melancholia was recorded as
suicidal and suffering from ‘depression of spirits without apparent cause’,
which manifested in that she ‘does not know what she shall do and
feels suicidal’ and ‘is not regular’.60 Julia P., a young woman admitted
into the same asylum the previous year was also recorded as depressed
and suicidal with ‘religious delusions’. The evidence for her mental state
consisted in that she ‘said the Devil was constantly after her and that
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she feels as if she must kill herself’.61 Similarly, William W., who was
brought to Brookwood from Lambeth workhouse in 1871, was described
as depressed, ‘very’ suicidal, and having ‘delusional views of religion’,
which led him to believe that ‘there is no time for him left to repent
and that his sins have been so great’.62 Like Morningside, Brookwood
had recently introduced casebooks with pre-printed sections, which made
it easier for attending physicians to record mental symptoms, in partic-
ular the presence of suicidal tendencies, where a simple yes or no was
sufficient. Suicidality appeared with high frequency in conjunction with
the melancholia diagnosis, which was reflected in the asylum’s annual
statistical reports. Depression on the other hand was not included in the
pre-printed section (unlike at Morningside), but it was nevertheless by
far the most frequently noted mental symptom in melancholic patients
alongside suicidal tendencies.
A similar picture emerges from the casebooks of Ticehurst, a private
licensed facility in Sussex run by the Newingtons, a family of physi-
cians, and where Henry Maudsley occasionally consulted. While private
institutions were subject to inspection, they were not under the same
administrative pressure as county asylums with regard to data collection.
However, recording practices generally mirrored those of public insti-
tutions. By the mid-1870s, pre-printed casebooks were also in use at
Ticehurst, which asked among other things whether the patient admitted
was suicidal. Depression equally appeared as the most common mental
symptom of melancholia, such as in 44-year-old John S., whose ‘depres-
sion of spirits’ was noted as ‘great’ and evidenced by ‘constantly thinking
& troubling about his business & money’ and that ‘he is unable to fix
his attention on anything & that he said last night “you don’t know
what I am going to do”’. This statement by the patient appears to be
the primary reason for suspecting him to harbour suicidal tendencies,
alongside a ‘refusal of food and medicine’. 42-year-old Caroline Ann W.,
admitted three years later and diagnosed with melancholia, was equally
described as suffering from ‘mental depression’ and recorded as suicidal.
She was reported as stating that ‘she was the devil and not fit to live’ and
that she ‘took poison & attempted to destroy herself’. Alongside such
‘typical’ cases of melancholia with what was at the time familiar signs of
‘depression’, can be found others such Eliza B., a young woman admitted
in the autumn of 1878 and diagnosed as ‘melancholic and suicidal’, with
her mental state described as ‘very depressed’. In this case, none of the
more common reasons for this term are given, rather the evidence for her
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depression appears to be that she ‘won’t eat any meat as she believes she
is then responsible for the death of the animals’.
Suicidal Melancholics
As the above cases imply, a number of different expressions and acts
suggested to physicians that melancholic patients were depressed, and that
they harboured suicidal intentions. In several of his reports to the Board
of Commissioners, Clouston remarked upon the growing incidence of
suicidal patients under his care, and as suggested above, his annual statis-
tical charts included a table of suicidal tendencies in patients admitted.
The total number of suicidal patients was divided into the various forms
of mental disease represented, followed by a list of the nature of attempts,
where such had been undertaken. Each year the tables indicated that the
vast majority of suicidal patients, whether they had ‘attempted’ or ‘medi-
tated’, were diagnosed with melancholia. However, when taking a closer
look at the patient records that served as the basis for these tables a rather
more complex picture emerges.
In his 1887 report to the Commissioners, Clouston emphasised the
importance of vigilance in order to prevent ‘suicidal’ patients from
achieving their goal. While deaths by suicide were rare in Morningside
(and generally also in other asylums), this year two patients had succeeded
in taking their lives, prompting Clouston to reiterate the substantial diffi-
culty for even the trained physician in detecting the presence of suicidal
intent in a patient:
We have no test by which we can infallibly tell the presence or absence
of the suicidal impulse – that most subtile, terrible, and sudden of all
morbid mental symptoms. It may exist in a man whose mental working is
otherwise strong: it may arise in a moment: it may be suggested by any
means of taking away life: it may overmaster the strongest resolutions and
the best principles; and it may even co-exist in the mind with a horror and
loathing of itself.63
That year, the number of ‘suicidal’ patients numbered 79, of whom
61 were melancholic. Of the total number of suicidal patients, 23 were
stated to have attempted and the remaining 56 meditated. The types of
attempts listed for that year were ‘precipitation’, ‘cut-throat’, ‘poisoning’,
‘hanging’, ‘strangulation’, ‘drowning’, and ‘starvation’.64
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One of these suicidal melancholics was Jane C., who had reportedly
become insane following ‘domestic bereavement’. She ‘grew dull and
low spirited’, and more recently had become ‘very restless and excited
and tried to throw herself over the window’. Jane, then, belonged to
the category of ‘attempted’ suicides, and was upon admission described
as suffering from ‘great depression’ and plagued by the delusional belief
that ‘she has committed unpardonable sins and must go to hell’.65 She
was a typical case of suicidal melancholia, much like the published case
of Moses B. Moses had, as noted at the start, been admitted to Morn-
ingside after taking ‘a poisonous dose of Belladonna’, an act that saw
him labelled ‘suicidal’ on his reception order and medical certificates and
consequently subject to close monitoring on the asylum ward. According
to assistant physician Joseph Brown’s article on the case, as well as Moses’
casebook entries, his suicide attempts continued once inside the asylum.
There, he swallowed several stones, after which he complained of abdom-
inal distress and began to decline his meals. This act of ‘refusing his food’
was looked upon with severity, as it was undertaken ‘evidently with the
hope of starving himself’. As a result, the stomach pump was deployed
on several occasions. Moses’ next suicide attempt reportedly consisted
in taking ‘an overdose of alcohol’, a feat he accomplished after having
saved up the small drop of whiskey patients were given with their evening
meal each night. Around two weeks after this incident, from which he
subsequently recovered, the patient ‘snatched’ from an attendant a bottle
containing ‘a solution of guttapercha in chloroform’, which he proceeded
to drink. Moses became unconscious and only came to several hours later
after persistent attempts to revive him. According to Brown, the patient
grew steadily stronger over the next few days, but ‘continues to refuse his
food, and has to be fed with the tube’. The persistence with which Moses
apparently pursued his desire to die constituted a demonstrable example
of the suicidal tendency in melancholics—so determined did the patient
seem in his suicidal convictions that ‘his one and only object in life is to
destroy it’.66
In this one single case, then, a number of acts were presented that
were merged under the ‘suicidal’ banner—swallowing of stones, refusing
food, drinking a large quantity of alcohol, and swallowing a poisonous
substance. A look at similar ‘typical’ cases of suicidal melancholia widen
the range further. Pauline N. had ‘threatened or attempted violence to
herself by drowning at the first attack, and during the second by swal-
lowing pins and knocking her head’, while Elizabeth F. had ‘refused
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food: saying that she did not want to live’ and had according to her
husband ‘attempted to poison herself’.67 Isabella M.’s suicidal tendency
consisted in ‘trying to leave the house in the night, and often refusing
her food’, John C. had ‘twice attempted suicide by cutting his throat’,
Isabella H. was deemed suicidal because she would walk ‘about the streets
in a depressed state – found standing on the top balcony to jump over,
&c.’, and Agnes F.’s suicidality manifested in proclaiming that she was
‘desperately miserable and that all she wants is to leave this world’.68
Robert A., an ‘anxious and dejected’ widower was labelled suicidal due
to having reportedly ‘threatened to cut his throat, and has tried to get
out of the window’, Alexander M. was deemed by one of his certifying
physicians to be suicidal after he ‘wanted to get a knife’, and Jane C.
was noted as having ‘threatened’ suicide after she ‘wandered away to the
Dean Bridges’ but did not jump in the river ‘as she says the water was not
deep enough’.69 Alexander D. was described in his case notes as having
‘attempted’ suicide after having become ‘very excited’. While in this state
he ‘appeared to be suicidal and took hold of a knife. He did not injure
himself however’. Robert G. was placed in the category of melancholics
who had ‘meditated’ suicide after he ‘asked for a pistol and a rope to
destroy himself’, as was Alexander B., who ‘said that he was tired of life
and wished to have done with it, but he has made no actual attempts’.70
Madeleine M., another case of typical suicidal melancholia, had report-
edly been ‘refusing food’ and ‘threw herself before a train’, and Catherine
G. was described as ‘suicidally inclined’ after stating ‘that she wishes to
die’.71
In the case of several melancholics who received the label ‘suicidal’,
either in their medical certificate or upon admission, no apparent reason
was given for their suicidality; rather, it appeared to be deduced from
their general state of mind. Annie V., a ‘suicidal’ melancholic admitted
in the summer of 1898, was noted as harbouring ‘melancholic ideas.
Thinks there is no food for her children, that she will be had up for
ill treatment, &c.’, but no other reason for her purported suicidality
was given. Similarly, in the case of Elizabeth R. who was admitted the
previous winter and reportedly required ‘constant watching’, the suicidal
tendency appeared to be derived from reports that she ‘wanders about at
night’ and ‘refuses food’. Refusal of food was equally the reason given
for the suspected presence of suicidal intent in Jane Ann C., while in
the case of Isabella H. no apparent reason was given beyond the ‘usual’
symptom of ‘depression’, deduced from the patient appearing ‘dull and
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melancholy and despondent’. In a number of such cases where the ‘suici-
dal’ label came without explanation, such as those of James C. and James
W., both admitted in 1888, few symptoms were given beyond the familiar
‘depression’, ‘lowness of spirits’, and ‘despondency’.72 In sum, the Morn-
ingside casebooks appeared to confirm the belief expressed by Maudsley in
1879, that ‘[s]uicidal feelings and attempts are common in melancholia,
so much so that one suspects their actual or possible existence even when
they have not been openly manifested’.73
A similar picture emerges from county asylums in England at this
time. As noted in Chapter 5, Thomas Brushfield lamented the flawed
nature of statistics on suicidality, suggesting that these often included
self-injurious acts committed without suicidal intent. In the case of melan-
cholia, however, he took a different approach. As with Morningside,
melancholic patients under Brushfield’s care were frequently labelled
suicidal even in the absence of suicidal acts or openly manifested intent.
In the case of John G., a suicidal melancholic admitted to Brookwood
shortly after Brushfield took over the running of the asylum in the 1860s,
no specific reason was given for considering him to harbour suicidal
tendencies, beyond the patient stating that ‘he feels very low sometimes
but cannot give any reasons for being so’.74 In patients diagnosed with
melancholia, any act or expression that could be construed as having self-
injurious intent was likely to be labelled suicidal. Ann F., admitted in
1869, was labelled as suicidal because she ‘seemed very much depressed
and expressed an intense feeling of melancholy, as if she would do herself
an injury’.75 Ann W., admitted the following year, was also considered
to be suicidal, which according to the attending physician manifested
in ‘persistent refusal of food’, while Sarah Elizabeth L. was said to have
‘attempted suicide by pressing her fingers slightly round her throat’, and
for this reason required ‘constant watching’.76
The previous chapter noted how George Savage equally questioned
the validity of statistics on suicidal patients, arguing that many of the
suicidal patients under his care were not ‘actively’ suicidal. By the 1870s,
Bethlem was also using pre-printed casebooks, which only required a yes
or no as to whether a patient was suicidal. On the pages of Bethlem’s
casebooks can equally be found a range of acts and expressions merged
under the suicidal label, and much as at Morningside and Brookwood,
patients’ behaviour appeared to be more likely to be labelled suicidal
if they were considered to be suffering from melancholia. For instance,
Sarah M., admitted in December 1878, when Savage had recently been
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put in charge, was perceived as suffering from melancholia with typical
religious delusions, stating that she had committed ‘the unpardonable
sin’ for which she could ‘not be forgiven’. Her suicidality appeared to be
attributed to her having ‘made several attempts to set fire to the house’. In
the case of Alfred N., another suicidal melancholic, his perceived suicide
‘attempt’ consisted in ‘having swallowed…shilling pieces last week, and
a penny this morning’. Emma H. was described as labouring under
‘extreme depression’, believing herself ‘to be the most wicked woman
in the world’. When she drank ‘some liniment’, this was seen as an act
with suicidal intent.
While a diagnosis of melancholia was likely to result in an assump-
tion that the patient was suicidal, there were at times also more practical
reasons for applying both labels to patients. Records of patients trans-
ferred to Morningside from St. Cuthbert’s, the local poor house, tell a
story of difficult to manage patients who were not reported to express
any of the usual symptoms of melancholia, including intent to commit
suicide, but who were admitted with ‘suicidal’ against their name and
given a melancholia diagnosis. The question of whether to treat lunatics
in the poor house infirmary or have them transferred to the asylum was
a contentious one; county asylums were generally much better funded,
staffed, and equipped, but it was also more costly to care for patients in
these institutions, and transfers of pauper lunatics from the workhouse to
the county asylum generally needed to be motivated by the inability of
staff in the former to care for the person in question.77 One of the most
common ways of doing this was to confirm on the medical certificate
and reception order that the lunatic was either ‘dangerous’ or ‘suicidal’.
One such case was that of Mary S., admitted from St. Cuthbert’s in
June of 1888. None of the usual symptoms of melancholia was noted,
except that she ‘refuses food’. She was described as excited and ‘noisy’ by
a nurse at St. Cuthbert’s infirmary, who also reported that Mary ‘tries
to bite and requires several women to hold her down’, and that she
was ‘requiring restraint by the attendants to prevent her doing mischief
and injuring herself in wild attempts to leave the place’.78 In the case
of Robert M., transferred from the same poor house the previous year,
commonly described symptoms of melancholia were equally notable by
their absence. Little information was given in the case notes as to the
reasons for his confinement and for the diagnosis, only that he had ‘a
depressed expression’ and ‘is in a constant state of restlessness, always
trying to take off his clothes and fumbling with his hands’. His medical
certificates and reception order, however, cite the facts indicating insanity
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recounted by the nurse at St. Cuthbert’s, who claimed that Robert was
noisy and restless at night, disturbing the other patients in the infirmary,
and that he ‘works at the bedclothes with his hands and has to be put
under restraint’.79
As these case studies illustrate, a vast number of different acts and
expressions came together to produce the single category ‘suicidal’, a
symptom of melancholia that functioned together with the other most
commonly deployed keyword, ‘depression’. These two symptoms of
mental disease were produced from a chaos of activities, often deduced in
part from ‘delusions’ of guilt and sin—the ‘religious delusions’ discussed
in Chapter 5—or from a patient’s ‘dull’ or ‘despondent’ demeanour, and
from various acts and statements that were interpreted as intent to ‘do
away with oneself’. The two things most often expressed by melancholic
patients themselves, according to their medical notes, were a sense of
profound guilt, of having done something terribly wrong, often causing
harm, shame, or destruction to one’s family, and following from this, a
belief that one did not deserve to live and must therefore destroy oneself.
No patient was reported as uttering the words ‘depression’, ‘mental pain’,
or ‘suicide’. These are, however, the key features that emerge from the
case notes, and from the annual reports to the Board of Commissioners,
where the persistent suicidality of Morningside’s melancholics was repeat-
edly emphasised by Clouston as one of the greatest challenges facing the
physician in charge of an asylum.
Clouston’s statistical tables of the frequency with which ‘suicidal
propensities’ were encountered in the Morningside patients illustrated
what had by the 1880s become the standard view among British asylum
physicians: of all lunatics melancholics were the most suicidal, and of
all suicidal patients the majority were melancholics. Clouston took care
to emphasise this feature in his textbook, warning students and fellow
practitioners that
[t]he question of the patient being suicidal should never in any case of
melancholia be left unconsidered, and the risk of his becoming suicidal
should never in any case be left unprovided for. No tendency to suicide
exists at all in many melancholics from beginning to end of their disease,
but it does exist in some form or other – in wish, intention, or act – in
four out of every five of all the cases, and we can never tell when it is to
develop in any patient.80
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His own statistics supported this claim year after year, yet no self-inflicted
death was reported at Morningside until two suicides were recorded in
1879. Overall such cases were rare in Edinburgh and elsewhere, but the
expectation of suicide formed a constant preoccupation for asylum physi-
cians as well as for English and Scottish Commissioners in Lunacy. Thus,
Clouston echoed the anxiety felt by many of his peers when he remarked
that ‘[t]he fear of it in reference to some one is always more or less present
in my mind’.81
Nevertheless, Clouston expressed the same kind of scepticism about
the reliability of statistics on suicidality as Savage and others had done.
In the first (1883) edition of his textbook he subjected the statistics he
had accumulated during his time at Morningside to closer scrutiny. As
noted above, Clouston’s tables of suicidal patients had separated those
who had ‘attempted’ from those who had ‘meditated’ suicide. Of the
last 729 melancholic patients who had been admitted to the institution,
the tables indicated that ‘four out of five…were more or less suicidal’.
However, many of the attempts, he suggested, ‘could scarcely be regarded
as being very serious’. Moreover, of the total number just below forty
per cent came under the heading ‘meditated’, in other words they ‘had
spoken of suicide, or given some indication that it had been in their
minds’. Clouston concluded that while the suicide risk in melancholia
was statistically very high, his experience told him that ‘the actual risk
of suicide being seriously attempted or accomplished is much less than
those figures seem to show’.82 Nevertheless, the recording practices put
in place by Clouston at Morningside contributed to the widely accepted
view of a close relationship between melancholia and suicidal tendencies,
with consequences for the admission, diagnosis, and care of melancholics
in the Victorian period.
Conclusion
The developments mapped in this and the previous chapter have
continued to shape perceptions of mood disorders into the twenty-first
century, where emotional pain and depression are perceived as closely
linked to suicidal thoughts and actions. Closely related to the emergence
of suicidality as a category separate from suicide has been the growing
focus of psychiatric attention in the late nineteenth and throughout the
twentieth century upon ‘self-injurious’ behaviour. Late Victorian medical
psychologists increasingly used the term ‘self-mutilation’ to describe a
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range of what they perceived to be non-suicidal acts, such as amputa-
tions and castrations; more commonly, however, medical discussion of
‘self-mutilating’ behaviour referred to ‘minor self-mutilations’ such as
‘skin-picking’ and ‘hair-plucking’.83 In present psychiatry, ‘non-suicidal
self-injury’ has become a firmly cemented medical concept84; however,
the parameters and definitions of what distinguishes suicidal from non-
suicidal self-injury have shifted over time as these categories have been
reconceptualised in the context of contemporaneous cultural tropes about
group and individual behaviours. The history of these psychiatric models
of behaviour is beyond the scope of this book, and have been considered
elsewhere.85 However, it is significant to note the varying and multiple
medical meanings of different kinds of ‘self-injurious’ behaviours in the
nineteenth century. In sum, ‘suicidal’ was produced as a multivalent and
shifting concept, one which was at the same time remarkably consistent in
medico-psychological literature and in administrative and clinical practice
for a time. Despite the fact that Victorian physicians themselves acknowl-
edged the ambiguity of the concept and the problems attached to its use
in the production of asylum statistics, they nevertheless continued to rely
upon this category as a significant diagnostic criterion in the definition of
melancholia, and as a useful tool in the determination of a patient’s state
of mind.
This chapter has traced the relationship between asylum statistics, diag-
nostic records, and published material to show how melancholia was
constituted, modified, reified, and applied as a diagnosis in late Victo-
rian medicine. Melancholia did not exist as a coherent disease entity with
clearly distinguished symptoms prior to the practices and the language
which sought to identify and classify it. If we want to say something about
how psychiatric diagnoses were produced in the nineteenth century (and
beyond), we must address the relationship between asylum case notes,
which were often messy and inconsistent, and published material where
neat psychiatric categories were described together with evidence drawn
from such case notes, here presented as clear and organised narratives. We
must pay attention to how such material was disseminated and discussed,
and how the categories present in published literature made their way
back to the asylum recording books. We need also to look at the rela-
tionship between the science of medicine and the science of statistics,
as well as that between statistics, legal reforms, and subsequent changes
to practice, and, finally, we must also consider to what extent different
practices transformed the nature of the knowledge that emerged from
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the asylum casebook and was translated into textbooks and journals. Late
Victorian melancholia was constituted as a disorder of emotion chiefly
characterised by ‘depression’, ‘mental pain’, ‘suicidal propensities’, and
‘religious delusions’. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the
diagnosis was remarkably coherent and precise; however a comparison
between published literature and asylum records illustrates the conflicts
that arise and, consequently, the negotiations that must take place when
medicine seeks to label and classify the complexities of human life.
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and the Politics of Classification
Opinion is not the same thing as evidence, of course. Yet how to read
the evidence on affective illness has proven highly contentious, while the
momentum of opinion is clear for all to see.1
Edward Shorter (2007)
The only things that one really knows about human nature is that it changes.2
Oscar Wilde (1891)
This book has sought to map the reconceptualisation of melancholia as
a modern biomedical mood disorder in nineteenth-century psycholog-
ical medicine. In the first half of the century, physicians began to draw
on experimental physiology to explain mental phenomena, creating a
language and conceptual framework with which to describe emotional
functionality. Central to this framework was the concept of psychological
reflex action, which allowed physicians to explain emotion as an invol-
untary act that was both physiological and psychological. Within this
context, melancholia was reconstituted as a disorder of emotion, a patho-
logical state that arose when the brain was subjected to repeated irritation,
over time affecting the tone of the cerebral tissue, resulting in patholog-
ical reflexive action. At this time, the nosological status of melancholia
in British literature was uncertain, as several medical writers sought to
replace it with, or subsume it under, other categories such as monomania.
Towards the end of the century, however, melancholia was one of the
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most frequently diagnosed conditions in British asylums, and the disorder
was awarded considerable attention in diagnostic literature. Moreover, the
internal biological model used to explain the disease, and the group of
symptoms used to define and diagnose it, displayed remarkable coherence
for its time.
The standardisation of melancholia in the second half of the nine-
teenth century occurred in a number of ways. First of all, the adop-
tion by medical psychologists of a psycho-physiological framework for
explaining mental disease facilitated a coherent internal model for this
modern disease concept. Secondly, the argument that mental disease did
not necessitate intellectual derangement but could be purely or largely
affective became almost universally accepted within mid-century British
medicine. Thirdly, following the creation of centralised bodies to oversee
the implementation of lunacy law and the management of asylums, and
the rapid growth of lunacy administration that followed, diagnostic and
recording practices were increasingly standardised. Despite continued
disagreement over nosology among Britain’s asylum physicians, a de facto
standardised system of classification emerged in which melancholia held
a prominent position as an independent disease category. Finally, as a
corollary of centralised lunacy administration and management, a large
body of statistics was created containing every conceivable piece of infor-
mation about Britain’s asylum population. Statistical tables from around
the country repeatedly suggested that melancholics were overwhelmingly
suicidal, contributing to a homogenous symptom picture for melancholia
in which suicidality was a defining criterion.
The story of how nineteenth-century biomedical melancholia was
created and reified illustrates some of the inherent tensions within the
psychiatric discipline, tensions that persist in the twenty-first century: on
the one hand the conflict between biological disease models and descrip-
tive nosologies, and on the other the uneasy relationship between neat
medical categories and eclectic human life. The story of melancholia
in this period constitutes only one small corner of psychiatric history,
but it offers a window into the ways in which such medical knowledge
about people is created and operates. As we saw in the final chapter,
the people who were diagnosed with melancholia did not always fit
so easily and neatly into this medical category. Rather, a multitude of
different acts and expressions were merged into single keywords such as
‘depression’, ‘mental pain’, ‘suicidal tendencies’, and ‘religious delusions’.
Victorian physicians themselves acknowledged the difficulty in labelling
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and categorising with accuracy the vast array of human emotionality with
which they met on asylum wards and in hospitals and private practices.
Nevertheless, they repeatedly emphasised the necessity of psychiatric clas-
sification, no matter how flawed any such system was. In this way, they
set the trend for psychiatric epistemology ever since.
Alternative Models of Melancholia
In 1901 psychiatrist Bernard Hollander published a lengthy article in the
Journal of Mental Science titled ‘The Cerebral Localisation of Melancho-
lia’ in which he argued that recent neurophysiological data suggested a
specific location in the brain for this emotional disorder.3 Hollander’s
theory of mind was in part based on a revised version of Franz Joseph
Gall’s early nineteenth-century phrenological system, which enjoyed a
period of popularity among the reading public, but which had been
widely discredited by scientists. A decade earlier Hollander had presented
a paper to the Royal Anthropological Institute in which he argued that
recent neurophysiological experiments, especially those conducted by
David Ferrier, provided ample support for a revised, ‘scientific’, version
of Gall’s phrenology. Drawing upon Charles Darwin’s The Expression
of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872),4 Hollander suggested a
strong link between facial expressions and emotional states. Following
from this, he held that galvanic experiments on animals eliciting various
muscular contractions in the face normally seen to correspond to specific
emotions indicated that different feeling states could be induced by
exciting different parts of the brain.5
This view was, Hollander argued, clearly supported by Ferrier’s exper-
iments in which electric currents had been applied to ‘the ascending
frontal convolution’ in monkeys, dogs, and cats ‘with the effect of
elevating the cheeks and angles of the mouth with closure of the eyes’.6
Hollander proceeded to quote a substantial section from Darwin’s Expres-
sion, suggesting that when men and animals alike are experiencing ‘high
spirits’ the corners of the mouth will inevitably and universally be drawn
upwards. This observation in conjunction with Ferrier’s physiological
experiments led him to conclude that ‘pleasurable emotions produce a
nerve current, which takes its start in this region’.7 Ferrier attended the
session and partook in the discussion that followed from Hollander’s
presentation. According to the notes from the debate, Ferrier was gener-
ally in favour of the idea of localisation of various mental functions, but
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cautioned against conjectural leaps, suggesting that while Hollander’s
thesis begged consideration, present scientific research could not support
his claims. However, Ferrier and the other attendants were in agreement
that there may certainly be a future for more detailed and exact brain
localisation of mental functions. The problem was how to proceed from
the present vantage point to sound scientific explanation. Ferrier, in
particular, suggested that while ‘scientific phrenology might one day
become possible’, the route by which one could arrive at such a system
must be staked out with care and precision.8 Hollander’s views on the
localisation of melancholia were not widely appropriated at the time,
but the attempts to locate emotion in specific parts of the brain have
continued into the present.
Towards the end of World War I, Sigmund Freud published an article
on ‘mourning and melancholia’ that offered a striking contrast to the
biomedical model of the late nineteenth century, and to Hollander’s
neo-phrenological argument for the localisation of melancholia. Freud
compared melancholia to mourning, noting that the two states of mind
broadly shared the same features, but only the former was generally
regarded as a form of illness. Mourning was for Freud a response to
‘object-loss’ and he conceptualised melancholia along the same lines, with
one significant difference—in mourning, the loss of object was clear and
the sufferer aware of it, but in melancholia the loss was unconsciously
experienced. In other words, ‘[i]n mourning it is the world which has
become poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself’.9 In this way,
Freud brought attention to what had been perceived by Victorian physi-
cians as their patients’ (incorrect) assessment of their suffering—i.e. that
it was without cause. The argument that pathological low mood could be
distinguished from ordinary sadness or grief in part due to the absence of
external cause was equally part of early-to-mid-twentieth-century descrip-
tions of clinical depression. It must be noted, however, that this criterion
was always an ambiguous one, an emotional trauma such as bereavement
were often perceived to trigger disorder. On the question of causation,
then, the boundary between ordinary and pathological sadness was never
clear. And as will be seen momentarily, it was further obscured with the
reconstitution of depressive illness as Major Depressive Disorder in the
last quarter of the twentieth century.
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From Melancholia to Depression
Where, then, does the history of melancholia end and the history of
depression begin? In the first decades of the twentieth century the use of
melancholia as a diagnostic category rapidly declined. However, whether
one writes the history of melancholia as a word, or as a concept or
concepts, no clear-cut end point exists—as we saw in the Introduction,
melancholia is inextricably linked to depression in contemporary liter-
ature, both psychiatric and historical. Moreover, the term melancholia
has continued to feature peripherally in medical language throughout
the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, and both melancholy and
melancholia appear with some regularity in the language and imagery
of popular culture, literature, and philosophy.10 However, the biomed-
ical model of melancholia that reached its apex in British psychological
medicine in the last three decades of the nineteenth century did not retain
this prominent position for long, nor did it remain aetiologically and
symptomatologically stable. With the emergence of an increasing number
of conceptual frameworks for explaining the mind, and a growing separa-
tion of asylum and outpatient psychiatry, focus began to shift. Maudsley’s
argument in favour of bringing medical attention to bear upon what
might be perceived as non-pathological emotional states came to inform
practice and theory within the psy disciplines to an ever greater extent,
particularly in the realm of psychoanalysis.
Two events at the turn of the twentieth century had significant reper-
cussions for the classification and diagnosis of low mood. The first of
these was the nosology introduced by Emil Kraepelin in 1899, in which
he divided mental disorders into dementia praecox and manic-depressive
insanity, that is, into a broadly cognitive illness and a broadly affec-
tive one. European psychiatrists had been gradually moving towards this
kind of classification for some time. As we saw in Chapter 4, Maud-
sley had divided insanity into affective and ideational in 1867. In the
early 1890s, Krafft-Ebing suggested that most forms of mental disorder
could be separated into ‘psychoneuroses’ and ‘psychic degenerations’.
The former category included melancholia and mania, which he perceived
as largely curable and with later onset, while the latter, which included
constitutional affective insanity and paranoia, often appeared earlier in life
and were more likely to become chronic. Kraepelin’s subsequent divi-
sion was, then, in part a rearticulation of existing knowledge. However,
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dementia praecox and manic-depressive insanity were classified as indi-
vidual conditions with subtypes rather than as umbrella categories. This
had important consequences for melancholia, which was largely done
away with as a stand-alone category. Its symptoms were subsumed
under manic-depressive insanity as a depressive stage, with the excep-
tion of ‘involutional melancholia’, a particular type of mood disorder that
Kraepelin saw as affecting the elderly.11
Kraepelin’s nosology proved hugely influential, both in the imme-
diate years following its initial publication, as well as for the reform of
psychiatric classification that occurred in the last quarter of the twentieth
century with the arrival of DSM -III , the third edition of the APA’s diag-
nostic manual. DSM -III , first published in 1980, has been referred to as
‘neo-Kraepelinian’.12 It endorsed a clear separation between affective and
cognitive disorders, and presented a version of depressive illness in which
many symptoms of melancholia, in particular delusions and hallucina-
tions, were marginalised. ‘Depression’ had eclipsed (rather than replaced)
melancholia as the major non-cyclical mood disorder by this point, a
development that was set into motion in the first decade of the twentieth
century. Kraepelin’s dichotomy had threatened to all but erase melan-
cholia from diagnostic literature, but the concept of a unitary depressive
disorder was retained with the shift to a new term for this type of illness:
depression.
At a 1905 meeting of the New York Neurological Society, Adolf Meyer
had suggested that melancholia was not particularly useful as a diag-
nostic category, since the name ‘implied a knowledge of something’ that
medicine ‘did not possess’. He proposed to do away with it entirely, to be
replaced by a symptomatic term that described one of the most tangible
features of this illness:
If, instead of melancholia, we applied the term depression to the whole
class, it would designate in an unassuming way exactly what was meant
by the common use of the term melancholia; and nobody would doubt
that for medical purposes the term would have to be amplified so as
to denote the kind of depression. In the large group of depressions we
would naturally distinguish our cases according to aetiology, the symptom-
complex, the course of the disease and the results…..The distinction had
best be made according to the intrinsic nature of the depression. From
that point of view we might distinguish the pronounced types from the
simple insufficiently differentiated depressions.13
7 CONCLUSION: MELANCHOLIA, DEPRESSION … 215
One must be careful not to suggest that melancholia became depres-
sion. There was no simple transition from one to the other, and the
field of emotional disorders was further confounded by a focus on the
‘war neuroses’ of WWI.14 There are many overlaps between the two
categories, but they are not, and have never been, interchangeable. Krae-
pelin’s and Meyer’s classifications of low mood were influential and
durable, and many early twentieth-century diagnostic texts incorporated
elements of both. In this way, depression became cemented as an indepen-
dent category alongside manic-depressive insanity. When the first edition
of the DSM was published in 1952, a fusion of the two systems produced
a nosology that echoed Maudsley’s 1867 division of melancholia, whereby
depression was divided into two types, a neurotic and a psychotic version.
A similar division of depression had been presented in the WHO’s Inter-
national Classification of Diseases (ICD) in 1949. In the early post-war
period, then, it was widely accepted within Anglo-American psychiatry
that two types of depressions existed: a simple or neurotic form, and
a melancholic or psychotic. DSM -III did away with this division with
the introduction of ‘Major Depressive Episode’ (later also ‘Disorder’).
Today this ubiquitous mood disorder reigns supreme, but melancholia
or melancholic depression has continued to exist alongside, and in an
increasingly uneasy relationship with, the now more mainstream depres-
sive illness favoured by the major diagnostic manuals. Standard depression
is defined as low mood, loss of interest or pleasure, fatigue, bodily retarda-
tion, guilt or feelings of worthlessness, insomnia or hypersomnia, changes
to appetite and body weight, and suicidality (symptoms must be present
for at least two weeks). The most marked difference between depression
so defined and melancholia is the absence of psychotic symptoms in the
former. Since the arrival of DSM -III , these are retained only for a minor
subtype, depression ‘with melancholic features’.
This way of classifying low mood, which was maintained in the fifth
(2013) edition of the DSM , has been subject to much critique both from
within and outside the field of psychiatry.15 One major criticism is that the
category Major Depressive Disorder is too broad, and that its criteria blurs
the boundary between normal and pathological low mood. The DSM -
III task force did away with a previous ‘bereavement exclusion’ qualifier,
meaning that depression was no longer distinguished from ordinary low
mood by the absence of cause. Moreover, the period for which symptoms
had to manifest for a diagnosis was shortened from one month to two
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weeks. These decisions led critics to argue that the category depression
has been expanded to the point of becoming largely useless.16
The second criticism of Major Depressive Disorder concerns the deci-
sion of the APA to endorse a single unitary depression instead of the two
types referred to above. Edward Shorter argues that this was not a deci-
sion based on scientific evidence. Rather, he suggests, the DSM -III task
force had originally intended to include a ‘minor’ and ‘major’ depression
in the new manual, but felt under pressure to drop the former as ‘insur-
ance companies would never pay for anything “minor”’.17 As discussed
in the Introduction, advocates of the two depressions model continue
to argue for the reinstatement in diagnostic literature of a second, more
severe form of psychotic or melancholic depression, which is defined both
in terms of mental and physical symptoms and specific biological markers.
Shorter and colleagues argue that the key to such a definition of melan-
cholia—one that is both clinically and biologically reliable—lies with
a combination of symptomatological descriptions (a statistically based
system) and measurable biological markers (a physiological foundation).
Shorter has contributed a historical perspective as one of the key building
blocks of the case for the resurrection of melancholia. His narrative is one
in which ‘biological psychiatry’ was founded in the nineteenth century
and has continued to develop along a progressive (albeit bumpy) path ever
since.18 In 2007, the year after the Copenhagen conference discussed in
the Introduction, Shorter published a book together with Conrad Swartz
on ‘psychotic depression’, which presented a more detailed version of the
argument for an endocrine-based definition of melancholia. The marginal-
isation of endocrinal research in psychiatry, they argue, has occurred to
the detriment of this branch of medical science, as it holds the key to a
greater understanding of mental disorders.19 Shorter and colleagues are
far from alone in the desire to—finally—make psychiatry truly biological.
When work on the fifth edition of the DSM was still ongoing, the head
of the US National Institute for Mental Health argued that such a recon-
stitution of psychiatric classification is essential because ‘[p]atients with
mental disorders deserve better’.20 This line of argument is significant;
a system of classification that recognises the biological (neurological,
genetic, endocrinal) basis of mental disorders is in the best interest of the
people who are perceived to be suffering from such conditions.
However, advocates for the ‘resurrection’ of melancholia as a distinct
mood disorder with biological markers also point to historical evidence
in making their argument, suggesting that melancholia is a universal,
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timeless condition that has always existed. The temptation to draw on
history to legitimise current psychiatric knowledge is obvious, but it is
both unhelpful and unnecessary. The question is not so much whether or
not we can plausibly diagnose people in the past with current conditions
and vice versa, but rather, whether we should. What is gained by doing
so? Does it serve its intended purpose, that is, if we can show that people
have suffered from the same illness throughout history, does this affirm
that the condition is real? It is difficult to see how it does. Historical
records tell us nothing about the experience, psychopathology, or biolog-
ical reality of people in the present. The current empirical data that forms
the basis of arguments for a distinct melancholic depression is convincing,
and if the APA and the WHO agreed to formally recognise melancholia
as presently described, this could potentially benefit people suffering from
severe low mood with psychotic and pronounced bodily symptoms, in
terms of swifter access to more appropriate treatment. One might argue,
then, that there is an urgent need to formally accept the validity of a
melancholic depression as a distinct diagnosis. But it does not follow that
this is done by demonstrating universality across time. The idea that this is
a possible and plausible approach to scientific knowledge echoes a Baco-
nian perception of ‘nature’ as something that human beings can observe,
intervene with, and learn from, and about which universal truths can be
demonstrated. But this idea of nature is itself historically specific. And
moreover, the scientific method cannot be applied to long-dead historical
subjects whom we believe to have suffered from melancholia, nor to the
documents they have left behind.
Current medico-scientific knowledge about melancholia does not gain
its validity and legitimacy from its presumed timelessness and universality.
Rather, if it is a valid and legitimate diagnosis reflecting the experience of
living subjects in the present, it is precisely because it is real right now.
Projecting it onto past and long gone individuals who are only names on
papers does not help to make it more ‘true’ in the present. What it does,
however, is threaten to demote history from its place as a rich, construc-
tive, and critical human science, a science that offers a different kind of
insight, by showing how things change, and how knowledge is produced,
instead reducing it to a one-dimensional discipline, the main task of which
is to lend legitimacy to current knowledge within the natural sciences.
When it comes to medical knowledge about the emotional life of humans,
we might do better to distinguish the past from the present. Much can
learnt about each from the other, but there is little to be gained from
218 Å. JANSSON
attempting to equate the two. This does not diminish current knowledge
about melancholic depression. What we know today is not any less valu-
able or helpful because it applies only to the present and not the past.
When it comes to treating people, to alleviating severe and debilitating
low mood, it is our actions in the present and the future that matter. This
is the real value of medical knowledge—what we can do with it right now.
The real value of history is not as a legitimising tool for such knowl-
edge, rather it is to show how present knowledge (medical or any other)
was created, and in this way help us gain a broader, deeper, and richer
understanding of the human condition. This should not be taken as
a rejection of biological claims about human beings. The aim here is
not to replace scientific conceptions of self, of mind and emotions, with
historical ones. The division between the human and the natural sciences
is equally historically constituted21; these different ‘sciences’ represent
different ways of knowing ourselves and our world, a multitude of ‘partial
perspectives’.22 Rather than foregrounding one as the source of truth, a
more hopeful approach would be to consider the wealth of knowledge
at our disposal when we are able to allow for multiple epistemologies.
The antagonistic relationship often perceived between the natural sciences
and the humanities is both unnecessary and unhelpful. What we might
better strive for is an ‘affirmative relationship’ between these spheres, a
relationship that, in the words of Nikolas Rose
seeks to identify and work with those arguments that recognize, in what-
ever small way, the need for a new and non-reductionist biology of
human beings and other organisms in their milieu, and which can thus
be brought into conversation with the evidence, concepts and forms of
analysis developed in the social and human sciences.23
The Politics of Pathological Emotionality
There are further reasons for promoting a more flexible, multidisci-
plinary, and multifaceted view of what it means to be human and of
our emotional life. Medical approaches to low mood have undergone
a number of significant shifts over the last two hundred years, one of
which has been the focus of this book. Another was the rise of social
models of depression in the mid-twentieth century,24 which emerged in
the context of the construction of the post-war Keynesian welfare state.
In contrast to this, twenty-first-century biological approaches to emotion
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and its disorders can be seen as closely wedded to a neoliberal worldview.
The link between socio-economic inequality and psychological distress
such as depressed mood is widely acknowledged,25 yet the dominant
treatment for depression relies on the perception of pathological low
mood as an individual problem of neurochemistry and emotional dysreg-
ulation. Clinical guidelines favour functional and cost-effective and/or
profitable treatment approaches geared towards getting people back to
work, specifically Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) and antidepres-
sant medication.26 Much has been written on the relationship between
contemporary models of depression and the rise of antidepressants on the
one hand, and neoliberal capitalism on the other.27 The central aim of
CBT and its sister therapy Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT), emotion
regulation, must equally be understood within the context of political
economy.28
The pre-twentieth-century origins of emotion regulation have received
scant attention by historians. As this book has shown, in the Victorian
period a belief that most forms of insanity commenced with emotional
disturbance was widely held among British physicians. Related to this
was the view that many lunatics could not be held responsible for their
actions.29 The disordered emotions of the insane and the acts resulting
from these (such as suicide) were not to be morally condemned, but
biologically explicated and medically treated. Yet at the same time, physi-
cians such as Henry Maudsley held that the development of pathological
emotionality could be prevented through conscious individual effort.
Persistent practice to monitor and master one’s emotions would over time
result in the formation of a healthy mind and moral conduct.30 The idea
that insanity could be prevented and that the development of a healthy
mind was an individual duty was underpinned by a cultural framework
where self-help and individual responsibility were celebrated virtues, and
where ‘freewill’ was a powerful philosophical and political concept.31
This cultural framework has seen a resurgence in the age of neolib-
eralism.32 The efficacy of the neoliberal programme is in part resulting
from the ability of its proponents to successfully promote it as a non-
ideological, rational, ‘common sense’ approach to economics and the
organisation of society.33 Over the last four decades, the core principles
of neoliberalism have come to permeate every facet of human existence.
Rose explains the subtle and effective ways in which what he refers to as
‘advanced liberalism’ has become an integral part of contemporary life,
creating a society in which ‘the regulation of public conduct’ is closely
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linked to and underpinned by ‘the subjective emotional and intellectual
capacities and techniques of individuals, and the ethical regimes through
which they govern their lives’.34 Psychiatric and psychological strategies
aimed at regulating pathological emotion and behaviour are one such
ethical regime. In Britain today, the programme of individual self-help
promoted by cognitive behavioural strategies is situated within a Conser-
vative approach to welfare that measures an individual’s health or illness
in terms of their ability to perform productive work.35 Both CBT and
DBT are seen as functional and cost-effective strategies,36 and a key goal
of these at present is to return the individual to active society—and to
paid labour—by treating the symptoms of mental distress in isolation
from their wider social causes. Meanwhile, illustrating the paradoxes of
the present system, government policies aimed at incentivising people to
return to work have been shown to be a major cause of psychological
distress, at times so profound it causes individuals to take their own
lives.37
How are we to make sense of and address depression and melan-
cholia in this context? In the first instance, the presently dominant way
of classifying low mood sits well within the current economic framework.
Major Depressive Disorder, as currently defined, constitutes a collection
of symptoms that are perceived to respond well to standard antidepressant
medication and CBT. Melancholic depression, which is seen as requiring
different and more comprehensive psychiatric care and treatment, fits less
comfortably in this context. This brings us to the problem of ‘correct’
classification in psychiatry, which has been a central theme of this book.
As the present story illustrates, there is nothing natural or inevitable about
how psychiatry defines, labels, and classifies human emotionality. Many of
the decisions made about the classification of melancholia in the nine-
teenth century were the result of administrative concerns and the need
to make diagnostic practices more efficient in the context of expanding
asylum populations and limited resources. Similarly, the decision by the
DSM -III task force to do away with a more severe, melancholic depres-
sion was at least in part motivated by financial concerns. It is perhaps
unavoidable that nosological decisions will be driven not only by a desire
for correct diagnosis and suitable treatment, but also by various polit-
ical factors. There is no conclusive evidence regarding the former, and
the latter includes many powerful forces, such as insurance providers and
pharmaceutical companies.
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While persistent conflicts and disagreement over how to classify mental
disorders have plagued the psychiatric profession since its infancy, there
has nevertheless been overwhelming support for the argument that clas-
sification is necessary. Critique of the usefulness and benevolence of
classification is, however, growing, both from within and outside the
psy disciplines. It has been suggested that the ‘poor validity’ of psychi-
atric diagnostics and the expansion of diagnostic categories to include an
increasingly wide range of human behaviour cause more harm than good
to the people whom psychiatry is meant to help, and that the current
system of classifying psychological distress as specific mental disorders
would be better replaced with an ‘operational definition of different expe-
riences and phenomena’ without denoting clusters of these as specific
disorders.38 Callard and Bracken have highlighted some of the ways in
which psychiatric labelling can be harmful. These include ‘diagnostic over-
shadowing’, whereby an existing psychiatric diagnosis can lead to the
patient’s physical symptoms being automatically attributed to that diag-
nosis, precluding a full medical investigation of those symptoms, as well
as the long-term institutionalisation that can result from some types of
psychiatric diagnoses. They conclude that diagnosis in psychiatry on the
whole does more harm than good, and that ‘the [mental health] interven-
tions that have arguably empowered people the most, such as innovative
community services, have not been diagnosis specific’.39 Cooke and
Kinderman have furthermore drawn attention to the problem of stigma-
tisation. Their critique centres on the schizophrenia diagnosis and the
stigma attached to this psychiatric label, which in their view renders an
already vulnerable group of people even more so. Adding to this are the
‘feelings of hopelessness’ that can result from being diagnosed with what
is largely seen as a ‘chronic’ mental illness.40
The latter concern speaks to the complex and sometimes harmful
relationship between psychiatric diagnosis and identity. Arguments for
parity between physical and mental health often turn to current biological
models of psychiatric illness to suggest that these two areas of pathology
should be treated the same because they are the same—in this way,
depression is no different from cancer or a broken leg. However, parity
does not have to be based in sameness. On the contrary, such argu-
ments are potentially harmful. In the first instance, psychiatric illness
concerns the part of us that is most central to our personhood—the
mind. While we continue to debate social and biological causes of mental
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distress, the ways in which such distress manifests are primarily (but not
only) psychological and consequently also relational and identity-based,
in ways that a broken leg is not. Attempts to frame mental disorders in
strictly biological terms carry the risk of imprinting human beings in all
their complexity with simplistic, reductionist biological stamps, which can
potentially have a self-perpetuating effect. Secondly, as people internalise
their diagnoses, this can feed back into, and reinforce, psychiatric labels
(what Ian Hacking called ‘looping effects’41). And finally, following from
this, attempts to destigmatise ‘mental illness’ by framing psychiatric condi-
tions as chiefly biological and to be equated with other medical conditions
can lead people to feel ‘less optimistic about their ability to get better’
and increase public ‘perceptions of dangerousness and unpredictability’
of such disorders.42
At the same time, we must be careful not to simply reject existing
diagnoses as not ‘real’ or ‘true’. If depression exists in psychiatric liter-
ature as a mental illness, if people are diagnosed with this condition,
and if they consequently experience themselves as ‘having depression’
or ‘being depressed’, then depression is inevitably a real thing. More-
over, framing one’s suffering in medico-scientific terms is undoubtedly
helpful for many people, especially in terms of alleviating feelings of
guilt, shame, and personal responsibility. A more helpful and nuanced
approach then, as we think about the future of psychological distress and
psychiatric diagnostics, is to accept and validate both the concept and
experience of ‘depression’ or ‘melancholia’ and other diagnoses as legiti-
mate medical conditions, while at the same time allowing equal space for
other explanations for and ways of naming difficult psychological expe-
riences. And finally, it is imperative that we continue to argue forcefully
for a comprehensive and multifaceted model of psychological distress that
places human suffering in the context of material reality. A strict framing
of severe and debilitating low mood as an internal problem, with the
pathology located solely in the individual, marginalises critical approaches
to the social and economic causes of emotional distress, and excludes
political solutions to a problem that is increasingly shown to at least in
part be the product of ideological decisions.
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Conclusion
This book has mapped the reconstitution of melancholia as a modern
biomedical mental disease in Victorian psychological medicine. It has tried
to show how this medical category was created and reified through a
combination of ideas and practices, which were specific to their temporal
and cultural context. At the same time, however, many of the concepts
that emerged through the creation of biomedical melancholia continue
to inform current perceptions of emotion as a biological event that
is subject to pathologisation. There are undoubtedly many similarities
between nineteenth-century melancholia and our time’s depression, as
well as between these two conditions and earlier forms of melancholy
and melancholia. But similarities across time should not be mistaken
for inevitability. One must be careful to avoid falling into teleological
traps when approaching historical events. When stories of people in the
past appear familiar to the twenty-first-century reader, such familiarity
is at least partly read into past accounts by those who are doing the
reading. History is made now, in the present. By arguing for universality
of human experiences based on current knowledge frameworks, the possi-
bility for different accounts not just of the past but also of the present
and the future are potentially foreclosed. As this book has aimed to show,
the idea of pathological emotionality, of ‘mood disorders’, is historically
specific. It was once created, made—which consequently implies that it
can be unmade. This is where history becomes more than storytelling or
academic pursuit. It shows that things can change, including the possibil-
ities and limits of human experience. History, then, holds the promise of
hope, of a future different from both the present and the past.
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